UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. 18-cr-00192-JL-1

December 7, 2020

IMRAN ALRAI 9:10 a.m.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

TRANSCRIPT OF EVIDENTIARY HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOSEPH N. LAPLANTE

APPEARANCES:

For the Government: Cam T. Le, AUSA

John S. Davis, AUSA Matthew Hunter, AUSA

For the Defense: Donna J. Brown, Esquire

Michael Gregory Eaton, Esquire

Court Reporter: Molly K. Belshaw, LCR, RPR

Duffy & McKenna Court Reporters 1 New Hampshire Avenue #125 Portsmouth, New Hampshire 03801

(800) 600-1000

Also Present: Jason Sgro

Robin Ephraimson

Imran Alrai

Nayha Arora, Esquire

1					
1	INDEX OF EXAMINATION				
2					
3	WITNESS: JOHN COMMISSO	Page			
4	DIRECT EXAMINATION				
5	By Ms. Brown	4			
6	CROSS-EXAMINATION				
7	By Mr. Davis	34			
8	REDIRECT EXAMINATION				
9	By Ms. Brown	66			
10	RECROSS-EXAMINATION				
11	By Mr. Hunter	101			
12	REDIRECT EXAMINATION				
13	By Ms. Brown	114			
14	CLOSING STATEMENT				
15	By Ms. Brown	151			
16	By Mr. Hunter	198			
17					
18					
19					
20					
21					
22					
23					
24					
25					

1	=	INDEX TO PRE-MARKED EXHIBITS	
2	DEFENDANT'S	DESCRIPTION	PAGE
3	EXHIBIT		
4	A	November 21, 2019 Letter to	
5		AUSA Davis	14
6	Gg	Emails re: updated presentation	62
7			
8			
9			
10			
11			
12			
13			
14			
15			
16			
17			
18			
19			
20			
21			
22			
23			
24			
25			

PROCEEDINGS 1 The Court has before it for 2 THE CLERK: consideration this morning day three of an 3 evidentiary motion hearing in criminal case 4 18-cr-192-JL, United States of America versus 5 Imran Alrai. 6 7 Morning, Judge. 8 THE COURT: Morning, everyone. 9 apologize. I'm struggling to kind of master 10 all of the tech that goes on around here to 11 keep us going when the staff is remote or where And between the stuff we use to 12 we're remote. 13 communicate with each other and just the 14 regular email, I find myself groping blindly. 15 So I'm sorry to make you wait so long. Anyway, 16 let's get back underway. 17 I know we're still with Mr. Commisso, so 18 let's continue. 19 MS. BROWN: Thank you, Your Honor. 20 21 DIRECT EXAMINATION 22 BY MS. BROWN: 23 0. Good morning, Mr. Commisso. 24 Good morning. Α. 25 We finished questioning -- I think it was Q.

1 Thursday afternoon; correct? 2 Α. Yes. 3 Between now and then, have you talked to anyone Q. 4 about your testimony in this matter on Thursday? 5 So, yes, conversations with some family members 6 Α. briefly just to let them know that I had 7 8 testified for the first time in a case. 9 spoke with my client just to let him know that 10 we had the hearing and that it was continuing. 11 I spoke with John Meyer because we needed to 12 figure out the schedule and his availability. 13 I did not speak about the substance of my testimony with John Meyer, but I needed to deal 14 15 with scheduling issues. 16 And I spoke with Mr. Davis for the same 17 reason, which was to talk about the scheduling of John Meyer's testimony. But we did not 18 discuss the substance of my testimony. 19 20 That's your complete -- nothing else? Q. 21 Α. Right. 22 And along the same vein, after you testified on 0.

Thursday, did you go back and review any

Yes, I looked at several things since last

documents related to this case?

23

24

25

Α.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

HEARING 6

Thursday. Is that because some of the questions made you Q. think you had to go back and review them to refresh your memory? Well, I guess partly, yes; and partly (audio Α. interference) -- so I wanted to be fresh again this morning, as I felt like I was fresh last Thursday. THE COURT REPORTER: This is the court reporter. Your answer was somewhat garbled. Will you please try to reconstruct your answer? THE WITNESS: It is a problem with my audio connection? THE COURT REPORTER: It is for me. THE COURT: A little bit. You said "partly yes and partly no" to the question, and then you were explaining. THE WITNESS: Right.

So this was reviewing documents. I had reviewed the documents before Thursday's hearing, and I felt like I was fresh on Thursday for testimony. And so since then, I've reviewed several documents so that I would feel fresh and have the information fresh in my

1 mind for this morning's testimony.

- Q. (By Ms. Brown) I want to take you now back to June of 2018. Specifically, the day that Mr. Alrai physically left the employment of the United Way.
 - I remember at trial there was a term that was used, "offboarding"; is that a term you use, or somebody else might have used that at trial?
- 10 A. Well, I didn't testify at trial --
- 11 | Q. Obviously, but I just --

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

21

22

23

24

25

- 12 A. I'm familiar with it in the employment law context.
- 14 Q. But you know what day I'm talking about?
- 15 A. Well, June 12 was the day that I interviewed him and he was placed on leave.
- Q. And that, as far as you know, was the last time he was ever physically at the United Way offices; correct?
- 20 A. Yes. That's correct, as far as I know.
 - Q. And the June 12 date that you just spoke about -- that was also the date that both you and Mr. Mulvaney, the Mr. Mulvaney we spoke about on Thursday -- that was the day that both of you interviewed Mr. Alrai; correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. And when you set that meeting up, you had that date in mind. It wasn't sort of a spontaneous thing.

You had coordinated that was the day that you were going to show up at United Way and interview him with Mr. Mulvaney; correct?

- A. We had planned that that was going to be the day of the interview, yes.
- Q. And just to go back a little bit.

We spoke on Thursday that prior to that date, meaning June 12, you had already spoken to the U.S. Attorney's Office at least once; right?

- A. At least twice, I quess, yes.
- Q. And so one of those, as we discussed -- I'm not going to go into it -- was a meeting about the allegations of fraud against Mr. Alrai.

And there were other contacts regarding a grand jury subpoena on June 4; right?

A. Yes. And I think the first meeting may have been the one where Rich Vossio and I, together, met with Mr. Davis and one or two agents, and really began the discussion of what we internally had been investigating.

THE COURT: Let me just say this.

I think we are going to have a little bit of a struggle today with the court reporter and Mr. Commisso's audio. I don't know if it's your mic or what's going on, John.

You're probably not in the office; right?

THE WITNESS: No, I'm at home. It usually works well, but it's broken up. What I can do is plug in a headset and see if that works -- if that helps. So just give me one minute to get the headset.

THE COURT REPORTER: Thank you.

THE COURT: I'm definitely following, by the way. I'm hearing it all. It's just that it's -- I know the reporter's got to be typing all day...

THE WITNESS: I have two children who are doing their school from home, so they're taking up the bandwidth right now. But maybe the headset will help, if you'll just bear with me.

THE COURT: How could you let trivialities like that interfere with what we're doing here?

THE WITNESS: Can you hear me through the headset?

THE COURT: About the same so far. Let's

1 see how it goes. 2 Could you hear me? Can you hear us, 3 Mr. Commisso? 4 THE WITNESS: I can hear you clear. THE COURT: It's about the same for now. 5 Let's just see how it goes. 6 7 THE COURT REPORTER: And do me a favor. 8 There was a name mentioned in your last 9 answer and I didn't get the gentleman's name. 10 Well, the gentleman I THE WITNESS: referred to -- his name is Richard Vossio. 11 12 If I recall, you were 0. (By Ms. Brown) 13 describing a May meeting that involved 14 Mr. Vossio, Attorney Davis, and yourself. Ι 15 think -- did I capture -- it was some FBI 16 agents, you said, were in that May meeting? 17 Yeah, at least one agent, maybe two. Α. And that would have been in June. 18 There were no face-to-face meetings in May --19 20 Thank you for clarifying that. Q. 21 -- that I recall. Α. 22 And if we are focusing on June 12 as the day 0. 23 that you interviewed Mr. Alrai, that meeting or 24 meetings that you discussed happened before 25 that date?

A. Yes. There's an FBI 302 report that will give you the date when the meeting with Mr. Davis and Mr. Vossio took place.

Q. And I'm not that interested in questioning you about that right now. I just want to set it in a context of what happened before the June 12th, so that's really where I'm going with that.

So back to June 12. You already said you had set up this meeting for you and Mr. Mulvaney to meet with Mr. Alrai.

Had you coordinated that meeting with

either the U.S. Attorney's Office or the FBI?

A. I would not say that we coordinated it. I would say that we had discussions before the meeting on June 12 with -- certainly, with Mr. Davis. I don't recall speaking to anyone other than Mr. Davis. We discussed a lot of

share information with him, I shared

information with him.

issues.

My memory is he shared very little information with me because there are rules and laws that I believe prohibited him from sharing information with me. So I would not say that

And to the extent that I was able to

HEARING 12

we coordinated, but we communicated about a lot of things before June 12.

Q. Well, I guess when I was using the word

"coordinated," it's my understanding when

Mr. Alrai physically left the building of the

United Way, he was greeted by at least one, if

not more, FBI agents. So they would have had

to have known he was going to be there that

day, speaking with you, to greet him.

So that's more what I meant by "coordinated"; not necessarily discussions, but the fact that the FBI would be there that day.

A. So Mr. Alrai, in a typical workday or workweek
 -- he was only physically present in Boston on
 Tuesdays and Thursdays. And let me just pause.

If the audio is really bad, I can also call in from my cell phone, and we might have a much better connection if I was speaking through my cell phone.

THE COURT REPORTER: I would not try to dissuade you from doing that if you think it will be better. This is the court reporter.

THE WITNESS: So do you want to pause right here and have me dial in through my cell phone?

1 THE COURT: Yeah. 2 Charli, that works; right? 3 THE CLERK: It does. The only caveat is you should just mute your video so that there's 4 no echo. 5 Yes. So if we can just take 6 THE WITNESS: 7 a three-minute pause here, and I'm going to do 8 some technical work on my end, so bear with me. 9 (Recess taken at 9:29 a.m., and the 10 proceedings resumed at 9:35 a.m.) 11 My point was -- in the 0. (By Ms. Brown) 12 questioning we just had was that you had 13 communicated with law enforcement, be it FBI or 14 U.S. Attorney, about this meeting on the 12th? 15 I communicated with them. We had -- we Α. 16 were planning a meeting on the 12th. 17 provided information to law enforcement before 18 we had that meeting, yes. 19 Q. I'm going to move on to another topic, and we 20 discussed this a little bit on Thursday. And 21 that was the letter that you wrote that is now 22 Exhibit A -- was attached to the Government's 23 motion, which is document 50. 24 You know which letter I'm talking about? 25 Α. Yes.

(Pre-marked Defendant's Exhibit A introduced.)

Q. (By Ms. Brown) And I specifically asked you about a section of that letter where you talked about trying to get additional -- produce additional documents from e-discovery regarding documents that RSM had either reviewed or assessed. And that's on page 5 of document 50-1-2.

Do you remember me asking you some questions about that?

A. Yes.

- Q. And the one question I neglected to ask you about that was that either before or after you wrote that letter, did you communicate to RSM that you were looking for documents that they had reviewed or assessed? Or did you do that search on your own without communicating with RSM?
- A. I just want to make sure I understand the question.
- Q. Okay. It's a long question. I can rephrase it, if you like.
- A. Sure. Go ahead, and I'll try my best to answer it if I understand the question.

HEARING 15

Q. Yeah. So it's probably a good start -- so this letter is dated November 21, 2019, document 50-1-2.

And as I said, you had stated in that letter -- and I'll just read that sentence -- "Nevertheless, UWMB is currently working to produce any documents from e-discovery database which RSM reviewed and/or assessed, and which were not previously produced."

So my question about that I didn't ask was, did you go on to search for those documents? Or did you communicate what you had put in that letter to RSM to ask them to look for documents that you had described? Or did you do both?

A. So let me answer this way, and hopefully it'll answer your question.

We had a request from Mr. Harrington. I think we had two requests from Tim Harrington. And I think by this point, we actually may have had the motion to exclude Naviloff's testimony. And, I believe, the final pretrial conference may have been on November 15. Oh. It's right here on the first page of the letter.

"Final pretrial conference on

HEARING 16

November 15." There were lots of things that happened from July to November 21 that were all -- that were about, in part,

Tim Harrington's request for documents. And so my focus through this entire process was to understand what he was requesting and understand what may need to be produced, to understand what could be produced in a reasonable fashion without too much time, delay, or burden. And, most importantly, as the representative of United Way, what did I have access to or control over?

So my focus always was, are there United
Way documents that we haven't produced, that
Tim Harrington may be looking for, and what
could we do to produce them? If we're not
going to produce them, why -- I guess is how I
was thinking. So during those months from July
to November, from Tim's -- July is when
Naviloff was retained by the Government.

Mr. Harrington started making discovery requests. He made some in, I think, July, August, September, and October. He filed a motion to exclude Naviloff's testimony. Judge held a final pretrial conference. And during

HEARING 17

all that time I was focused on what are they looking for from me with respect to United Way documents?

And while I was focused on that, I was talking with RSM about documents that they may have, and I was talking with the Government to understand what the Government may be looking for in response to things from us. But the Government didn't have the documents.

So, now, I'm not sure I answered your question, but I tried to give you context so we can hopefully get to the answer to your question.

Q. And I think you did not answer my question, so I'm going to repeat it. And just to be clear, all I'm trying to find out here is -- you made this representation in this letter that was attached to a motion.

What did you do -- not the reason you did it -- what I'm looking for is what you did towards finding those documents that you said that you were working to produce -- documents. So what I don't understand from that sentence is whether working to produce documents from e-discovery means that all that happened from

HEARING 18

that representation is you went and looked at the e-discovery available to you, or did you pass along that effort to RSM and ask them --

Say, "Hey, can you send me documents that you reviewed or assessed that had not previously been produced?" So that's all I'm trying to find out -- what actions you took towards that representation.

A. So one piece of it is described in detail in the letter, which was we had an e-discovery database. We had produced a whole lot of documents already.

And what I described in the letter was an effort to find out are there any documents in that e-discovery database that anyone at RSM had accessed in any way? And, if so, if they haven't been produced, let's produce them.

So if you just draw a box around the e-discovery database, any document in that database that any member of the RSM team touched in any way -- accessed -- they didn't have to study it, but they had to click on it and they had to access it in some way -- all of those documents were produced as a result of the work that was done that is described in

So that's one piece of it. 1 that letter. And I just want to clarify the term "we," 2 Q. 3 because that can be confusing. THE COURT: Which letter now? What's the 4 date on that letter? 5 November 21, I believe. 6 MS. BROWN: 7 THE WITNESS: It's marked as Exhibit A. 8 THE COURT: Okay. That one. Yeah. 9 (By Ms. Brown) So you used the term "we" in Q. 10 referring to access to the e-discovery. 11 By "we," do you mean you, or you and RSM? 12 Α. I mean me. 13 When I'm talking about contacting Kroll, the vendor, and saying "how can we find all the 14 15 documents that anyone at RSM may have touched?" 16 That's me. I'm the one calling Kroll and 17 emailing Kroll. RSM was not involved in that 18 process at all. It was my e-discovery 19 database, for lack of a better term. I mean, 20 it was United Way's database. I was the 21 e-discovery expert or supervisor, for lack of a 22 better term. 23 So I'm in a relationship with Kroll. 24 They're my vendor. So I communicate with Kroll 25 about the nuts and bolts of how do we find

1 these documents and produce them? 2 THE COURT: We're really having trouble 3 with the audio now. I have a suggestion. 4 THE CLERK: be easier if you leave the meeting and then 5 rejoin, just so that you have established a new 6 7 connection. It's pretty garbled. 8 THE COURT: You want him to basically --9 THE CLERK: Leave the meeting and then 10 just rejoin. 11 THE COURT: I guess give it a try, John. 12 Try to just terminate and rejoin. 13 I'm going to do that, and I THE WITNESS: 14 will be back in a minute. 15 (Recess taken at 9:44 a.m., and the 16 proceedings resumed at 9:47 a.m.) 17 THE COURT: Okay. 18 THE WITNESS: I am back. 19 THE CLERK: Welcome back. THE COURT: You can pose your question, 20 21 Counsel. 22 (By Ms. Brown) I think if I clarify what I'm 0. 23 trying to get at, it might make the answers a 24 little shorter. 25 What I'm trying to understand from these

HEARING 21

emails that we've been reading -- it sounds like RSM has their own internal access to data, and that you have this e-discovery file that's managed by Kroll.

And what I don't understand -- are they the same thing? Do you have more? Do they have less? So that's what I'm not understanding of -- so here's the issue. You said you looked in the e-discovery to see if they accessed it.

Did they have their own copy of that that they could have accessed without you knowing about it? I guess that's where I'm going.

A. So a few things. No, they did not have their own copy of the e-discovery database. They did have the ability to access the e-discovery database, but not at this point in time that we're talking about.

At the time we got close to trial, that e-discovery database had been taken offline and nobody had access to it. I had United Way documents that were not in the e-discovery database that I had access to. And I assume and believe that RSM had their own documents in some sort of document management and document

HEARING 22

storage system, so I guess their own ability to do their own searches or to make whatever efforts they needed to do or felt they needed to do to respond to the Government's requests.

Does that clarify? There are documents in different places, and different people have different levels of control over those documents.

- Q. And that's what I was trying to ascertain. So, thank you. That does give a little bit of clarity.
- A. Is the quality of the connection any better?

 THE COURT: No.

MS. BROWN: It's not great, but it's a little better. I think there's kind of a tinny quality.

Q. (By Ms. Brown) I just want to clarify this point, which is when you put in the letter that's Exhibit A that you were looking to produce documents that RSM reviewed or assessed, part of that effort --

It doesn't sound like you sent an email or made a phone call to RSM saying, "Hey, can you make sure that I have everything you reviewed or assessed?" Sounds like you didn't do that;

right?

A. Well, no, I didn't, because my focus was on
United Way's documents. And I had control over
United Way's documents, even if RSM may have
had similar documents that they received from
United Way.

So, for example, the e-discovery database is one example. I had control over United Way's documents in the e-discovery database. I didn't need to talk to RSM to understand what should be produced from that database.

In addition, if RSM asked for documents from somebody -- just as an example, from the accounting department, from somebody like Domenic Pallaria, who was the controller -- if RSM wanted a copy of a document, a spreadsheet, a report, a bank statement -- those documents would come to me so that I could then provide them to RSM; but also so that I could have a document collection and management system so that I would know what I had sent to RSM, and then I knew that I also needed to send it to the Government.

So I think I'm answering your question, because I don't need to talk to RSM about what

documents they have. Because it's the United Way's documents, I was confident that I already had control of those documents.

- Q. So I think that was a longer way of saying that my assumption was correct, which is you didn't, either by email or phone call, contact RSM to make sure that they had not assessed or reviewed something that had not already been produced?
- A. Well, I think -- let me explain.

So in addition to everything else I've discussed, we did have phone calls. And, in fact, there are emails that show the series of folders and names of folders. And I think we may have talked about it last time how they shared some of that information with me. And then we had phone calls.

And so the purpose of that -- so in addition to me feeling confident that I knew what RSM had from the United Way, we went above and beyond. We went many steps further, because I had calls and emails with Christopher Fitzgerald and Greg Naviloff where they sent me these names of folders and described for me the types of documents they

had collected.

And we went through them and discussed them. And I was able to say for some large number of those documents -- maybe all of them, I don't remember.

I was able to say "that folder right there that contains all the reports that

Domenic Pallaria generated from the accounting department -- I've already produced that. I have that exact same folder with those exact same documents. You got these from me."

So we went through a process like that where together, we tried to figure out "what do I have for the United Way; and what do they have?" And when I say "what do they have" -- if they were RSM documents, that was not my responsibility to produce. My responsibility only was to weigh in as to the possibility of attorney-client privilege.

Q. Well, because you had a reviewing status as to the posttrial discovery production as it related to United Way, you're familiar that one of the things that was produced after trial was a network scan with multiple tabs on it; correct?

A. Yes.

- Q. And you would also agree with me that while maybe one or two of those tabs might have been produced pretrial, that entire network scan that was produced after trial was not produced pretrial?
- A. I don't know all the details, but what you just described is what I understand. But I'm not familiar with all the details of that schedule compared to other schedules.
- Q. Well, I guess what I'm trying to understand is how that happened that only part of the network scan was produced pretrial, and then afterwards, we find that there are -- there was more to the file than had been produced pretrial.

So were you part of that, or are you saying you don't understand how that happened?

A. Well, I can tell you what I was part of and what I understand.

Mr. Harrington made a request.

And I don't know if he specifically said "network scan," but something like that. And so we went -- we took an effort to find anything that we could produce that was a

HEARING 27

network scan. And from my perspective, the effort was, if we have anything like this, let's find it and let's produce it. He specifically asked for it, and we wanted him to have it. That's the approach that we took.

And I think he may have asked for it more than once. So my state of mind was, it seems like this exists. Let's find it and produce it. So what did I do? I talked to the people who might have it. So I spoke with John Meyer. I probably emailed him as well.

And I said, "Do we have something called a network scan?" And I got a response from John Meyer.

And I believe he sent me a document that's called a "network scan" or something similar.

And we produced it -- one version of that before trial, that I believe came from John Meyer.

Similarly, I communicated with RSM and said, "Tim Harrington is looking for something called a network scan. Do we have it? Let's find it and let's produce it."

THE COURT: Audio is not happening.

Mr. Commisso, let me ask you a question.

HEARING 28

Are you in a position to go to your office and do this? Or are you too far away?

THE WITNESS: I'm too far away. I'm trying to think. But my other options might be from what I have at home. One option --

THE COURT: Let's go off the record here. (Recess taken at 9:58 a.m., and the proceedings resumed at 10:01 a.m.)

THE COURT: This is pretty meandering stuff. If I'm supposed to be getting a lot out of this, it's not happening.

I understand where you're trying to go,
Attorney Brown -- I really do. But this isn't
very straightforward stuff.

I don't know why -- Mr. Commisso, why don't you just answer the questions "yes" or "no"? You can always explain yourself. But these answers go on forever. Just answer her questions. I tell witnesses this all the time, and you must hear it. You're a trial lawyer -- criminal defense lawyer.

Answer "yes" or "no," and then explain your answer if you need to. But let me just say, if the situation of your involvement, and RSM, and United Way, and all the players is

supposed to be getting clearer to me, it's heading in the opposite direction. And that's not good. So I'd appreciate just some real straightforward examination and answers to questions.

Q. (By Ms. Brown) And I will try to focus on what I'm actually looking for, so you don't have to give as long an answer, and maybe we can get right to it.

So we were talking about that in the post-conviction document production, there was a network scan that had 40-plus tabs on it of information that had not been produced pretrial. So I don't need you to describe that right now. I'm just putting that on the record.

So a minute ago, you described the process where you tried to, for lack of a better word, assess what RSM looked at and didn't look at.

Because whatever you had -- any discovery would be what they had access to, as I'm understanding this. So we now know that there was -- like, there was that one network scan produced pretrial. Now we know there were multiple other network scans that were produced

2 So it sounds like you were describing, as 3 I understood it before we took a break, that

you got those documents directly from

Mr. Meyer; correct?

after trial.

1

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

21

22

A. So before trial, I got a network scan from Mr. Meyer. Before trial, there was a second network scan that I believe came from RSM.

Those were the only two network scans I was aware of. And now in the last month or so, there was a third network scan. And I don't know the history and origin of that network scan.

Q. So you, personally, did not find this third network scan.

It came from some other party?

- A. I did not, personally, find the third network scan.
- Q. And you don't know whether it came from Mr. Meyer or from RSM?
 - A. When you say "came from," you mean in post trial?
- 23 Q. Post trial.
- A. Somebody found it recently. I don't know for certain, but I believe it was RSM that

identified the third network scan that had not been previously produced.

- Q. And so can I assume from that that third network scan was not in this e-discovery that we were talking about earlier?
- A. As far as I know, it was not.

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

- 7 Q. That's where I was going with that. Thank you.
 - A. If it had been, then it should have been produced in the e-discovery process, but I can't confirm that.
- 11 Q. But it wasn't produced; correct?
- 12 A. I don't know. I don't know if it was produced.
 - Q. Just so you know where I'm going with the next question, I'm going to ask about your contact with witnesses in this case. And I'm not asking for detail about what was said, anything like that. It's just who you had contact with in preparation for trial.

So a lot of the witnesses at trial were employees of United Way; right?

- A. Some of them were, yes.
- Q. And in preparation for trial, you met with and prepared witnesses who were employed by United Way for their testimony at trial?
- A. I met with them to help them prepare for their

1 testimony, yes. Would that apply to every United Way employee 2 Q. 3 who testified at trial? I believe that's correct. 4 Α. Did you either meet with and/or talk to or 5 0. email Naviloff in preparation for his trial 6 7 testimony? 8 Α. I certainly communicated with him. But for the 9 purposes of preparation, I don't -- I don't 10 remember meetings with him, and I don't know 11 that we really had any discussion that I would 12 characterize as preparing him for his 13 testimony. 14 And I'm not going to go into a lot of detail Q. 15 about this. And I asked some questions of 16 Mr. Naviloff a couple of weeks ago regarding 17 the October 4, 2018 email regarding --18

A. Excuse me. I'm going to change my settings here. Hopefully, we'll have a better connection here. So just bear with me.

So I don't know if that will help or not, but I thought of one idea that might improve the connection.

So please start your question again.

Q. Sure.

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

As I said, I was not going to go into a lot of detail on this, but a couple weeks ago when Mr. Naviloff was testifying, I asked him about an email that you were involved in from October 4, 2018, where you suggested revisions to the RSM report.

You remember listening to that exchange of testimony when Mr. Naviloff testified?

A. Yes.

Q. And you agree that as part of that exchange of ideas on that email, you suggested revisions to the report, including a suggestion that it be titled -- or it say that Alrai "executed a complex fraud scheme"?

You remember that email?

- A. Yes. It may have already used those terms, but I made a revision to that portion of the PowerPoint presentation.
- Q. And, in fact, you also suggested including that "this complex fraud scheme included gaining trust and deceiving multiple individuals"; that was part of that same suggestion?
- A. Yes, that's what my email said.

MS. BROWN: I don't have any further questions.

THE COURT: 1 Thank you. 2 Cross-examination, Mr. Davis, I assume? 3 CROSS-EXAMINATION 4 BY MR. DAVIS: 5 6 0. Good morning. Mr. Commisso, you were and are an outside 7 8 counsel for United Way on all matters relating 9 to the Imran Alrai DigitalNet case; is that 10 right? 11 Α. Yes. 12 And I would say -- you said "case," but I would say all matters. So there were lots of 13 14 tentacles and spin-offs. 15 Is your role limited to the criminal case? 0. 16 Α. No. 17 And can you summarize briefly the major areas Q. that are not the criminal case that you have 18 19 been working on since the spring of 2018? 20 There are many of them, and they are described Α. 21 in my declaration. But a few of them that come 22 to mind include dealing with the IRS, the 23 Massachusetts Attorney General's Office, the 24 New Hampshire Attorney General's Office, the 25 annual audited financial statements, the

HEARING 35

disclosure of those financial statements to federal agencies and state agencies, responding to federal and state agencies that provide funding for United Way's social service programs, dealing with public relations and media relations issues, dealing with the insurance company, dealing with Mr. Alrai's attorneys before -- separate and apart from the criminal case, and something called Charity Navigator, which is a third-party watchdog group.

And I've identified others in my declaration, but that's a pretty good start.

- Q. Of all of the total fees that your law firm has billed United Way, did you calculate the approximate percentage that relate to the criminal case?
- A. Yes. And I don't have it in front of me. It is in the end of my declaration. But it's less than 50 percent of my time and fees. And that's just from my firm -- less than 50 percent concern the federal criminal case.
- Q. The Court asked in this case to hear more about the practical effect on the Defense of your involvement in the prosecution, including in

the documents disclosed in discovery.

Do you recall that question being asked?

A. Yes.

- Q. What has your role been in the criminal matter on behalf of United Way?
- A. Well, I've already talked about the grand jury subpoena and responding to the grand jury subpoena. Overall, my responsibility is with respect to United Way documents. So I want to make sure that I produce documents in response to the grand jury subpoena. And Mr. Harrington, before trial, had a number of requests, and I did my best to identify United Way documents that could be produced to the Government in response to Mr. Harrington's request.

And with respect to RSM documents, my primary role was to understand privilege issues and to make sure I protected my client's interest in not disclosing privileged information. And there were probably some other things that I did. But the number one thing was taking responsibility for United Way's documents and protecting the privilege.

Q. In producing United Way's documents, did you

pick and choose among the documents you decided to produce?

A. Yes, in the sense that we had to run search terms to try to find documents. But when we found relevant documents, that was the --

The picking and choosing was "is this relevant?" Not "is this good or bad?"

"Is this relevant to the issues as I understand them or as they've been explained to me?"

- Q. And can you explain briefly your criteria in deciding relevance of a United Way document?
- A. So let's say it was broad in the sense that did it concern Mr. Alrai, and DigitalNet, and their dealings together? That's the broad way that I would describe it -- and the services that Alrai or DigitalNet provided to United Way, and who paid for that, and who was involved in that process from day one through the day payments were made.

So just to give you an example, every time somebody had trouble with the printer, just getting a document to print on the printer, I do not think that was a relevant document.

Because, frankly, we would have never finished

discovery if we treated each problem with the printer as a relevant document.

But, broadly speaking, if it related to Alrai's services and DigitalNet's services, then it was relevant.

- Q. And did you produce every single relevant document you identified that was not privileged?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And in the posttrial discovery proceedings in this case, have you become aware of any United Way document that was exculpatory and that was not produced before trial?
- A. No.
- Q. And have you become aware of any United Way document that, under your relevancy criteria, should have been produced before trial?

THE COURT: Look, I really don't -- his answers and his opinions about these issues?

I've seen documents that are exculpatory that were not produced before trial. We've been talking about them in this hearing.

Now, you might disagree. And I understand that, because reasonable minds can disagree.

But Mr. Commisso's opinion about what's

exculpatory or what's relevant -- I'm not sure what I'm supposed to do with that.

MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, I beg to differ, only because I'm not asking about internal RSM communications. I'm asking specifically about United Way documents.

THE COURT: Oh. Okay.

MR. DAVIS: This man has been attacked 500 ways about United Way documents. So I'm just asking if he's seen anything that should have been produced from the United Way documents he produced.

THE COURT: Okay. That's a distinction that does matter.

Go ahead.

THE WITNESS: So my response to that is look at every one of the Defendant's filings after trial, and look at every one of the attachments to those filings, and there is not a single United Way document. I'm not talking about RSM or anyone else's documents. There's not a single United Way document that supports the attacks against me. And I, frankly, find it outrageous.

Q. (By Mr. Davis) I want to ask you about your

role in the prosecution. 1 2 Were you the puppet master of the 3 prosecution team in this case? 4 Α. No, I was not. Did you play any role in the drafting of the 5 0. indictment in this case? 6 7 Α. No, I did not. 8 Q. Did you play any role in the grand jury 9 exhibits that were used in this case? 10 Α. No, I did not. 11 Did you receive any grand jury material in 0. violation of Rule 6(d)? 12 13 Α. No. 14 Did you play any role in the gathering of Q. 15 documents from the myriad other sources besides 16 United Way that were collected in this 17 investigation? 18 Α. No. Did you have any role in crafting the 19 Q. Government's exhibit list for trial? 20 21 No. Α. 22 Did you have any role in choosing the witnesses 0. 23 on the 40-person exhibit list the Government 24 used? 25 Α. No.

1 Q. Did you orchestrate the prosecution?

2 A. No.

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

21

22

23

24

25

3 Q. Now let's talk about preservation.

First of all, do you recall in the motion in this case -- the motion to dismiss -- on page two, the Defense assertion that on June 19 of 2018, Mr. Alrai sent you a message requesting that you instruct United Way to "preserve all IT data during the investigation"; do you recall that assertion?

- 11 A. Yes, I do.
- Q. And are you familiar with the letter from Mr. Alrai's counsel on June 19 of 2018?
- 14 A. Yes, I am.
- Q. And did that letter request that you instruct
 United Way to "preserve all IT data during the
 investigation"?
- 18 A. No, it did not.
- Q. In fact, did it have specific requests about what United Way was supposed to preserve?
 - A. Yes. There were seven or eight bullet points of specifically identified data.
 - Q. And was one of those bullet points "documents or correspondence related to any and all requests for proposal for IT or similar

technological support services"?

- A. I believe so. I haven't looked through the letter in a little while, but, yes. It lists the documents and data about IT services.
- Q. And were documents, in fact, preserved?
- A. Yes. Every item on that list was, in fact, preserved. And 100 percent, or nearly 100 percent, of those items were, in fact, produced to the Government.
 - Q. And did that letter -- again, from Mr. Alrai's counsel on June 19, just one week after he was walked out -- did that include documents related to committee meetings that Mr. Alrai was on?
 - A. Yes.

- Q. And did it include documents related to committee meetings where the committee discussed United Way's IT service providers and structure?
- A. Yes, and we produced those.
- Q. And did it include documents or correspondence related to all internal investigations, audits, or reviews of the United Way's IT service providers, structure, or operations, including the recent information and audit by CBIZ and

MHM?

- A. So, yes, it requested those. We did not necessarily produce all of that if it was privileged. So if it was historic information before the investigation, we would have produced it. But if it was --
- Q. But did you preserve all of that information?
- 8 A. Yes. Yes, it was all preserved.
 - Q. Did the letter on June 19, 2018, also request that you preserve documents or correspondence from, or copying, Mr. Alrai's United Way email address?
 - A. Yes, we preserved those. And we produced a lot of them, but not all of them.
 - Q. And did you also -- were you also asked to produce or preserve documents or correspondence related to Mr. Alrai's termination, including Mr. Alrai's employee file and performance reviews?
 - A. Yes. And, in fact, the employee file and performance reviews, we produced directly to Mr. Strauss (phonetic) within, I would say, two to three weeks of his termination. So that was a separate production different from the grand jury production.

And so of the items on Mr. Alrai's very 1 Q. 2 specific preservation letter --3 THE COURT: Can I interrupt, Mr. Davis, with a question -- a clarifying question? 4 MR. DAVIS: 5 Yes. Mr. Commisso, when both of 6 THE COURT: 7 you, Mr. Davis and Mr. Commisso, referred to 8 the grand jury production just then, what 9 exactly are you referring to? 10 THE WITNESS: You're asking me? 11 THE COURT: Sure. 12 I'm referring to the THE WITNESS: 13 documents that I produced to the Government. 14 Right, initially. THE COURT: 15 THE WITNESS: Or throughout the case. 16 But, yeah, those types of documents we produced 17 before the original indictment. 18 THE COURT: Yeah. That's what I'm asking. 19 Okay. 20 THE WITNESS: Yes. 21 THE COURT: I've never been, like, 22 1,000 percent clear on that, so that's helpful. 23 Thank you. 24 I'm sorry, Mr. Davis. 25 MR. DAVIS: Quite all right, Judge.

1 Q. (By Mr. Davis) Let's just talk briefly about 2 what has been preserved at United Way. We 3 talked about network scans. 4 How many network scans have been preserved? 5 At least three have been preserved and produced 6 Α. 7 to the Government and the Defendant. 8 So the Defendant has three network scans right Q. 9 now; is that correct? 10 Α. Yes. 11 Pictures or maps of the IT environment -- have 0. 12 you produced those? 13 Yes, to the extent that they exist. And we Α. 14 also -- to the extent they didn't exist, we 15 asked Mr. Alrai to either provide them or tell 16 us where we could find them. 17 And did you make that request almost Q. immediately after his termination? 18 19 Α. Yes, before the end of June, within two weeks 20 of his termination. And that was 2018? 21 Q. 22 Α. Yes. 23 0. And did you discover whether Mr. Alrai actually 24 kept pictures or maps of the IT environment?

Mr. Meyer, I believe, searched for that

25

Α.

And he found one piece of paper 1 information. 2 hanging in the IT room that just had a list of 3 computer names, or server names, or IP And that was the sum total of the 4 addresses. documentation or map of the IT system. 5 Did you preserve invoices and contracts 6 0. relevant to this case? 7 8 Α. Yes, absolutely. 9 Did you preserve emails relevant to this case? Q. 10 Α. Yes. 11 Did you preserve PowerPoint presentations? 0. 12 Α. Yes. 13 Did you preserve meeting minutes about IT Q. 14 services of all kinds? 15 Α. Yes. 16 Q. Did you preserve virtual desktop sessions at 17 United Way? Yes, for certain key employees who were related 18 Α. to the IT function. 19 20 And did you preserve laptops and computers at Q. 21 United Way? 22 Yes, for certain key employees related to these Α. 23 issues. 24 Did you preserve cell phones? Q. 25 Α. Yes.

1 Q. And do you know how many? 2 Α. I know there were at least two cell phones. 3 There may have been three. I just don't know the exact number. 4 5 Did you preserve servers? 0. 6 Α. Yes. 7 Q. And did you preserve websites? 8 Α. And I don't know the technical side of 9 what that means, but, yes. 10 And did you preserve log-in information? Q. 11 I believe so. Of that, I'm not certain. Α. Maybe 12 that's a question for Mr. Meyer. 13 And at any point, have you suppressed any of Q. 14 the IT information at United Way that has been 15 preserved? 16 Α. "Suppressed" -- I'm not sure what the meaning 17 is, but I know the answer is no. So I quess 18 I'm not sure what you mean. Have I 19 suppressed --20 Meaning, have you been aware of an item that Q. 21 Mr. Alrai was looking for that you had 22 preserved, that you decided not to turn over? 23 Α. No. It was all driven by my obligation. 24 preserved a lot of evidence, and we turned over

a lot of evidence. But we didn't turn over

everything, because I was following the rules
as they applied to the United Way of
Massachusetts Bay.

Q. Now, we've talked a lot in this case about your -- or in your testimony about the assertion of privilege on behalf of the United Way.

Do you recall that?

A. Yes, I do.

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

21

22

- Q. And you have described that you have asserted privilege, and continue to assert privilege, regarding the data breach investigation that RSM was part of after Mr. Alrai was terminated; is that right?
- 15 A. Yes, that's correct.
- Q. And have you made up, recently, that data breach investigation as a new and different basis to assert privilege?
- A. No, it's been asserted since the very beginning of the engagement.
 - Q. And, just briefly, was the data breach investigation clearly asserted as a basis of privilege before the trial in this case?
- 24 A. Yes, it was.
- 25 Q. And can you describe briefly how that was done

and when that happened?

A. Well, I guess, at least two things. One is that I made it clear to the Government that we considered it privileged, and that we had not and would not produce documents concerning that.

And then when Mr. Harrington began making discovery requests in July, we produced documents. And in at least one of those documents, there's a reference to the data security investigation.

And then there are about 15 to 20 pages of a document that are redacted and stamped "redacted."

- Q. But you have never provided any privileged documents related to the data breach investigation to the Government; is that correct?
- A. That's correct. If I had, it would have been inadvertent. Because I made it clear that I did not intend to and did not want to provide any of those documents.
- Q. And as to the privilege log you recently filed in this case, there are approximately 300 documents as to which you assert privilege; is

1 that right?

- A. Yes, that's correct.
- Q. And is the privilege you're asserting related to the data breach investigation?
 - A. Well, data breach and, in addition to that, certain documents concerning the e-discovery procedures that were in the Kroll database.
 - Q. But do those relate to Naviloff's loss analysis at RSM?
 - A. No. The documents on the privilege log do not concern -- are not within the scope of Naviloff's loss analysis.
 - Q. And are you using the data breach investigation or the Kroll e-discovery issue as a means of masking or suppressing relevant information from Mr. Alrai?
 - A. No. No, I've been working hard to turn over everything from the United Way that concerns Mr. Naviloff's loss analysis. And I'm not looking to withhold or suppress anything that I understand somebody's looking for and that it relates to Naviloff's loss analysis.
 - Q. You've been accused of "selective assertion of privilege"; do you recall that?
 - A. Yes, I do.

Q. After you waived privilege with respect to the RSM loss analysis investigation, were you selectively asserting privilege?

- A. No, I wasn't. It's clear, based on everything that's been produced, we have waived the privilege regarding the loss analysis, and we're not using that or any other privilege to shield documents concerning the loss analysis.
- Q. At this moment, is there any document that you're aware of regarding the RSM loss analysis that is being withheld from Mr. Alrai on the basis of an assertion of privilege?
- A. Not that I'm aware of.

THE COURT: Well, data security privilege, though; right?

THE WITNESS: Right. But that does not concern the loss analysis.

THE COURT: Right. Understood.

When -- Mr. Davis, when you were questioning a minute ago regarding selective assertion of the privilege after the waiver, from your perspective -- I want to be clear on this -- when did the waiver occur as to the loss and as to any privilege issues regarding the loss analysis? Mr. Davis.

MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, from the Government's perspective, there was arguably a subject matter waiver that occurred in November of 2018 once we sat down with Mr. Commisso and Mr. Naviloff. Because we clearly discussed the findings that RSM had made regarding loss analysis, including the general sort of categories that included duplicate billing and excessive billing, et cetera.

And so in my mind, not that I would have any interest in litigating with United Way, and not that United Way was being uncooperative, but that was a subject matter waiver. And I would guess Mr. Commisso would agree on that.

THE COURT: Was it declared understood?

Or is that just your -- if you had to litigate it, you'd put it in November 2018, when you started talking about loss analysis, duplicative billing, overbilling?

MR. DAVIS: If the question is to me, Judge, I probably don't recall accurately.

I don't remember that one of us looked at the other and said, "Okay. This constitutes a waiver."

THE COURT: Sure.

1 MR. DAVIS: Mr. Commisso probably 2 remembers better than I do. 3 THE COURT: Go ahead. 4 MR. DAVIS: Mr. Commisso, do you remember on that point? 5 So my memory is similar to 6 THE WITNESS: yours, which is we didn't have a discussion. 7 8 did not, on my own side, brief the issue or 9 determine what it would mean. I do think that 10 the November 2018 meeting was the point where 11 we began to waive the privilege. And it wasn't until later that we had to figure out what that 12 13 And so in July of 2018, when Naviloff meant. 14 became the Government's expert and 15 Mr. Harrington requested documents, we then had 16 to start figuring out where the lines were. 17 What was the scope of the waiver? still -- well, so, it evolved, I guess. 18 didn't sort it all out in November. 19 And we 20 began to really sort it out in July. 21 THE COURT: July of... 22 THE WITNESS: 2019. 23 THE COURT: 2019. 24 Was there a point at which -- because a 25 waiver is not a small thing; right?

HEARING 54

Was there a point at which you acknowledged in your own file, Mr. Commisso, or with your client, where you said, "Look, our conduct constitutes a waiver. This is going to change the way we produce documents to the Government"?

Did that ever get noted anywhere, acknowledged, either internally or externally, in your dealings with the Government?

THE WITNESS: Internally, certainly, we discussed waiver issues or privilege issues from the beginning and throughout as we made our decisions, and certainly with respect to sharing Naviloff's work in November, and certainly with respect to allowing the Government to hire Naviloff, because I needed to make sure my client understood what that meant.

So we evaluated the issue and we made sure we knew what it meant and what the risks would be.

THE COURT: But I guess what I want to know is -- let me just -- I think I said very clearly last week that Mr. Commisso didn't do a thing here, I thought, that was not completely

HEARING 55

predictable for any lawyer representing a client, or inappropriate, unethical, unlawful, or anything of the sort. There's been a lot of talk about accusations here today. And I guess one could consider -- Mr. Commisso's outraged. Mr. Davis is not happy about it, it's clear.

But I certainly don't view this as
Mr. Commisso on trial at all. I'm just trying
to understand what happened; okay? I can't
imagine it would have gone much different with
any competent counsel.

But is there an acknowledgment -- I mean, is there a day -- a document on which you said to your client, "Listen, we've waived" -- or you wrote in your own file to protect yourself, right, "This is a waiver"? Or you're communicating with the Government?

Is there a rubicon -- is there an imaginary line, a date -- some acknowledgement, internally or externally, about a waiver that would change the way you dealt with producing evidence to the Government?

THE WITNESS: Yes. So, with respect to communicating with my client, there are certainly documents -- and I guess I'm

HEARING 56

hesitating to say too much about it, because I need to think about the privileged nature of those communications. But to your point, yes, it is very easy for me, in my file, to pinpoint, because I documented it extensively exactly how that played out.

With respect to communications with RSM, I believe there will be communications between -- I'm hesitating a little bit because my memory is vague -- but I expect there would be communications between me and Greg Naviloff.

Because Greg Naviloff can't turn over documents or sign a contract with the Government without me acknowledging that the United Way is going to waive the privilege. Because if he does -- if he does it without our acknowledgment, he risks having a liability to the United Way for disclosing confidential information.

So there's a clear record with my client. There should be a clear record with Mr. Naviloff. With Mr. Davis, I haven't thought about what record may exist, but I know that we talked about the issues. And on various issues of privilege, he might have asked me things.

Or I might have told him, "Before you talk to Mr. Naviloff, I need to make sure that I'm okay with it and my client is okay with it."

So there were communications and different types of documentation on these issues.

THE COURT: Okay.

And if you want to stay with the issue,
Mr. Davis, vis-`-vis your client, your office's
dealings with Mr. Commisso or Mr. Naviloff,
feel free to develop it more. It's up to you.

- Q. (By Mr. Davis) So I'll say, Mr. Commisso, once the Government began to deal with RSM and Naviloff as the Government's expert, did you assert any impediment to Mr. Naviloff's sharing fully his work that had occurred, some of it under United Way's contract?
- A. No. No limitations, no impediment with respect to Naviloff, and the loss analysis, and the work that he was going to do for the Government.
- Q. So the Government could and did communicate freely with Naviloff after it hired him in July of 2018; correct?
- A. Right. And, in fact, my role at that time was essentially something close to zero, unless it

dealt with documents that Mr. Harrington needed, or maybe Naviloff and the Government needed that I might be able to provide -- United Way documents. But, otherwise, I was not a participant in the Government's relationship with Greg Naviloff.

Q. I just have a few more questions. I want to ask you about internal RSM emails; that is, emails within RSM, among the employees of RSM, including Naviloff and other personnel.

You've seen those in the posttrial discovery; correct?

- A. Yes.
- Q. Did you ever ask for all of those emails to do a comprehensive review prior to trial?
- 16 A. No.

- 17 | Q. Why not?
 - A. It never occurred to me. I can't think of any reason why I would want them. It just -- it never crossed my mind, and I can't think of a case in 20 years where I may have asked for something like that.

THE COURT: That last part of the answer makes me think I misunderstood the question.

What was the question again, Mr. Davis?

The question was whether 1 MR. DAVIS: 2 Mr. Commisso requested from RSM all of its 3 internal email communications at any point. 4 THE COURT: Okay. Yeah. May I proceed, Your Honor? 5 MR. DAVIS: THE COURT: Give me a second. 6 7 No, go ahead. Thank you. 8 (By Mr. Davis) Were there, before the trial in Q. 9 this case, significant requests for some RSM emails from Mr. Alrai? 10 11 Yes, I believe there were. Α. 12 And were there, in fact, RSM emails that were 0. 13 produced, prior to the trial, to Mr. Alrai? 14 Yes, there were. Α. 15 And did you play a role in reviewing those 0. 16 emails? 17 Yes, if they concerned United Way employees --Α. for example, John Meyer. 18 19 Q. And were you directly involved in the discovery 20 litigation just before trial -- that is, in the October and November 2019 time frame? 21 22 Yes, I was. Α. Yes. 23 0. And was it in that context that you filed 24 Defense Exhibit A, your six-page letter that 25 detailed exactly what you were doing in this

1 case?

- A. Yes, that's exactly right.
- Q. And in connection with that litigation, did

 Mr. Harrington, the counsel for Mr. Alrai, ever

 ask for every internal RSM email in this
 engagement?
 - A. No, not that I understood, or not that I'm aware of. And that certainly was not the focus of the actual issues being litigated before the Court.
 - Q. And to your knowledge, was any such request -again, for every internal RSM email about this
 engagement -- was that ever made prior to
 trial?
 - A. No. The first time it came up was a year later, in August and September of 2020.
 - Q. And in your communications with Mr. Naviloff, at any point, did Mr. Naviloff indicate to you that there might be RSM emails that could be used to impeach him at trial?
 - A. No. We never discussed that.
 - Q. And in your communications with Mr. Naviloff, did Mr. Naviloff ever tell you that there might be internal RSM emails that contained exculpatory information to benefit Mr. Alrai?

A. No, he never told me that.

- Q. So were you doing anything to suppress or prevent the disclosure of RSM internal emails?
- 4 A. No.

1

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

- Q. And, in fact, as you said, it never occurred to you to request every RSM email in the investigation; is that right?
- 8 A. That's right.
 - Q. And just one last question.

In dealing with -- well, have you dealt in the past with forensic accounting consultants who may be expert witnesses in litigation?

- A. Yes, I have.
- Q. And in any of those engagements, has it ever been part of your practice to collect and review every single internal email at that forensic accounting consultant firm to review?
- A. No, it's not been part of my practice. And, in fact, it's sort of the last thing that I would ever expect happening.

What we do focus on, in civil and criminal litigation, is the -- what I call the raw material, or the original source documents that go to the expert. And you want to know what those are so that you can then provide them in

But the underlying business records 1 discovery. 2 and source documents -- the idea of producing 3 internal emails or internal work product is not something that I've ever been involved in. 4 So, no, I would not have been thinking 5 about it in this case. 6 7 Q. I want to ask you just briefly about the 8 "fruitful" email, which is Defense Exhibit Gg. 9 Is that something that -- I'm not even 10 sure -- Tracy, if you're on, can we call up Exhibit Gg? 11 12 Yep. Just give me a moment to THE CLERK: 13 share my screen. (Pre-marked Defendant's Exhibit Gg 14 15 introduced.) 16 (By Mr. Davis) You recognize that email to Q. 17 Mr. Commisso? I've seen this recently. 18 Α. And this is the email that includes the -- at 19 Q. 20 the very bottom, the bullet "the trending of total United Way budget versus IT budget was 21 22 not fruitful"; do you see that? 23 Α. Yes. 24 Do you recall that in a motion the Defense Q. 25 filed in this case, on page five, in referring

to this same email, the Defense said that the "new email revealed a discussion about an earlier version of RSM's report where the RSM team decided to leave out a chart that showed that there was no significant change in IT cost during Alrai's DigitalNet's tenure because it was not fruitful"; do you recall that being in the motion?

A. Yes. Yes, I do.

- Q. And, of course, Mr. Naviloff being questioned about that same document; do you remember that?
 - A. Right. And I remember the first time I read that motion.

And immediately my response was, "No, that's not true."

- 16 | Q. And, in fact, is it true?
- 17 A. No, it's not true.
- 18 Q. And why is it not true?
 - A. Well, because if you go to Exhibit Z, which is a report prepared by RSM in October of 2018 -it was presented to the special committee just four days after that email -- and you turn to page, I want to say, 58 and 59, you will see that there are two charts and a whole lot of narrative about the IT budget and how it

changed over time.

Q. Right.

And included on page 59 of that same exhibit, you recall the sentence that "total functional expenses for United Way and IT expenses each increased by 7 percent over the period FY13 through FY17"; do you recall that?

- A. Yes, I do.
- Q. Do you recall further that the same note in the same exhibit at page 59 said that IT expenditures did not grow at a higher rate than total expenses; do you recall that?
- A. Yes, I do.
- Q. So was there anything that the RSM team was concealing from the special committee about these facts?
 - A. No. They obviously put the facts in the report. There were two pages of those facts. And as I remember the presentation or understood the point of it, this information helped to explain how Alrai was able to keep the crime going for so long without being detected.
- Q. So is the comment about things not being fruitful in Exhibit Gg -- is that part of some

deliberate effort to withhold exculpatory information from Mr. Alrai?

- A. I don't see any evidence of that, and I'm not aware of any effort -- deliberate or joint undertaking, or anything like that, to withhold exculpatory evidence. And I see no evidence of it.
- Q. So, Mr. Commisso, just to summarize, in your role as United Way counsel in this engagement, have you done anything to suppress evidence, that you're aware of, that's favorable to Mr. Alrai?
- A. No, I have not.
- Q. Have you destroyed evidence or failed to preserve evidence in violation of any request or duty that you were aware of?
- 17 A. No, I have not.
- Q. Have you selectively produced documents so as to choose documents that harmed Alrai and to hide documents that help him?
 - A. No, I have not.
- Q. And have you manipulated United Way's privilege so as to deprive the Defendant of evidence that he's entitled to?
- 25 A. No.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

1 No further questions. MR. DAVIS: 2 THE WITNESS: There are two issues that I 3 think need clarification. 4 THE COURT: Well -- okay. Proceed. MS. BROWN: Are you allowing him to make a 5 6 statement? 7 THE COURT: I would allow him to make a 8 statement, but if you'd prefer to examine him, 9 Attorney Brown, before he does, I'm fine with 10 that. 11 I would prefer to do that. MS. BROWN: 12 That's perfectly fine, and I THE COURT: 13 should have asked you first. I'm sorry about 14 that. 15 MS. BROWN: Thank you. 16 17 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 18 BY MS. BROWN: 19 Q. Mr. Commisso, one of the questions the 20 Government asked you was whether you were aware 21 of any documents -- I don't know if you used 22 the word "owned" or "possessed" -- by United 23 Way that were not produced and were 24 exculpatory; you remember that question? 25 Yes. Α.

Q. And so I want to go back to -- you and I discussed this earlier -- is the network scans that were produced in this case. And the Government asked you about it.

And as of at least this date, there's been three of them; correct?

- A. I'm aware of three.
- Q. But one of those three was produced after trial -- the most recent one?
- 10 A. Yes.

Q. And I think I neglected when I was asking you earlier about this -- just for the record, that document is UUU -- U as in "under" -- and it's actually an Excel spreadsheet.

Would you agree with that description of what I'm talking about as to the third network scan?

- A. I know it's a spreadsheet. I don't know what the exhibit number is, but present whatever you want as the exhibit number.
- Q. Well, I guess I'm going back to that because as I understood your testimony, you're saying that there was nothing that United Way possessed that was exculpatory, or even potentially exculpatory, that you, as United Way, did not

turn over prior to trial.

Did I understand your testimony correctly on that?

- A. Yeah. I was not aware of anything that we didn't turn over prior to trial that we were required to. And now, after a year of additional discovery, I'm not aware of additional documents that have now been turned over after trial that are exculpatory with respect to United Way's documents.
- Q. And this is where I'm going with this.

That network scan -- we'll refer to it as the third network scan produced after trial --

A. Yes.

- Q. -- would you consider that a United Way document?
 - A. I don't know the answer to that because I don't know enough about the history of that document.

I can tell you that before trial, I never saw or heard of that document, and that after trial, it was my understanding that RSM produced that document.

Q. In terms of your previous testimony, where at least I understood it that you and RSM had an identical batch of discovery that you had

HEARING 69

access to, that just wouldn't be true if they produced something after trial that you didn't have; right?

A. Well, no, no, they have their own internal RSM documents. You know, if they go on the web and they do some market research where they talk to a different department within RSM, they collect their own documents. I don't have access to them.

If they're United Way documents and I provide them to RSM, then I've got my own set and I've provided a set to RSM.

Q. But what we're talking about is a network scan of the United Way computer system -- IT system -- in the summer of 2018.

You would agree with me, if that's an accurate description of this document, that that's a United Way document; right? No matter where it came from, it originally came from the IT system of the United Way?

A. Well, yes. I guess it's a question of possession; right?

So I don't know the history -- the provenance of that electronic file. I don't know who has control over it, where it resides.

I know I didn't get it. So I didn't have it in my collection of documents. And I didn't -- as far as I recall, I did not send it to Kroll -- to the e-discovery database. And I did not receive it, so I did not send it to RSM.

So if it originated at United Way and made its way to RSM, then I don't know how that happened. I was not in the chain of communication in that scenario.

Q. And that goes back to my previous question.

That when you made the representation to the Court about what documents from United Way were going to be produced, just checking your e-discovery database wouldn't have captured that; correct?

- A. No, which is why we did additional steps -- we took additional steps.
- Q. And that's what I was trying to get at before.

Those additional steps did not include either picking up the phone or sending an email to Naviloff and saying, "I'm just making this representation to the Court that the Government and the Defendant have everything that you've reviewed or assessed. Just want to make sure that's true."

You didn't do that?

A. No, in fact, we did do things like that.

So when I say there are multiple things we did to verify, one thing would be for me to contact John Meyer and ask John Meyer, "Do you have these two or three categories of documents?"

And another thing that I did is I worked with Greg Naviloff and Chris Fitzgerald. And there are those emails that show that list of, like, 15 folders that they want to discuss with me.

And so that was a check on -- that was our way of being comprehensive, so that I could see, "Okay. They've got the four folders that look like documents I gave them, and so I'm confident that I've already produced those four folders." Well, then they've got eight other folders. I don't know what's in those folders, because they control them.

And so we're talking through the issues together to see if we missed a United Way document that I should be aware of that I know that I have to produce it.

THE COURT: We need to give the reporter a

break.

So let's take -- you can continue after this, Attorney Brown, but let's take the 15-minute break. We'll reconvene at 11:15.

I've got to make a phone call on a case, but I'm going to do it right now so it doesn't drag into beyond 15 minutes.

(Recess taken at 10:59 a.m., and the proceedings resumed at 11:16 a.m.)

- Q. (By Ms. Brown) Before the break, we were talking about this third network scan that was produced post conviction that you did not -- I want to choose the right word -- have access to, see, or at least was aware of prior to trial; correct?
- A. I was not aware of it, yes.
- Q. And I'm going to describe it how I at least view this document, and correct me if your understanding is different.

But I am describing it as an Excel document. And at the bottom of it, there are different tabs for -- and I don't even know what the tech term is for it -- like, different files, but you can access different tabs.

If I told you there were 40-plus tabs in

HEARING 73

this Excel document produced post trial, would that sound about right?

- A. It does, but I'm really not familiar with the document, other than I know it exists. So I'm not the best person to investigate the number of tabs.
- Q. And, again, just for the record, it's -- UUU is the document that I'm talking about. I just want that to be clear, because it is an exhibit.

Well, the reason I ask about it is the Government asked you if you were aware of any documents that came from United Way that were produced after trial that contained either exculpatory or potentially exculpatory evidence. And so it sounds like you're not aware of whether that document contains either exculpatory or potentially exculpatory evidence; would that be a fair assessment?

A. That is a fair assessment. And I guess I don't know whether that document ultimately came from the United Way. So I did not have that document in mind, because I don't know if it came from the United Way and I don't know if it contains exculpatory evidence.

Q. But let's just say, hypothetically, it purports to come from United Way at some point.

If it purports to be a network scan of the network at United Way at some point in time, at least at some point, it came from United Way; right?

A. If it came from John Meyer -- if John Meyer ran the network scan and then he sent that network scan to RSM, which is possible, I would not have received it. I would not have put it in the e-discovery database. I would not have produced it myself.

So, then, yes, that would come from United Way. If RSM created it, then maybe I would think of that as RSM work product and not a United Way document. It's just -- that's where I make a distinction. I don't know if that distinction matters to you, but there's a difference between United Way's documents that John Meyer creates and RSM work product -- something they create as they're doing their work. That's all.

Q. And you would agree with me, if RSM was, for lack of a better word, doing their work, and they were doing that work for United Way

HEARING 75

through the summer, fall, and early winter 2018/2019, those documents really belong to United Way; right? United Way through -- you hired them; right?

A. So I think it's a technical issue that I can't say "yes" or "no" to. If they create their own internal work product, then I would not say those are United Way documents. Whether it's a spreadsheet they create, or notes, or a memo that they create for their own internal purposes and they put in their own internal files, I don't consider that, for the purposes of this discussion, to be a United Way document.

What I think of when I say a "United Way document" is an email that comes off of our email server, or an invoice, or a contract -- something that can be found in the files of the United Way.

- Q. And as I said, because you haven't really reviewed this network scan, Exhibit UUU, you can't say that, if it did come from United Way, that it doesn't contain exculpatory evidence?
- A. I have not reviewed the document. I don't know what it contains. I have a general

HEARING 76

understanding of the document. And I'm not in a position to draw lines between what's exculpatory and what's not. You've got one definition. I've got -- I'm sure I have a different definition in my mind.

Q. Well, we heard on Thursday that anything that relates to the work that RSM did for United Way, if it's going to get produced to the Government, it had to go through you so you could vet it for privileged information.

Did I understand that testimony correctly?

- A. Well, that's probably too broad. But if it relates to Naviloff's loss analysis and relates to his loss analysis for United Way, then I would want to do a privilege review of those documents. If it concerned the Government's work -- Naviloff's work for the Government, then I wouldn't do a privilege review of those documents.
- Q. Well, what I'm getting at is that there was a much smaller version of this network scan given prior to trial. And what I'm getting at is, if I understand this process, it would have gone through you for a review to see if it contained privileged information.

A. Possibly, although the nature of this document

-- I'm not even sure what I would review. It's
a report, as I understand it. So one version
of it -- the first vision of it came from
John Meyer. He sent it to me. I looked at it
and I produced it in the sense there was some
privilege review, but there's really no content
that I can review for privilege so -- or
produce.

Q. Well, it talks about things like passwords and security.

I mean, those are things you'd want to be looking at; right?

- A. That's not attorney-client privilege. That's more confidentiality. That's why we have the protective order in place.
- Q. But what I'm getting at is that -- and it sounds like you're saying "yes" to this, but I just want to clarify.

The much smaller version of this, which was just one tab of this network scan that was produced pretrial -- that came through you first to do some sort of review for privilege analysis?

A. Yes. So let me try to be clear.

There were two versions produced before trial. One of them certainly came from John Meyer. I certainly obtained it and reviewed it, and I was responsible for producing it.

The second version -- I don't recall, as I sit here right now, who produced that. If John Meyer produced it, that means I produced it. If RSM produced it, then I might not have seen it before trial -- or before it was produced. I just don't know. I just don't recall the chain of custody, or whatever you want to call it, with respect to the second network scan.

- Q. And as to the third one, did it have to go through you first to be produced, or you've never seen it?
- A. I think -- I saw it after it was produced. So, no, it didn't go through me before it was produced.

MR. HUNTER: Your Honor, I don't mean to interrupt, but if it's helpful, I could proffer how the Government received these three network scans, if it would help.

MS. BROWN: I'm fine with that.

HEARING 79

THE COURT: You can proffer it, but -- I guess I'm going to have you proffer it so you can -- it might help the witness remember.

But after this hearing, I'm going to ask for a timeline to be created about every discovery request, and order, and production, from the beginning of this litigation through where we were now. Because there's just too much to keep track of and too much to distinguish from.

By the way, Mr. Commisso has answered, I thought, very appropriately a minute ago when he said, "Look, what you think is exculpatory is different things." It's a very reasonable position.

But that's why I didn't understand the questions from the prosecution about "did you withhold exculpatory evidence?"

That's not for the witness to decide.

That's not for anyone to decide except me. And although I do appreciate the distinction, and it's very important, between United Way documents and RSM work product -- because I don't think there was a discovery allegation to produce RSM work product, except possibly a

Brady obligation.

But it's a very fuzzy, gray area here, because there's a question about whether the prosecutors would have thought of it or had the -- it's just not a normal situation. We've got to explore it and we're -- frankly, we're spending way more time on -- for three days -- and I know you have a burden to meet,

Ms. Brown. This is not a criticism.

But we're spending tons of time on RSM, and United Way, and their counsel, when I think the real questions here are for the prosecutors. That's what I think. And I don't know when we're going to -- I guess I'm just going to have some questions for them myself. I don't plan on putting anybody on the witness stand, but you're all officers of the court. And I know you're going to answer me truthfully, but that's what the real questions are here.

Because there's a difference between Mr. Commisso representing a victim and how he would approach issues, and how he would approach them if he was, frankly, defending an accused. It's not really the same thing.

HEARING 81

So go ahead and make your proffer,
Mr. Hunter, and try to make it succinct and
clear, please.

MR. HUNTER: I will. And if the Court has questions later or after this witness, I can fill in.

But, in essence, before trial,
Mr. Harrington is requesting information about
the IT environment. We learned that John Meyer
had run a network scan, and that there might
also be a network scan that RSM had. We asked
for them and we got them. One was a 62-page
PDF that was produced before trial. The other
is this one-page Excel spreadsheet that
Ms. Brown is referring to.

During this litigation -- and I make a note of it in our surreply, I think -- during a discussion with RSM, we realized that the one-tabbed Excel spreadsheet was only part of the larger scan that they did. And so I asked for it. They produced it to us. And we produced it to the Defense. And my understanding was -- because through the pretrial proceedings, our understanding was we had received all network scans and had produced

them. So when I learned there was this larger network scan that RSM had, we produced them.

And that's the basic understanding of where the Government got them and the timeline of production. There were two produced before trial. And this one larger one we produced after trial as soon as we learned about it.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. BROWN: Thank you, Your Honor, for clarifying that.

- Q. (By Ms. Brown) And during your questioning by Attorney Davis, if I understood this correctly or wrote it down correctly, I understood that you said that prior to trial, you did not assert a privilege as to the work done by Mr. Naviloff; did I understand that answer correctly?
- A. Well, we had waived the privilege with respect to the loss analysis -- Mr. Naviloff's loss analysis. So at that point, there was no more privilege. But we also hadn't litigated the scope of that. So I guess I'm not sure what -- well, maybe you have another question.
- Q. I do. I didn't want to misstate what you had said. So I wanted to understand what you said

Α.

HEARING 83

first, and it sounds like I did understand it correctly.

My question as a follow-up to that was you would agree with me, and I'm not going to go through it all again -- we talked about this last week -- there were several emails involving Mr. Naviloff's loss analysis that you had redacted because you felt they also contained information relative to data security, and we brought some of those up on the screen last week that were emails that were produced.

So they weren't held back under the privilege log, but they had a notation of "redacted" on them. You remember there were some of those emails last week; right?

Yeah. So you're now -- there's some moving parts there.

So you first asked me a question about before trial; right? And about the use of privilege before trial. But now when you're talking about those redacted documents, those are all produced in August and September, maybe October, of the year after trial; right. So I just want to make sure we're talking about the

same period of time and the same --

Q. Correct.

I guess my question is that you're still asserting the privilege as to some of the emails involving Mr. Naviloff; correct?

- A. The portion of those emails that contain information that is only related to the data security investigation.
- Q. But you're still asserting privilege as to some of the emails involving Mr. Naviloff?
- A. Yes.
 - Q. And, in fact, we talked about it last week -let me get the document number -- the privilege
 log that was produced after trial -- many, if
 not most, of those emails also have
 Mr. Naviloff's name either -- that it's to him
 or he's cc'd on those emails.

So you are still asserting some form of privilege as to emails involving Greg Naviloff; correct?

A. Yes, because the scope of the Judge's order was to produce only those documents related to Naviloff's loss analysis. And in addition to that, I had to redact or withhold privileged information regarding the data security

investigation.

Q. Well, I just wanted to -- it wasn't clear from the question from Attorney Davis.

But I wanted to clarify that you are still asserting privilege as to some of the work Naviloff did in this case in terms of emails relating to his discussion of this case with his team members at RSM.

- A. Yes, but I just want to make sure we're clear.
 - The content of those privileged documents do not relate to the loss analysis.
- Q. And that's as to the documents that are in the privilege log; right?
- A. And also the ones that have been marked as redacted.

And I also want to make clear -- there is no motion, or letter, or any other communication where you have challenged any of those redactions that you showed me the other day.

- Q. You would agree with me, it's hard to tell it's a redaction if you can't see the document, isn't it?
- A. Well, you challenged the privilege log. And so you could -- I'm not going to tell you how to

do your job, but there are things that you could do.

- Q. Now, Attorney Davis -- and my notes indicate he asked you the question that you have never produced data breach investigation to the Government; do you remember that question?
- A. We have always asserted the privilege with respect to the data security investigation.

 And, therefore, we have never produced or disclosed any documents concerning the data security investigation.
- Q. But we now know, because of your assertion of the privilege on this, that Naviloff, in some way, shape, or form, had access to information relative to the data breach investigation because you've asserted privilege as to his emails regarding this?
- A. So, correct, he was on emails that -- he was on emails that contained privileged information regarding the data security investigation. He was not part of the DFIR team, but the two teams both worked at RSM. And, sometimes, two teams were together on the same emails.
- Q. Now, one of the questions -- the -- well, actually I forgot to come back to this. I had

one more question regarding the network scan we were talking about, which is document Uuu.

Do you recall being on an email exchange where this network scan was discussed?

A. No, I don't remember that email.

- Q. If I told you there was an email from
 August 13, 2018, where you were copied, where
 the subject line is "additional network device
 scan, privileged and confidential," you don't
 have a recollection of that email?
- A. I do recall emails in August of 2018 about the network scan. I just -- yes, I recall, generally, there were emails.
- Q. And so you may have had access to the network scan being on this email chain back in August -- between August 13 and August 15 of 2018?
- A. I had access to that email discussion. I did not have access to the network scan.
- Q. So if there were an email from Ryan Gilpin where he put a link into the scan saying "you could navigate here," and then has the hyperlink, "and download and run and file and screenshot below."

You don't remember him sending a link to access to that network scan?

A. He sent that to John Meyer at the time. I had no memory -- paid no attention to it. I only know about it because I've seen it over the last week or two.

O. And so -- you're correct. So that's an email

Q. And so -- you're correct. So that's an email chain between Ryan Gilpin and John Meyer.

And you and several other members of RSM are on that chain; correct?

- A. I don't have it in front of me.
- Q. One of the questions Attorney Davis asked you is whether trial counsel specifically asked for, and to quote Attorney Davis, "every single internal email from RSM."

And you answered "no," that trial counsel did not ask for that.

Remember that exchange?

17 A. Yes.

- Q. Do you remember defense counsel prior to trial asking for all documents and data collected and reviewed by RSM in calculating United Way's loss?
- A. That sounds similar to the language in one of the discovery requests.
- Q. In fact, that -- it wasn't one of the discovery requests, but it's also in the actual motion to

exclude Naviloff, document 27, page two.

And do you also remember that trial counsel also asked for any reports prepared by Mr. Naviloff, RSM, and its employees?

A. So with respect to those two issues, what I remember is I had -- I had a duty or a role, which was to focus on United Way's documents. So with respect to your first question about RSM emails, I don't really have much knowledge or more to say that I haven't already said because I was focused on United Way's documents.

And on the second part of what you said, he -- I don't think you read the entire request. Because what I remember is, he was looking for reports that RSM had prepared regarding the loss analysis for United Way. And so from my side, focused on United Way's documents, what I was focused on was the reports that were for United Way.

And I guess the distinction I'm making is, if they prepared a report that they use internally, well, that -- I didn't get that.

That was not for the United Way. But if they put together a PowerPoint presentation for a

HEARING 90

report to the special committee, that was a report for the United Way. And they also helped with the insurance claim, so that was a report for the United Way. And, in fact, those are the documents that I produced in response to Mr. Harrington's request.

Q. Well, I guess if I understood your testimony earlier, you were saying that once Mr. Naviloff started talking to the Government in November of 2018, anything relative to Naviloff or RSM's loss calculation -- there's no more privilege. It was gone. Because as Naviloff testified at trial, he basically took his loss calculation from RSM and carried it over to his work for the Government. So there wouldn't be any distinction as to documents -- whether they were for RSM's loss calculation or for the Government's loss calculation.

As I understood your testimony, the privilege didn't exist anymore as to the loss calculation for RSM; is that right?

- A. I'm confused. I'm not sure what you want me to respond to. I'm sorry. I'm just confused.
- Q. Well, I was asking about the fact that you said that the trial counsel didn't specifically use

the word "internal" emails. And I will agree with you that trial counsel did not use that specific term.

But trial counsel did ask for reports prepared by Mr. Naviloff, RSM, and its employees, relative to RSM's investigation of the loss resulting from Alrai's alleged fraudulent conduct. And the answer, as I understood it, was you thought they were only talking about work that involved United Way.

But what I'm pointing out to you is that you're saying that there's no distinction; it's the same analysis as to the loss calculation.

- A. You mean whether it was for the United Way or for the Government?
- Q. Correct.

A. Yeah, so I think we may have talked past each other a little bit. I was just trying to make a point that as it concerned me, Mr. Harrington wanted copies of reports that Naviloff prepared for the United Way.

And so I had to think, "Okay. What reports did Naviloff prepare for the United Way?" Well, I know there were two that went to the special committee. I know that there was

1-800-600-1000

one that was a draft that ended up going to the insurance company. And I'm sure there may have been others.

But that's what I was thinking in response to that, which is "what are the reports of the loss that Naviloff prepared for the United Way?"

Q. Well, you spoke earlier that there might be internal documents at RSM. Like, they may have created a spreadsheet.

And that still is work that was done for United Way, because you had hired RSM; right?

A. But if you look at -- do you have Mr. Harrington's requests?

Q. I have it as document 47. And what I'm reading from that is what he basically does from document 47, which is his -- Defendant's motion to exclude expert testimony.

The first three or four pages, he summarizes -- and maybe this is a good start on what the Judge is requesting later -- Attorney Harrington basically does a history up until this point of both his requests for discovery and the Government's response to that discovery. So I was reading from that

HEARING 93

document, specifically on page two, paragraph six.

And so that -- I guess the point I was asking you about was that discovery isn't a matter of "Simon Says." They don't have to use the exact word to invoke you having to turn it over. The spirit of that request was that Attorney Harrington was trying to get to the basis for the opinions of Naviloff.

That's what he was attempting to get to -were their internal reports, where their
analysis -- he didn't have to use all those
magic words, or the magic word "email" to get
to what's the basis of Naviloff's opinion.

And you understood that; right? You understood that that's where Attorney Harrington was trying to get to -- was what was the basis of Naviloff's opinions; right?

Yes. So I understood his requests -- he was

A. Yes. So I understood his requests -- he was trying to get to the original source documents; right? RSM gathered up all of this data, and a lot of that were United Way's documents. So that he wanted United Way's documents that were accessed, reviewed, relied on by Naviloff with respect to loss analysis. I understood that.

HEARING 94

Q. And as I said, I just read to you paragraph 6A which says "all reports prepared by Mr. Naviloff, RSM, and its employees collectively referred to as 'RSM' relative to RSM's investigation of the loss resulting from Alrai's alleged fraudulent conduct."

That does not limit it to documents in the possession of United Way, does it?

- A. No, but for purposes of my responding to it,
 I'm only responsible for documents in the
 possession of United Way.
- Q. But you've asserted privilege as to documents that were created and possessed by RSM?
- A. With respect to the data security analysis.
- Q. But my question is, you've asserted privilege as to documents created and possessed by RSM?
 - A. Yes. Yes, I have for certain documents -- for certain categories of documents.
 - Q. So in some way, you are responsible for documents from RSM, especially if they were created while they were working for United Way -- you're responsible for whether those documents get to the Defendant?
 - A. Yeah, I don't agree with that.

THE COURT: Well, is it more "responsible"

you're focused on?

Q. (By Ms. Brown) Yeah, I guess I could rephrase that.

You have some control over whether a document gets to the Defendant?

- A. I have -- through asserting of privilege, and providing a privilege log, and asking RSM not to turn the documents over, yes. That's my role.
- Q. And I just have one final question.

Going back to the beginning of the case, late May through June of '18, at any point during that time, did any of the government agents, either being FBI agents or the U.S. Attorney's Office, ask you to preserve any data, IT environment -- anything along those lines? Were you asked by the Government to preserve anything relative to this case?

A. Were we asked to preserve anything? I don't -bear with me, because it's been two and a half
years.

We were asked for things. I guess the short answer to your question is I don't remember, but I can tell you what happened, which is we were asked for things. So in a

HEARING 96

sense, that, I would say, is a server request for preservation. You know, when they say they want us to produce certain types of documents, we obviously preserve them.

And I know that I had discussions early on where I described the types of things that we were doing, like the fact that we were collecting laptop computers, and cellphones, and things like that. And, in fact, we sent them to a third party, StoneTurn Group. And then we had arrangements for an FBI agent to obtain those images from StoneTurn Group.

So I don't remember any specific requests for preservation, but I do remember periodic discussions about what the Government may be looking for and what we were doing to preserve, collect, review, and produce the evidence.

Q. And did you ever receive a request from the Government -- and, again, focusing on this period of time of late May through June of 2018 -- did you ever receive a request to preserve, like, network scans, or preserve the IT environment as it existed at the time Mr. Alrai either worked there or shortly after he worked there?

A. Can you just say that -- sorry.

Say that one more time.

Q. Sure.

Again, focusing on the time of June of 2018, when Mr. Alrai left the employ of United Way, did the Government -- and by "the Government," I mean the FBI or the U.S. Attorney's Office -- did they ever make any requests that you preserve network scans or IT environment?

- A. No, not in those words, no. To date, the

 Defendant has not made a formal request that I

 preserve the entire IT environment or network

 scans.
- Q. And you -- strike that.

As I understood your answer, it sounded like the way you were responding to the subpoena was on, for lack of a better word, a document-by-document request.

A. No, I guess I wouldn't describe it that way. I would say we did it on a rolling basis. It was an enormous undertaking, and we searched comprehensively and exhaustively. And then we produced relevant documents on a rolling basis.

THE COURT: What does "relevant" mean to

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

HEARING 98

you? I mean, I don't understand how you have a role in determining that. I mean, it's discovery. What's relevant to an expert is the expert's eyeballs at every side. That's how I view it.

Now, I realize in a civil litigation -and in criminal too -- internal conversations might not necessarily be subject to production. And it doesn't appear that that was required here, because no one set that forth and agreed But you keep invoking relevancy in a to it. way that -- and earlier in this litigation, we had conversation about what the expert relied What the expert relied on is what the on. expert saw -- period. Because choosing not to rely on it is a decision that's very important vis-`-vis an expert's competence and bias. It's crucial information what an expert decides not to rely on, if the expert saw it.

And it sounds like someone was making determinations here before -- before the posttrial orders, I mean. It sounds like someone was making determinations here about what was appropriate and whether or not Mr. Naviloff relied on it based on whether he

actually cited it or discussed it. And from my perspective, that's just not the standard.

Do you understand what I'm saying?

THE WITNESS: Yes, but I guess there are two different issues. One issue is -- three issues. My internal investigation, the

Government's investigation, and the response to the grand jury subpoena. And then there's

Naviloff's investigation; right?

So Naviloff and RSM determine what's relevant; right? And my job in sort of overseeing their work is to make sure they have access to what they want.

Because if somebody says "don't let them look in that room over there" or "don't let them talk to those three witnesses," now we no longer have a fair and independent investigation; right? So when it comes to Naviloff requesting information, Naviloff asked for what we thought he needed or wanted. So that's one.

With respect to my investigation, and that is directly related also to producing documents to the Government, I would say it's guided by all of my experience as a civil and as a

HEARING 100

criminal defense litigator. You start with an enormous amount of data. You can't review it all. You can't produce it all. And so you end up with this funnel effect as you're trying to narrow it down to a reasonable number of documents. And you use very sophisticated tools in 2018 that help you find the best documents with the least amount of effort.

THE COURT: That's two. You said there were three.

THE WITNESS: I said we had Naviloff.

THE COURT: Oh. Naviloff, you, and the Government.

THE WITNESS: And the Government.

THE COURT: I respectfully just observed -- and I mean this respectfully, because it's not meant to be a challenge, but I don't understand how any of that addresses what I just asked you.

THE WITNESS: So you want to know how do I determine relevance?

THE COURT: No, I don't. I don't. It's okay.

You can continue with your questions, Attorney Brown.

MS. BROWN: That was actually my last question, Your Honor. And I don't have any follow-up based on the Court's questions.

So I don't know if the Government has recross, but I don't have any other questions.

MR. HUNTER: Briefly, Your Honor. I'll try to hone in, I think, on what the Court's concern was.

RECROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. HUNTER:

Q. So, Mr. Commisso, you were -- the Court raised a concern about wanting every document that Mr. Naviloff saw. So that way, the Defense could assess the relevancy determinations that Mr. Naviloff made. And defense counsel asked you some questions related to this.

And so with respect to the e-discovery database which you were talking about -- actually, I'll -- with the e-discovery database -- from that database, you made productions to the Government in response to the grand jury subpoena; is that right?

- A. Yes, that's correct.
- Q. And in relation to this pretrial litigation

about Mr. Naviloff, Mr. Harrington was seeking documents related to Greg Naviloff's expert testimony; do you recall that?

A. Yes.

- Q. And in order to identify every document in the United Way e-discovery database that Greg Naviloff could possibly have looked at, did you work with Kroll to identify those documents?
- A. Yes, every single one of them, without making a determination if it was relevant or not. We, just turned it over.
- Q. And I just want to talk a little bit about how the e-discovery database worked, as it's relevant to that issue.

Did everyone who had access to this e-discovery database have unique log-in credentials?

- A. Yes, everyone from RSM had unique log-in credentials. And the system tracked every time an RSM employee accessed a document in the system.
- Q. And you addressed this in your letter when defense counsel asked you some questions about it, but is the work you did with Kroll pretrial

related to this motion to exclude 1 Did you work with Kroll to 2 Greq Naviloff? 3 identify every document in the database that anyone with an RSM log-in credential had 4 clicked on, viewed, accessed, et cetera? 5 Yes, and then we produced the few documents 6 Α. 7 that needed to be produced as a result of that. 8 So going to the Court's question, you did an Q. 9 initial review in response to the grand jury 10 subpoena where you tried to identify, 11 basically, all the documents relevant to this, 12 the Imran Alrai case, to put it simply? 13 Α. Yes. 14 And then this second search that you did was a Q. 15 little more technical, where you tried to 16 identify every document in that database that 17 somebody from RSM had clicked on, or looked at, or viewed, or accessed? 18 19 Α. Yes. 20 THE COURT: Wait a minute. 21 This second one you're talking about, Mr. Hunter -- which one is that? 22 Is that the 23 one after Mr. Harrington's motion to exclude 24 Mr. Naviloff? 25 MR. HUNTER: Yes, Your Honor. I'11

clarify.

Q. (By Mr. Hunter) So when you reactivated the database after Mr. Harrington filed his motion to exclude Greg Naviloff's testimony,

Mr. Commisso, was that when you undertook the effort to identify any as yet non-produced documents?

THE COURT: You froze. Mr. Hunter froze; right? This is really the first hearing I've had, I think, since we've been Zooming hearings starting -- I think it was in April -- where we've had this many problems.

THE WITNESS: Yeah.

THE COURT: I'm sure Mr. Hunter can hear us talking, but he knows that we're not hearing him. Oh. He's gone.

THE CLERK: He actually dropped off a few times this morning, Judge, as well.

THE WITNESS: There were two issues that I wanted to clarify, if I can get the time to do that.

THE COURT: Well, I'm happy to listen to you, but the attorney conducting your cross is not in on the hearing. So I don't know if that makes a difference to the Government's counsel

or not, if we want to let Mr. Davis -- look, I 1 2 have some questions for you too --3 MR. DAVIS: So, Judge, I think Ms. Le and I can handle the rest of it. And I apologize 4 for having to break. 5 Are we still on redirect now? Or are we 6 7 on recross? 8 THE COURT: Yeah, we're on recross. 9 Hey, Judge, can we do what you MS. LE: 10 were suggesting before -- we were just having a break at 12:00. Hopefully -- maybe Mr. Hunter 11 can go into the office. Because I think the 12 13 next witness is his witness to cross, if 14 necessary. Oh, look. 15 Mr. Hunter's back on. 16 THE COURT: So we're on recross, 17 Mr. Davis. 18 Go ahead, Mr. Hunter. Try your question 19 again. 20 I'm sorry about that. MR. HUNTER: I lost 21 power briefly. 22 (By Mr. Hunter) So, Mr. Commisso, trying to 0. 23 recall where I left off. 24 So after Mr. Harrington -- this is in the 25 context of after you reactivated the

HEARING 106

e-discovery database, when Mr. Harrington had moved to exclude Greg Naviloff's testify.

At that point, did you work with your e-discovery vendor, Kroll, to identify every document in the database that someone with an RSM credential had clicked on, or looked at, or accessed?

THE COURT: Yeah, but you already asked him that, Mr. Hunter.

And what I asked you was "what are you talking about?"

Because you called it "the second time."

And I think you're trying to refer to not the original grand jury production, but the time immediately after the motion to exclude

Naviloff, where we resolved it rather than excluding Naviloff by producing discovery; right?

MR. HUNTER: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. But you're talking about things like e-discovery databases and things that aren't going to have much -- we've got to talk about criminal procedure and production. How you get there is interesting, I guess, to somebody, but I need to

HEARING 107

understand -- we're having documents produced in response to a motion to exclude an expert. And then there were other documents produced after the trial was over; right?

I think what you're trying to establish -tell me if I'm not understanding. The point
you're trying to make is that that second
production -- not the grand jury production,
but the pretrial production -- produced every
United Way document that anybody from RSM laid
eyes on; is that what you're trying to
establish?

MR. HUNTER: Yes. Every document in that collection in the database, Your Honor.

And broader point that I'm --

THE COURT: What's that mean, "in that collection in the database"? What's that mean?

MR. HUNTER: So I believe Mr. Commisso has testified to this. That as part of his internal investigation, he put together a large e-discovery database of documents collected from email accounts, from virtual desktop images, from United Way's records, that RSM then had access to for their analysis, and he used for his internal investigation and to

respond to the grand jury subpoena.

And the reason why I was asking these questions is because the Court inquired about how Mr. Commisso made a relevancy determination, and, in particular, raised a concern about -- regarding expert discovery. The standard being, wanting to provide every document that the expert laid eyes on. And so what I was trying to do was at least put on the record the efforts that were made to identify those documents and produce them.

THE COURT: Okay.

But don't you understand that that plays right -- that doesn't necessarily help you, because what you're saying is a lawyer for the victim decided what's relevant to produce. And that's, like, the whole point of the motion. And if that's supposed to make me feel better -- I guess it makes me understand more, but it's -- and the problem is -- it isn't that I'm questioning the relevancy determinations.

The point is that someone needs to be accountable and cross-examinable in a trial for that. That's how this works. It's not about -- that I question Mr. Commisso's

HEARING 109

judgment, or even motives. It's just that that has to be something that everybody understands during a trial.

And it isn't particularly helpful to say after the fact, "Oh, none of this mattered. None of this was relevant." It's a difficult thing to know. That's up to a trier of fact -- that's me in this case -- and I don't know. I just keep venting like this at you guys, and I know it doesn't help you.

You can continue with it, but I wasn't questioning Mr. Commisso's definition of relevancy. I was more questioning the fact that he was even making a determination to begin with of -- how that really is justified; right?

It's a criminal prosecution. And the victims in any criminal case produce evidence, sometimes pursuant to a grand jury subpoena. But when you have someone in the process that might have motives that could -- not improper motives, but motives that a trier of fact should be exposed to, that matters. And it's very difficult to make this determination with this. Let me ask this question.

And I say "it's difficult to make this determination." It's harder to keep track of all the different permutations of what was produced here at different times. I mentioned earlier to Mr. Davis -- you might have been off at the other hearing -- I mentioned of requesting a timeline. But I don't want to make you do busywork and waste your time.

Is there a document that I already have that kind of -- you're nodding, Ms. Le -- that kind of lays this out? Because you were just referring to it in the testimony, I know.

What would that be?

MS. BROWN: Well, I referred to document 47, which is the motion to exclude Naviloff's testimony filed by Attorney Harrington.

So as a prelude to his request to exclude Naviloff, he documents the history of the discovery process, especially as it pertains to Mr. Naviloff. So he talks about -- they're notified when they get the report. There's back-and-forth. And I don't have that, but I think there's even the letters -- or emails that are in there, but Attorney Harrington's document 47 documents the history up until the

time of the filing of that motion.

And then if you look at the two motions that are responsive, which is document 50 and 51, then I think that even picks up on, like -- because I know from document 51, the Government talks about the chambers conference, and what happened in the chambers conference.

So if you put those three documents together -- 47, 50, and 51 -- it gives a pretty good timeline of what was happening.

THE COURT: Through when?

MS. BROWN: One's 52 -- I want to say this all is going on through October, November. It was all pretrial.

THE COURT: Yeah. And, see, I want the big picture.

Go ahead, Ms. Le.

MS. LE: And I know this because I wrote this part of the Government's response, Your Honor.

So record document 170 -- and this follows -- if you go to page five, starting at page five and on to page six, I prepared the charts about the posttrial discovery and the Court's order. We have listed for the Court

HEARING 112

dates that we received certain records and dates that we provided those records to defense counsel, including the Bates number, as well as the descriptions of the contents of the posttrial discovery.

Which I think is what the Court is concerned about; right, Judge?

THE COURT: Yeah. Yes. I'm going to look at that, though, because I really don't want to create busywork for you guys just to have you file more stuff. You're very busy as it is, and you've worked hard on this.

I'm going to look at these documents and determine if they tell me what I want to know before I make you do anything else.

MS. LE: And it might help the Court when you go back and look at certain of the exhibits -- we did list all the Bates numbers by sequence. So if the Court has a particular document that is a concern that was produced posttrial, in our pleading on page six through seven --

THE COURT: What's your pleading -- 170?

MS. LE: 170, Your Honor. That is our objection to Defendant's motion to dismiss.

That was filed September 23, 2020. And it goes through the history of the Court's discovery order and our litigation regarding discovery.

And when we created these charts, we did that by documenting our production, including when we received information from either RSM or United Way, the Bates sequence, as well as a description. So that that might help the Court if you're going to go back and compare the exhibits that counsel has submitted during this litigation.

THE COURT: Thanks.

Look, Judge Johnson is trying to reach me about something that we've got to deal with, like, right now. So I'm going to have to suspend this. It's 12:11.

We will resume at 1:15; okay?

(Recess taken at 12:11 p.m., and the proceedings resumed at 1:17 p.m.)

THE COURT: All right.

Let's resume, please.

MR. HUNTER: No further questions from the Government.

THE COURT: Okay.

Attorney Brown?

1

2

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

3

BY MS. BROWN:

4

6

5

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15 16

17

18

19 20

21

22 23

24

25

I just want to clarify something, Q. Attorney Commisso.

> You were asked questions about this e-discovery database. I think we already established earlier that this e-discovery database, we now know, didn't have everything that RSM had access to?

That's correct. Α.

> That's my question. MS. BROWN:

THE WITNESS: Okay.

And, Mr. Commisso, you said THE COURT: you wanted to clarify a couple of things. even though it's unusual, I know you were admitted pro hac vice, so I want to give you an opportunity to do that.

THE WITNESS: Okay. And, really, I think it's just one thing.

I gave an answer last Thursday.

The answer I gave was "we were all working together." And as soon as I said those words, I knew that it needed clarification. I believe the context was pretrial discovery.

HEARING 115

So after Mr. Naviloff was hired by the Government, and after Mr. Harrington had submitted requests for certain discovery concerning Mr. Naviloff, there was a series of email messages. I don't remember the exact exhibits. I don't remember the exact question. But I do know what I meant by my testimony when I said we were all working together.

As I've explained, I was responsible for producing United Way's documents and for protecting United Way's privilege. And so I had conversations with Greg Naviloff and others at RSM. I had conversations with Mr. Davis and others in the U.S. Attorney Office. And, I guess, in a sense together, we were working to identify and produce documents, to the extent that we could, in response to Mr. Harrington's pretrial discovery request.

So I didn't want to just leave that answer, "we were all working together," hanging out there as something having bigger meaning than I had intended.

THE COURT: Okay. That's understood. I hadn't seized on it in any kind of way like that, but I understand your point. Let me ask

you this question.

You brought this case -- I think it was you, personally, right, to the U.S. Attorney's Office in Boston before the New Hampshire office accepted it -- at least that's what some of the briefing says.

Were you involved in that?

THE WITNESS: I contacted the U.S.

Attorney's Office in Boston twice. And before we really got into a discussion, a prosecutor in Boston notified me that the case was already active in New Hampshire, and I was introduced to Mr. Davis.

THE COURT: Oh. All right.

So what I've read -- that they twice declined prosecution -- is that inaccurate?

THE WITNESS: I can only tell you my understanding. My first call to the U.S. Attorney's Office in Boston, I asked some questions and I did not identify my client. So there was no -- in the first call, there was no declination. There was just a discussion about some issues in general without identifying a client.

In the second call, I called and said,

"Okay. We want to move forward. I'm going to identify my client, and I would like to schedule a meeting." And very shortly after that, I was told that I would be introduced to Mr. Davis because they already had an active investigation.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DAVIS: Judge, may I make a brief proffer on that?

THE COURT: Absolutely. I was just going to ask you to do that. Yes.

MR. DAVIS: So, Judge, the New Hampshire federal investigators' open investigation at the end of 2017 -- that was based on bank information regarding the wires to Pakistan. And so well before we knew anything about anything at United Way, both the FBI and Homeland Security had an open investigation that I, at least, had a meeting and maybe two meetings at. Some subpoenas were issued. So we were -- and we were aware of Mr. Alrai's travel in the spring of 2018. And, if you recall, there was evidence about the border search as he came back in in April of 2018.

So all of that had happened in this case

HEARING 118

with New Hampshire before Mr. Commisso called Mass. And the FBI notified me that United Way had called Massachusetts. I communicated with the fraud chief in Boston. And we quickly resolved that, because we had the open case, we would continue.

THE COURT: Okay. That's actually fairly significant -- to me, anyway. And I think that's the fist time I've heard that.

The reason I say that is only because if one has to sit -- I mean, look, I think the motives of counsel representing a client who's been victimized -- or allegedly victimized, right, by an employee are not hard to understand.

But it's a very different picture of Mr. Commisso seeking twice to have a case investigated and prosecuted by the Boston federal authorities, being rebuffed, and then coming to New Hampshire and affirmatively seeking that out. That's a very different picture than you've presented, because it would -- it might suggest more about the intensity of counsel's or the client's wishes to have the case prosecuted for any number of reasons.

HEARING 119

So the fact that there's an open case already and you knew it was underway is -- I think that's significant information, and I'm glad to have it now.

THE WITNESS: And, Your Honor, I was never rebuffed in my discussions with the prosecutor in Massachusetts.

THE COURT: Yeah, I gather that now. I gather that now. It's just one of those things that gets worked out between districts. Okay. Second question about that.

When you first dealt with federal prosecutors, Mr. Commisso, be it Boston or New Hampshire, I know you eventually produced documents pursuant to a grand jury subpoena, or a number of them; right?

But in your initial content -- I can think of when I was a prosecutor, if I had received a contact from a victim -- an alleged victim or their counsel, I probably would have requested some documents just to kind of get started -- to review the situation.

Did that happen here?

THE WITNESS: So your question was broken up and I might have missed the important part

of it.

So you said "did that happen here." Did what happen here?

THE COURT: Before you began responding to grand jury subpoenas, were you responding to other sort of just more informal or less formal requests for information? Did any of the prosecutors or federal agents ask you to give them any documents so they could review your situation and decide whether to open a case?

THE WITNESS: So what I remember was a first meeting with Mr. Davis at the very beginning of June.

THE COURT: As to what?

THE WITNESS: The very beginning of June, approximately June 3 or 4. And Mr. Vossio attended with me.

And at that meeting, we had a small binder of documents, approximately 15 to 20 documents, that we had put together that helped to tell the basic story as we understood it. And I believe we left one or more copies of that binder with Mr. Davis or with the agents.

And within 24 hours of that meeting, we had a grand jury subpoena. And I believe we

started producing and enrolling production -- batches of documents as quickly as we could.

THE COURT: Okay. Yep.

My other question, and I want to ask this question again with Mr. Commisso still on the witness stand, only because I think the next witness won't have any information about it.

I want to explain how I remember something, and to determine if I have it right or wrong, through Counsel. My memory is that Mr. Harrington moved to exclude Mr. Naviloff. And then we got -- this is before COVID, but we got on the -- I think it was a telephone call together, because it was kind of a discovery dispute in a way. At least that's the way I saw it. I was never really seriously considering excluding Mr. Naviloff, but I thought, I think maybe correctly, that this is just an attempt to get information.

And what I said was -- and tell me if I got this wrong -- I said, "Look" -- I asked him on the phone, "Mr. Harrington, what do you want?" He kind of listed it out.

And I sort of charged you guys to -- the prosecutors and defense lawyers to "go work it

HEARING 122

out and get back to me if you can. If there's anything you disagree about, let the Court know and I'll resolve it." But my memory is you did resolve it. And that's -- I think the letter we've seen in this hearing was part and parcel to that process. It was sort of a request from Mr. Harrington about -- a bullet list of things he wanted, and you were working through it together.

I don't remember you coming back to the Court saying, "We have these areas of disagreement. Could you resolve them?"

Do I have that right, roughly, if anybody remembers -- Mr. Hunter, Ms. Le, Mr. Davis -- about what happened?

MR. HUNTER: I think so, Your Honor. I think there was one point of disagreement.

And that was Mr. Harrington sent us a list of search terms for John Commisso to run through the e-discovery database. And that's what prompted Mr. Commisso's letter.

We forwarded it to him. And it was -- the cost to reactivate the database, and run the searches, and do the review that would be required -- so that was the thing we weren't

HEARING 123

able to resolve. But we were able to resolve other issues, which goes to -- like, I've got to find the documents anyone from RSM clicked on, for example, was part of that resolution.

THE COURT: Yeah. I think -- did I sort of give you a new list of search terms that was somewhat narrowed? Did I do that? Or how did we get that resolved? Anybody remember?

MS. LE: Go ahead, Mr. Commisso.

THE WITNESS: So what I recall is we had a hearing about the list of search terms and about my letter. And there was a discussion -- there certainly was no agreements.

I'm not sure about the resolution, but in terms of how it was reported on the docket, I believe if you look at one of the final orders on the docket before trial, it makes a reference to "the matter is resolved as stated at the hearing," or something like that, so that you have to read the transcript to know how it was resolved. That's what I remember.

THE COURT: Okay.

But, certainly, nobody stood up and said, "No, I'm entitled to something I haven't received." Or no one said, "Judge, we still

HEARING 124

haven't produced this, and we'd like you to resolve it." Once I issued that order, I don't think we heard anybody else object or counter that. Okay.

Ms. Brown, if you have any different information, by the way, please share it. You weren't there at the time, I know, but you might have a different understanding.

MS. BROWN: Not about what was said at the hearing. I think -- in terms of understanding, I think one of our issues is -- I kind of referred to it at my cross-examination --

That discovery isn't about "Simon Says."

That you don't use -- it was very clear that

Attorney Harrington and his partner were trying
to get at the basis of Mr. Naviloff's opinion.

Where was it coming from? What was it based on? Who did he consult with? All of those things. And he may not have used the precise words to trigger a search of -- but I don't think that's necessary for Brady.

I think, first of all, the Government has the obligation of Brady, regardless of whether the Defendant asks for it. Because if you don't know it's there, you don't know what to

ask for.

But, secondly, there's no question that counsel for Mr. Alrai was trying to get at the bottom of this opinion, both on the advice of his expert in IT, and because he wanted to be able to cross-examine this witness about the basis of his opinions. And that's articulated in document 47. So I don't think it's a matter -- it's not necessary for a Brady violation that he used a magic term to get a magic document. And so I just wanted to add that.

But I will also agree that how the litigation regarding Naviloff tied up was somewhat loose in terms of whether that -- like, whether that motion was still live or not. It sounds like there was some resolution. It's not like a situation where Attorney Harrington filed a motion to withdraw the motion to exclude Naviloff.

Or did he say, "Oh, well, yeah, I'll take some discovery" -- was he withdrawing his objection by accepting additional discovery?

That's not clear to me.

THE COURT: Well, it's clear to me. It's clear to me only because I'm trying to keep

your motion in context.

There wasn't a request, once the Court said it was resolved or during the trial, where anybody said, "Look, there's something I was entitled to I didn't get." But your point about Brady is well received. I understand your point.

It's just that -- I can't say that I'm persuaded by it, but I understand that there's a difference between you didn't comply with the discovery rule or order and, well, during your compliance, you either became aware or should have become aware of Brady material, to which I am entitled, regardless of any order or rule. That's a different thing.

And that's your argument; right?

MS. BROWN: That is my argument. That's what I'm going to address when I sum up the presentation.

THE COURT: Okay. I just wanted to have a conversation while we still have Mr. Commisso here under oath. I think I've got the answers as best as I'm going to get. And I think we should move on to the next witness.

MS. BROWN: Well, Your Honor, over the

HEARING 127

weekend and again this morning, cocounsel and I have conferred. And I don't think we're going to call Mr. Meyer. Most of what we get from him is rehashing his testimony, which is -- there's a transcript of it, and it is what it is. I don't think we need him to go through his testimony again, because it's the record. So we've elected not to call him.

I'll ask Attorney Commisso if he can notify Mr. Meyer. I know he's been waiting, and I apologize for that. But we couldn't make that call until we had examined Mr. Commisso. So that would be our final -- well, Attorney Commisso would be our final witness. We do have some summation for the Court.

I don't know if the Government has any witnesses. I don't think they do, but --

THE COURT: Give me a second then. I'm just going to check my notes in case there's anything I wanted to ask Mr. Commisso that I would have asked Meyer. Hold on a minute. Okay.

I have some questions, but I think only one of them needs to be done now with Mr. Commisso.

HEARING 128

I'm looking at document 1-64-12, Exhibit 12 to Attorney Brown's motion. It's an email -- we've talked about it. It's an email where Mr. Naviloff emailed Mr. Commisso some folders.

And he said, "Let's discuss the contents of these four folders for potentially providing to the USAO"; right? And I guess my question is -- like, I'm not sure who to ask this of.

Which of the three of you prosecutors was primarily dealing with Mr. Naviloff? Was there one of you who was doing it, or was it all of you?

MR. DAVIS: Judge, I would say
Mr. Naviloff was Matt Hunter's witness, but
that I was the lead. And I think we talked
about -- Matt and I probably talked about every
issue of significance with Mr. Naviloff.

THE COURT: Then here's my question for both of you. I'll ask you first, Mr. Davis.

Were you aware that Naviloff, who is by this time your expert -- okay. You retained him -- were you aware he was consulting with Mr. Commisso about his productions to you?

MR. DAVIS: So, Judge, I would have said

HEARING 129

what I was aware of was that anything that potentially involved privilege -- that is,
United Way's privileges that were still being asserted -- would be run through Commisso. And in numerous discussions with Naviloff, that step in the process was always acknowledged and something we expected. And Matt may be able to supplement that further, but I certainly -- well, I guess I'll leave it at that.

THE COURT: Well, would you agree with me, though, that this email, unless I misunderstood the testimony from the witnesses in this hearing -- this conversation seems to go beyond that. This isn't clearly a discussion of what's privileged, unless I'm misunderstanding. This seems to go beyond a discussion of privilege. And it has Mr. Commisso involved in Naviloff's document productions in a way that exceeds or that goes beyond the scope that you just described about privilege discussions; right?

MR. DAVIS: I certainly agree it's beyond the scope of privilege. I think Mr. Commisso can further illuminate that, and Matt, maybe, as well. Because I think it's fair to say that

HEARING 130

Naviloff, at various times, would have encountered a scope issue. Because he's at RSM. And RSM, writ large, is doing several different things for United Way.

And my understanding -- my broad understanding of this issue is that it was a scope question for Naviloff. That is, are all of the folders on this thing what we're talking about here or not? I don't read it as a relevancy sort of conference between Naviloff and Commisso.

THE COURT: Yeah. I almost wish I had sequestered all of you before we had this conversation, but I'm just going to continue with you. I don't mean that in an insulting way. I hope you don't take it that way. It's just we all, as human beings, have a tendency to influence each other.

But, Mr. Davis -- so what you just said there -- my understanding is that goes to this scope issue involving RSM's work that goes beyond loss calculation; okay?

And I guess my question -- and you said,
"I read this as a discussion of that kind of
scope issue, because we both agree it's not

privileged."

What's the basis for that understanding?
What makes you read it that way? What is the
basis for your understanding that this isn't
Mr. Naviloff consulting with Mr. Commisso
regarding his production to your office
regarding loss calculation?

MR. DAVIS: I think it's what I've been told about it. And I just -- I don't trust my memory. I'm not looking at the document, either. I would defer to Matt Hunter and Commisso on the point.

And I'm sorry I'm not being helpful. As you might have guessed, Judge, I'm 62.

Questions about folders, I'm not as sharp on.

I don't mean to make excuses, but I would trust

Matt's memory and I would trust John Commisso's

memory much better than I.

THE COURT: And I accept your answers, by the way, as being as honest and straightforward as your memory will allow.

Mr. Hunter, do you follow that line of questioning? It appears to Mr. Davis, and I agree, that this conversation here in this Exhibit 12, document 1-64-12, is not about

HEARING 132

privilege. Now, Mr. Davis has told me what he thinks it refers to, and then he's explained to me why he thinks that -- what the basis is.

What's your understanding of what this conversation's about, if you have one? Well, let me ask you first a question that I asked Mr. Davis first.

Were you aware that Mr. Naviloff was consulting with Attorney Commisso, part and parcel to this production of his expert file to you?

MR. HUNTER: So the part that I was aware of, Your Honor, was that, similar to what Mr. Davis said -- that United Way waived its privilege as to RSM's loss analysis, but not everything that RSM did. So I was aware that RSM, because they couldn't waive the privilege or produce privileged materials, was consulting with John Commisso to ensure that they were producing things that were within the scope of that waiver, and were not producing things that had to do with other work that RSM was doing. So that was my understanding of that.

And regarding -- and I don't know exactly the title of this particular email, but I do

1 know that when we got it -- a discovery request 2 from --3 THE COURT: It's August 2019. Okay. So, yeah, this is when 4 MR. HUNTER: we're getting discovery requests from 5 Mr. Harrington. And I know what we asked RSM 6 7 for is we wanted basically the work file --8 like, all of their analyses, any documents that 9 they had that they relied on or considered in 10 their analysis. And we were looping in John Commisso to ensure that RSM didn't produce 11 12 something that was outside the privilege 13 waiver. 14 So my understanding was that was what the 15 consultation was about. Not -- again, not to 16 discuss what is relevant to your loss 17 calculation; but is this something that relates 18 to other work streams that RSM was doing for 19 the United Way? 20 THE COURT: Okay. And what's the basis of that 21 22 understanding? Where did you learn that?

understanding -- it is where we were at this

stage in the litigation, the summer before

The basis for that

MR. HUNTER:

23

24

25

trial. Because I think at that point there was a general understanding that United Way had waived all privileges to the work Naviloff did for loss. But we knew that there was other work that RSM had done.

THE COURT: So you're surmising that based on the timing of the conversation?

MR. HUNTER: And my understanding at that time of the nature of United Way's privilege assertion. That we had asked RSM to -- we had asked to ensure that -- we knew that RSM was consulting with John Commisso regarding privilege, and we asked them to do that. Because we didn't have a right to seek privileged material.

But what we asked for is we wanted everything that had to do with the work Greg Naviloff did as to loss. So that was my understanding of what -- the discussions we had had and what we were seeking to get.

THE COURT: But, again, you're surmising it. You're basing your understanding of what this email means based on its timing and your understandings of, as you point out, the scope of the waiver and other work streams.

HEARING 135

In other words, it's not like you know today, one way or the other, whether Naviloff was just plain consulting with Commisso about what to produce.

MR. HUNTER: I certainly -- we've had a whole hearing about this. I think that Greg Naviloff and John Commisso haven't said that there was that sort of activity going on. And we certainly did not ask for that type of activity to be going on. And so I have no reason to think that that activity was going on.

I understand there's this email. But I see this email is consistent with what we did understand, which was John Commisso was protecting United Way's privilege. I suppose -- I have no reason to think or dispute that that is what was happening, if John Commisso testified about it and Greg Naviloff testified about it.

THE COURT: I know, but -- okay. That's true. But Ms. Brown filed a motion about it. And there's been a lot of time since you filed the motion and we had the hearing.

So I guess I'm asking you, did you talk to

HEARING 136

witnesses and say "what's this all about?"

Because you haven't told me that's the basis

for your understanding. You're sort of

surmising it. And, like, that's fine, but

there's also just preparing a witness.

"Hey, were you consulting with Commisso about everything you did before you did it? And in what way, and about what?" I mean, did you have those conversations? It sounds like you did not.

MR. HUNTER: So those conversations are -we asked Greg Naviloff and John Commisso to
prepare declarations of what they did and what
happened. And those are the declarations that
we attached to our motion.

THE COURT: And I don't mean to be flip here, but I'm taking that as a "no," that you didn't ask him these questions that I'm asking you right now.

Like, "What was this conversation about? What was your work -- what was the nature of your working together?" These are -- I don't look at any of this as inappropriate, but I want to understand it. And we're all kind of circling around it a little bit. I guess

that's the best we're going to do.

MR. HUNTER: Your Honor, the reason why -we tried to go through every single email that
defense counsel attached to their motion. We
did have, I think, the general conversation
that is reflected in the declaration -- that he
did a review for privilege. And that was our
understanding.

THE COURT: So you're telling me, then, that defense counsel files a motion with an email where your expert is talking to the lawyer for the victim and saying, "Let's discuss these documents before we produce them to the U.S. Attorney."

And you didn't put that in front of the witness and say, "What is this about? What's going on here?" That didn't happen?

MR. DAVIS: Judge, I would just add --

THE COURT: Wait a minute. Whoa. Whoa.

MR. DAVIS: I'm sorry.

I'm just saying, any prep of the witness is mine, Judge, not Matt Hunter's.

THE COURT: Oh, well, I guess I'll ask you.

I mean, is that something you -- I realize

the answer could be yes or no, but I'm asking what it is.

Did someone ask Naviloff, did someone ask Commisso, "What's this about?"

Because I just asked you a minute ago, "What's the basis for your understanding?"

And you didn't say, "I asked him before the hearing and they told me." You said -- I don't know.

MR. DAVIS: I don't believe I put either of the emails in front of either witness. And I don't think we specifically discussed that question.

THE COURT: Okay.

THE WITNESS: So, Judge, I'd be happy to respond to any of these questions.

THE COURT: No, I'm good, Mr. Commisso. I do have some questions about the process, but that was really the only one.

Well, I guess, let me just ask you this,
Mr. Commisso: Have you heard anything from the
prosecutors that's inconsistent with your
understanding of what's transpired here in
terms of your dealings with Naviloff or your
dealings with them?

HEARING 139

THE WITNESS: Well, I think there's a lot that I could say that would clarify these issues. And I can tell you what I was doing with Naviloff, and why, during that period of time.

THE COURT: And I'm sure you could. The question isn't so much your answers to it. The question is whether anybody -- is whether the trier of fact in this trial had an opportunity to hear all this. All right? Because there's lots of inferences that can be drawn. That seems to be lost on everybody here.

The fact that you guys have an account of what happened, whether or not I think it's accurate based on any number of factors, like your memories, your motives now, your motives at the time -- those are all interesting issues. But those are a-trier-of-fact-for-a-trial issues.

I know I'm supposed to do a privilege -not privilege -- a prejudice assessment here.

It's part of the burden. But I'm not -- I
think I have the information I need to make
that assessment. Because if there's something
I don't understand, there will be explanations.

I know there will be.

And you're a defense lawyer. You understand. Criminal trials are about cross-examination. They're about testing the witnesses. Let me just ask you this,
Mr. Commisso.

You've, I'm sure, represented clients either facing trial or in trial where the prosecution had expert witnesses; right?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COURT: I mean, have you?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COURT: And I assume that you make your normal discovery requests, and you're provided with the file or whatever you've requested in some form; right?

THE WITNESS: Correct.

THE COURT: Have you ever had one when an expert was working with a staff from his or her business, whether it was an accounting firm or something, where underlings or coworkers were also working on the file?

THE WITNESS: No, I can't think of something in particular that matches that circumstance.

THE COURT: A straight answer. I appreciate it.

But if you did -- because there's a 6th Amendment right to confrontation law on this; right? If you did, wouldn't you expect to see, if you had an expert -- if you're dealing with an expert testifying against your client facing felony charges, I assume you wouldn't want to just see what -- you wouldn't take the expert's word, first of all, about what he relied on.

You'd want to see everything he reviewed; am I right?

THE WITNESS: Well, that gets to the heart of the issues in this case.

THE COURT: Well, that's exactly why I'm asking you.

Are you telling me that an expert witness testifying against your client in a federal criminal trial -- you would take the expert's word for what he relied on, and not everything he reviewed?

THE WITNESS: I would make a request for all the documents that he reviewed and relied on.

THE COURT: Right.

And if he was working with underlings -- a 1 staff or coworkers, you'd want to see the 2 communications between them, wouldn't you? 3 Well, I don't know that I 4 THE WITNESS: would have the right to. The rules of 5 discovery don't go that far. 6 Not my question. 7 THE COURT: 8 Would you request it? 9 THE WITNESS: If I was doing my job well, 10 yes, I would expect to request it. 11 THE COURT: And wouldn't you expect, once 12 you requested it, the prosecutors at least to 13 review it to determine whether or not you were 14 entitled to it -- at least review it to 15 determine if there was exculpatory evidence? 16 THE WITNESS: Well, no, not if it's 17 outside the bounds of discovery. 18 THE COURT: So you'd make a request that's 19 outside the bounds of discovery, and not assume 20 that when they responded to it, maybe imposing 21 some restrictions on whatever you'd 22 requested -- you would assume they hadn't even 23 reviewed it? 24 THE WITNESS: Well, now I'm thinking about 25 the context of this case. And I'm thinking

HEARING 143

about the fact that the Government didn't have possession of this evidence, and the evidence that we're talking about now was way outside the bounds of permitted discovery. So I would not have expected the prosecutors to have requested this discovery that nobody thought the Defendant was ever entitled to.

THE COURT: So when you were going through the items, because I -- by the way, I do accept that Mr. Harrington didn't make a request for internal communications. I do, unless there was no violation of any sort of rule or order there. I'm with you.

But were there discussions between you and the prosecutors about the internal communications at RSM regarding this document review? It would seem strange to me that one would rely on all these people that are reflected in the bill that wasn't produced, and not -- just at least discussed the communications.

THE WITNESS: Well, I would say no. And the reason why I feel confident saying no is I'm looking now at Mr. Harrington's discovery request from July 30, which I think was the

first one. 1 2 THE COURT: Yeah. 3 THE WITNESS: And he asked for a copy of all documents and other data "collected and 4 reviewed by RSM in calculating the loss." 5 And those words, "collected and reviewed," 6 7 meant something to me, because that's exactly 8 what I think of when I think of expert 9 discovery. And those are the United Way documents. 10 Those are the invoices, the 11 contracts, the accounting record; right? 12 THE COURT: Yeah. 13 THE WITNESS: So that's what we're talking about -- is where do we find the documents that 14 15 were collected and reviewed? 16 And then in another request it was 17 "reviewed and relied on." But at no time do I remember saying "where 18 do we find" or "who's going to find" or "should 19 20 we find the internal work papers and the internal email communications?" 21 22 I understand -- believe me, I THE COURT: 23 understand that it wasn't requested --24 demanded. 25 But to me, "relied on" -- I mean, if

you're going to rely on -- if you, as an expert, are going to rely on underlings to develop IT -- because he's not an IT expert. He's an accountant; right? We talked about that ad nauseam. It was trial testimony. If I'm going to rely on -- I forget his name...

THE WITNESS: Ryan Gilpin.

THE COURT: Ryan Gilpin. Right. And there was another one that he did testify at trial. If you're going to rely on his work, well, when he transmits that work to you, it might very well include an explanation of his analysis. And that would seem to me something that the expert relied on.

I realize it wasn't as specified as "producible, discoverable." But, to me, the Brady obligation at least makes me wonder whether that should be reviewed. And that's kind of what I'm stuck on here.

THE WITNESS: And I guess I'm at least two or three steps removed from that because I wouldn't have been part of any decision-making process about RSM's documents. And my mind never went anywhere in that direction with respect to those kinds of internal

HEARING 146

communications. It's not something I've ever talked about in any litigation that that would be subject to discovery.

THE COURT: I accept everything you say, except the first thing you said is that you were not involved in the production of RSM -- you were involved in the production of RSM documents. RSM's witness was asking you questions about what to produce.

THE WITNESS: With respect to United Way documents.

THE COURT: Oh, I see, not RSM. Yeah, I mean, I think of the RSM documents as what RSM reviewed. And I view it as their communications with each other, although I do realize that those were not requested or ordered to be produced. This puts this in a very sort of odd posture. Okay.

Listen, I asked Mr. Commisso some questions. If either side wants to pursue my line of questioning with cross or direct, or whatever you want to call it -- if you want to cross my exam, I'll allow Ms. Brown first and then Mr. Davis.

Any questions, Ms. Brown?

1 MS. BROWN: I just wanted to clarify to 2 Mr. Commisso.

- Q. (By Ms. Brown) As a criminal defense lawyer, you're also familiar with constitutional law; right?
- A. Yes.

Q. And so you're familiar that there's case law that says a defendant may object if the expert who is giving the opinion on the witness stand is not the person -- is, for lack of a better word -- I use this -- ghost expert.

So if there is a testifying witness and that witness is testifying to things that would, arguably, be hearsay or at least not allow the Defendant to cross-examine the opinions that come from some other expert, a criminal defense attorney may want to object to that, because they can't cross-examine the underlying opinions if that person isn't called; do you understand that case --

- A. I'm familiar with the idea because you briefed it in this case.
- Q. And so in order to make that objection that someone's opinion is coming from -- some expert's opinion is coming from someone else,

1 you'd have to know about it; right?

- A. I'm not sure what to say. I haven't litigated this issue outside of this case, so I don't have any experience litigating this specific issue about expert discovery in a criminal case like this.
- Q. But you did have the billings that RSM sent to you. And, in fact, your name is right on the bill that they sent to you for their work both for RSM -- I don't think they would have sent you the bills for the Government -- but they sent you the work that they, meaning RSM, did for United Way; right?
- A. Yes, I received bills from RSM.
- 15 Q. And you understood that at least six or seven,
 16 if not more, people worked on the loss
 17 analysis; correct?
 - A. I understood what the bills showed. And, yes,
 I met more than six or seven people over the
 course of the engagement.
 - Q. And that was information that you were privy to that, as far as you know, the Defense attorney didn't know about.

You didn't share your billings with defense counsel prior to trial, did you?

I don't know whether he was privy to it or not. Α. 1 And I know he never asked me for that 2 3 information. I have nothing further. 4 MS. BROWN: THE COURT: Mr. Commisso, though -- didn't 5 Naviloff say -- didn't he testify that he 6 discussed the issue of internal RSM emails with 7 8 you? 9 THE WITNESS: I know he testified -- you mean at the first date of this hearing? 10 11 THE COURT: Yeah. 12 THE WITNESS: He testified about the 13 I don't remember specifically what he issue. said. 14 15 What I remember is he said he THE COURT: 16 asked you about it and talked to you about it. 17 I think I was the one asking him questions. 18 MS. BROWN: For the Court's convenience, 19 there's a transcript of it. And it's at, I 20 think, page 127 -- of what you talked about. Because you asked -- you did ask about it. 21 22 we can address that, but it is in the 23 transcript. 24 THE COURT: I'll take a look at it.

sure you're going to point me to it when you

25

1 argue. 2 Ms. Brown, let me ask you a question 3 before I let Mr. Davis ask the witness. Mr. Commisso just said, well, he's 4 familiar with that body of law because you 5 briefed it -- the idea of communications with 6 people relied on doing a forensic analysis. 7 8 I think of that issue as sort of part of a 9 Crawford, Davis, Bullcoming type of analysis; right? Is that what you're talking about? 10 11 MS. BROWN: Exactly. 12 Okay. And that's not about THE COURT: 13 discovery. That's not about Brady, but it's 14 about confrontation, which, to me, ties in a 15 little bit. 16 MS. BROWN: It was just a follow-up to 17 your questions about his role as a criminal defense attorney -- of what he would anticipate 18 19 Counsel would need. And I just was following 20 up on that. 21 THE COURT: Okay. 22 Mr. Davis, did you have any final questions for Mr. Commisso? 23 24 No questions, Your Honor. MR. DAVIS: 25 THE COURT: Thank you. Okay.

Thanks, Mr. Commisso.

THE WITNESS: So should I let Mr. Meyer know that he's released?

THE COURT: Yeah, apparently so. No one wants to seem to call him. All right.

Your motion, Ms. Brown -- to try to keep this under control -- we can extend this longer if we need to, but why don't we try to restrict ourselves first to -- I'm going to say 15 minutes; okay?

MS. BROWN: I think I can do that, Your Honor.

CLOSING STATEMENT

MS. BROWN: What I've presented -- I actually put together a PowerPoint to organize some of the issues, and especially focus on the issues either that the Court presented to us prior to trial, or issues that have been more of a contention during the trial, and to focus on those. And, obviously, I can go faster or slower through the slides, depending on what questions the Court has about -- the Court may have more question about certain issues than about other slides.

So I had spoken with Charli about this before the hearing. So there's a way that she is -- she could share the screen with me and I could pull up the PowerPoint.

THE COURT: Sure.

THE CLERK: Okay. You should be able to now.

MS. BROWN: I'm getting a visual that John Meyer entered the waiting room, so I'll ignore that.

The right-hand side of the screen is mostly -- I wanted to set out the three issues that are in the motion to dismiss, which are the Brady -- I have split up the Brady violation issues, both into the billing records from the Government that they were in possession of, and the email exchanges and network scans. And the reason for this is one group of documents were in the possession of the Government, and one, arguably -- well, they didn't possess them.

The question is, are they responsible for the non-production? So that's why I divided those two issues. The third issue is the due process violation and failure to take steps to

preserve the IT information. So that's how I've divided them up.

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. BROWN: And for some reason, my screen is not advancing. Oh, I've got it now.

So I wanted to just put up -- the Court, obviously, knows the Brady test -- but different parts of this test apply to different documents. First part, being whether it's exculpatory, applies to everything.

The second part, of whether it was -- the Government either willfully or inadvertently suppressed the evidence, and then whether prejudice. So some of these apply more than others.

In terms of the Brady issue, there's two parts. Again, I'll just kind of skip through. So the billing records.

So these are the records that have the name "John Davis" on the top. They are addressed to the U.S. Attorney's Office. And the question on that is really two parts of the three-part test, which is whether they are exculpatory and whether they were prejudicial. The Government clearly had them. The

HEARING 154

Government clearly did not turn them over. I know the Court asked some questions about whether they had to or not, and I'm going to address that shortly. So I just wanted to start off by -- I put up here what those documents looked like. On the left -- so I basically cut it in half.

On the left-hand side it says

"John Davis," and it says the invoice for RSM.

And it -- on the right-hand side, it lists the work done on the case, billed by hours.

So were these records exculpatory? So just to give a little bit of a breakdown of the timeline, the first notice and request for documents was July 22. And this is when defense counsel learns that Naviloff is going to be an expert for the Government. And they ask for reports prepared by RSM or its employees regarding loss calculation, explanation of methodologies used, and electronic data. And I -- where I can, I put the document number. And then there's another document request, October 18, by a defense counsel.

Well, actually, I think I took this from

HEARING 155

the motion 47-4, where Attorney Harrington says, "The Government has not produced all documents that were available to and reviewed by Mr. Naviloff in preparing his opinion," which ended up being correct. What's important here is what information is available to the Government that should have triggered them to believe that these billing records were exculpatory? And we can talk about prejudicial in a minute.

So just by having these records, the Government knows that Naviloff had billed us in 25 percent of the time preparing the report for the Government. And the Government filed a responsive pleading stating that the Defense had everything Naviloff considered. Knowing that Naviloff had billed us in 25 percent of the time preparing the report, the Government, again, filed an attachment to the responsive pleading. That is actually Commisso's report that we talked about, where he said that they were working on producing all documents reviewed and assessed.

You know, I would add here, Your Honor, just what we didn't get from Commisso is "I

HEARING 156

sent an email to RSM saying, 'Hey, I'm filing something in court saying that I'm working on producing all documents you reviewed and assessed. Please make sure I've done that.'"
He didn't do that.

And you're like, "Well that's not his job." That's another problem here -- is the Government didn't do their job. And their job was to make sure that the Defendant got exculpatory evidence. And I'll get to that in a minute, but that email exchange you were asking about before, where Naviloff and Commisso were talking amongst themselves about what to turn over and what not to turn over -- there's another part of that exchange, which is Exhibit Lll, and I'll talk about it a little bit more.

But that -- so how we got some of these documents, you might remember from Attorney Commisso -- like, we'd get some documents that were redacted. And then he reviewed them again and unredacted some of the things he redacted.

And one of the things he unredacted is in Exhibit Lll, where -- because we were trying to

HEARING 157

figure out how it starts -- Attorney Hunter to Harrington; Harrington to Attorney Hunter; Attorney Hunter to Harrington. So it's a back-and-forth between counsel in the case.

Then, all of a sudden, the email pops over to Naviloff and Commisso, and we're like, "how did that happen?" And there was a missing email in the chain. And it was Attorney Davis, who forwarded those document requests from Harrington to Commisso and Naviloff. Well, why is that important?

When we look at Exhibit Lll, when
Attorney Davis forwards those email exchanges,
which include defense counsel's document
request, it says, "Gentlemen, this just in."
And that really sums up the Government's role
here.

They abdicated their role of, like, "Hey, you guys figure out what we need to turn over here," and they turn over the role of figuring out what's exculpatory to the lawyer for the alleged victim and to their expert witness, and didn't --

I mean, there's no guidance, like, "Hey, can you really make sure that you've got

everything you relied on, or analysis?"

I mean, a few minutes ago, Attorney Hunter said, "We were looking for all analyses." How do we know that?

We don't have an email where
Attorney Hunter sends it to Mr. Naviloff,
saying, "Hey, please give us any analysis you
relied on." Because if he did, they didn't
comply with it, because there's definitely
analysis going on in these emails. And so if
they asked for that, that's problematic.

So that's why they were on notice that these billing records were exculpatory. This email shows it a little bit more -- I've got the same side-by-side as before. Well, actually, no. This is the trial testimony of Naviloff.

And so the point I'm making with this slide -- it says, "While it was clear that the billing records were exculpatory before trial, it is abundantly clear that the billing records were exculpatory at trial." And so what happens is Attorney Harrington makes all these efforts to get to the bottom of Mr. Naviloff's opinions regarding the fraud evaluation issues.

And at trial he asks Mr. Naviloff -- I
think what precedes this is that "you're not an
IT expert." And then he asks him "and in this
particular case, did you consult with any IT
experts in writing your report?"

"I did."

"And who were those IT experts that you consulted with?"

"John Meyer, Diego Rosenfeld, and another couple of associates that report to Diego Rosenfeld."

So this is at trial. The Government knows that this is a billing they have. This billing on the right is from the time period when this report would have been written. There's no Diego Rosenfeld there. Now, Mr. Harrington doesn't know that, but the attorneys for the Government do. And if they were busy, not paying attention to the fact that what these bills -- but at trial, this became abundantly clear that they were sitting on exculpatory evidence that trial counsel could have impeached Naviloff with.

And that -- he's talking about "Diego Rosenfeld is a principal with over

HEARING 160

20 years of experience," and he's not listed there as billing during that period, which would have been July 17, which is around the time Mr. Naviloff became an expert for the Government up until October 4. So this is a really important -- to the extent that they have some excuse for not turning over these records before trial, it is our feeling that these were exculpatory prior to trial. But they became very exculpatory.

And, yeah, I know it would be hard to stop a trial and say, "Wait a minute here. We've got exculpatory evidence. Now it's crystal clear that it's exculpatory," but that's what they had a duty to do. And they didn't do it.

And it even became worse because, in that same testimony that I just read, not only did Greg Naviloff list his IT testimony coming from Rosenfeld, he also listed it coming from Meyer. Now, the Government has sent a letter before trial saying that Mr. Meyer's -- they're not going to offer him as expert witness.

The other thing that's even -- I didn't even put this in my PowerPoint because we're learning this today -- is that there was a

HEARING 161

stream of documents from Mr. Meyer to
Mr. Naviloff that -- Mr. Commisso was out of
that stream. And I'll come back to why that's
important in a minute.

So the Government is at trial. Their expert witness is saying that these two IT experts were very important to his consultation.

And they're not stepping up to say, "Wait a minute. We've got some information that's not clear on that." And that's very consistent with what I said before -- is sort of a "hear no evil; see no evil. You guys figure it out" kind of thing, and "you send us whatever you want to send us."

So as I said, after this cross-examination, the Government knows that their key witness is not an IT expert, and that this key witness had consulted with a -- consulted with a non-testifying IT -- well, it should be just "expert" -- well, I mean, if you consider other people at RSM. And this factor is not disclosed to Defendant.

Naviloff's claim, revealed at trial, that he consulted with an IT expert to inform his

HEARING 162

opinions is not consistent with the billing records possessed by the Government. And the RSM billing records which were possessed by the Government would have materially impeached Mr. Naviloff, and they still did not turn them over.

I want to come to one of the Court's questions here.

THE COURT: Can you go back to that slide?

I just have to ask you. This is a heavy
document trial. There's a lot of documents, a
lot of discovery. I'm not sure I'm ready to
accept that it would be clear the minute -- I
agree, by the way, that the bill would have
been a good cross-examination tool after that
testimony. I'm not disputing that at all.

But I'm not sure I'm ready to hold the prosecutors responsible for not immediately realizing that this bill -- we don't even know why they didn't produce the bill, really. It could have been a conscious decision. It could have been inadvertent. But the idea that they would recall that and immediately recognize it as exculpatory and realize they had to produce it -- that seems like a lot to me.

Why do you make that argument?

MS. BROWN: Well, first of all, going back to the test that I set forth before, inadvertent means we win. That inadvertent disclosure can be a Brady violation.

THE COURT: Sure. Doesn't mean you win.

It means -- you know what I mean.

MS. BROWN: Right, but it would satisfy that prong of the test. I should have said that.

And there's lots of Brady cases out there where there were innocent reasons for not turning it over. Bundy. The Government didn't know about the documents in question -- that there was someone working for them that didn't produce or withheld the documents, but the actual lawyers for the Government didn't know about them.

And, in fact, Bundy is a really good case, because what happened in Bundy is when they did learn about the documents, they said, "Stop," and they turned them over in the middle of the trial in Bundy. This didn't happen here. And there are cases where the Government can kind of save themselves, if they turn -- well, say,

HEARING 164

"That wasn't really clear it was exculpatory.

Now that I see your defense, yeah, it's more apparent."

But I don't think we need to prove intentional. It can be inadvertent, but they -- I think you have to look at it cumulatively, which is what I talked about before -- that Exhibit Lll, which is -- they had -- they had passed this off in terms of worrying what documents the Defendant got. They passed it off to Naviloff and Commisso.

And to the extent it was inadvertent, they're still to blame, because they had a role in finding exculpatory evidence as to their own expert witness when they were on notice. And that billing record put them on notice.

You're muted, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

It's not that I disagree with the analysis you're giving. It's more that I just don't think -- in your papers, you have repeatedly accused him of intentional misconduct. And I don't think I'm as ready as you are to assume that, like, that bit of testimony from Naviloff immediately registered with them as something

HEARING 165

that alerted them to a particular document they should have produced.

It's not that I disagree with your point about inadvertence or anything like that. It just seems to be a view of adverse counsel that attributes to them some degree of misconduct that I'm just not ready to find based on this evidence.

But you've got to make your argument, so go ahead.

MS. BROWN: Well, I think, Your Honor, the error -- they've got a responsibility to keep an eye out for this stuff. And they had this document. And, as I said, you've got to look at it cumulatively.

To the extent of being called -- being accused of being on a fishing expedition, repeatedly, and being accused of dilatory discovery tactics, defense counsel was persistent in saying, "We want to get to the bottom of this opinion," and they kept doing that. And the Government was on notice of that.

And they knew that -- and in these requests it says "or their coworkers or people

HEARING 166

who work for RSM." Over and over,
Attorney Harrington was trying to get to the
bottom of this. And then they get this bill
that has six people working on the case, and
the one who's testifying bills less than
25 percent.

That's just clearly a red flag here when you put that together. Alone, maybe it wouldn't have set off alarm bells; but with the Defendant's persistent request for getting to the bottom of Naviloff's testimony to be able to have ability to impeach him -- when you put that together, then it certainly put that -- put them on notice. Or, as I said, we don't have to prove that it was intentional -- just that it was inadvertent.

THE COURT: Yep.

MS. BROWN: So the next slide has to do with some of the questions the Court posed. What is the authority for the proposition that the Government must or should turn over itemized expert bills?

And what we're saying is, we don't have to prove that they always have to turn over expert bills. I don't think that's what the law is in

HEARING 167

discovery. What we're saying is, to the extent that expert bills are covered by work product or attorney-client privilege -- I think it would probably be more work product if it was a prosecution -- a prosecution still has a duty to disclose Brady materials, even if that was work product. So that is what applies.

It's also worth noting that in one of the -- I'm not sure if it's document 50 or 51.

Actually, it's 50. I have it right there -- 50:6. They said that they had produced documents consistent or akin to Rule 26.

Rule 26 provides that billing records for a testifying expert are not work product. And that makes sense. I mean, how much somebody's getting paid is relative to their credibility and bias. So to the extent there was any concern that these records were covered by work product, and even -- it's not just a matter of turning over the record.

It should have clued them in to picking up the phone and talking to their expert witness, like, "Whose opinion is this?" And, "You've told us that this is your opinion, but there's a lot of people working on this case, and we

HEARING 168

need to know that." And there was no curiosity, whatsoever, as to the basis of these opinions, despite repeated attempts to get to the bottom of it by defense counsel.

I wanted to mention this. There was -- I forgot if it was during the questioning of Mr. Sgro or Mr. Naviloff, but Attorney Le mentioned common sense.

"it would be common sense that there would be emails in this case." And I think we need to put that in perspective. Because if you knew that six people worked on the expert report, and that Naviloff did less than 25 percent of the work on the report, yes, it would be common sense that there were emails among the team sharing their analysis and findings.

But if you didn't know that six people worked on the expert report, and you'd been told that you had everything Naviloff reviewed and considered, it would not be commonsense that much of the work and analysis had been done by others. So I think it's important to look through the lens of the information the Government had and the information defense

counsel had at that time.

They are exculpatory -- these billing records -- I'm still on the billing records -- because the Court relied on Naviloff's testimony when it found that "the duplicate billing, failure to register services in some cases, the astronomically expensive markups established fraud."

They're also exculpatory because Naviloff was the only witness who testified as to these things -- the duplicate billing, et cetera.

And if the Government had provided the billing records, it would have led to further discovery and the emails.

I mean, that's how this happened after trial -- is once we, as post-conviction counsel, saw the emails combined with the testimony, we knew what to ask for. We knew to ask for the emails. And those emails rendered additional exculpatory evidence that I'll talk about next, which is the emails -- mostly intra-RSM emails and the network scan.

And it's our opinion -- our position that they were favorable evidence to the Defendant, the Government willfully or inadvertently

HEARING 170

suppressed the evidence, and that there is -and so I think what I put in this last bullet
here -- "there's no Brady violation if the
Government did not suppress the evidence." So
since that's sort of the, for lack of a better
word, the big issue, I'm going to address that
first instead of going prong by prong.

And so it's our position the Government suppressed the evidence -- the RSM emails and network scans -- either willfully or inadvertently, when they represented the Defendant had everything RSM considered or reviewed. And I'll get to that in that minute in terms of those representations.

The key to understanding why the Government is responsible for the nondisclosure is the question that the Court also asked of the parties -- is what is the meaning of and reliance upon the Government's representations as to its disclosures of documents considered by Mr. Naviloff, and the existence of further documents of this nature?

And going back -- I mean, it sort of goes to your comments a few minutes ago, Your Honor, about not believing that the Government did

HEARING 171

this intentionally, or willfully, or maliciously. Again, we don't have to prove that.

Let's just look at it as inadvertently and maybe add the word "reckless" or "negligent" in there. So going back to what we said before, they've handed off this duty. Now, if you're going to put in a motion that Defendant has everything that RSM reviewed and considered, you should check on that.

You should pick up the phone and say,
"Hey, Mr. Naviloff, I've got to respond to
this. And I'm going to put in this motion I
have everything that you reviewed -- any
analysis." That's what they said -- they said
they asked for analysis. "Do I have all that?"

Hopefully, Mr. Naviloff would have been honest enough to say, "Well, there was some internal analysis. There was some internal documents. We've got these network scans -- it's, like, 40 tabs of them." That didn't -- we assume, even giving the Government the benefit of the doubt and looking at it in a light most favorable to them, they were negligent, because they put these statements in

HEARING 172

a motion that we now know just aren't accurate.

And even if they did it inadvertently -even if they did it without double-checking,
they're still responsible, because that pretty
much sent the Defendant -- he's, like, "Okay.
I guess I got everything, because they've said
I've got everything he considered."

This is a list of cases. And we talked last week of doing the supplemental motion. I will put them in that supplemental motion of where -- why it's significant that the Government made representations regarding what they produced, and what they didn't produce, and why that's important to the Brady analysis. I'm not going to go through every case here, but we will include this information. But there is case law supporting our analysis that, again, with the Government, inadvertently makes -- it suppresses evidence. And we're saying they suppressed it by making these representations.

These also go to the information about the -- why the Defendant didn't file a Rule 17 subpoena as well. Again, he was told repeatedly -- what is interesting here on this

HEARING 173

issue, Your Honor, at least how I'm understanding them -- and I've learned a lot from this hearing. But at least how I'm understanding things, the Government was passing this off to Naviloff and Commisso.

But we're not sure what guidance -- again, we know Commisso is putting in an affidavit or declaration that he was going to check to make sure the Defendant had everything that was reviewed, but he can't say that he passed that along to RSM.

And we haven't heard any evidence that the Government passed along to RSM, "Hey, we're filing a motion saying we've -- we're turning over everything you considered or reviewed, including consulting with internal IT experts." So the Government can't save themselves from this by having -- for having a hands-off approach to discovery or finding exculpatory evidence.

This is even more dense, and I know it's hard to read. This is a list, and we will include it --

THE COURT: Go back to the last slide, please.

MS. BROWN: Sure.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MS. BROWN: And I want to emphasize that there's been all sorts of parsing of words on this, whether "relied" or "considered."

To the extent that you take the word "relied" as being -- looked at it, decided it wasn't important, it's important to remember that Attorney Commisso, in that affidavit that was attached to the Government's motion, said "reviewed."

And there's -- "reviewed" means looked at, even if you didn't find it important or whatever.

THE COURT: I view that as "relied."

"Relied" is anything the expert saw. Because disregarding is the same as considering.

MS. BROWN: Exactly.

And so the next is just a compilation of the representations. I think most of this comes from our motion. We will include this list. But it's very -- as I say, if you just focus on that affidavit -- I'm sorry.

This slide is about the misleading representations -- the significance of that.

HEARING 175

And we've found several cases -- in fact,
Badley, which -- this isn't new case law --

"In reliance on the misleading representations, the Defendants might abandon lines of independent investigation" -- in this case we would say "filing a subpoena -- defenses or trial strategies that would have pursued." So this is very basic law that the representations are really key to the Government's role in the suppression of this evidence.

And I also want to compare here -- if there's any doubt that this is exculpatory, I sort of will rely on the emails themselves.

Because this is one particular email from Fitzgerald to Naviloff where they're having this conversation about how "we need a substantive meeting with Diego to get him in the loop. I'm a bit worried now that we are communicating with the United States Attorney's Office and relying on Ryan, who is only a newly promoted senior associate."

So RSM knows it looks bad to have Gilpin being the only one who is supplying the IT analysis in this case. And, so -- and what's

HEARING 176

real important is -- maybe this makes a point better than my previous slide of how Naviloff was spinning here.

He has this internal email about "we've got to bring the senior guy on board because most of our IT work was done by Ryan Gilpin."

And then at trial, when he's asked about his IT expert, he goes, "Oh, Diego Rosenfeld is a principal with over 20 years of experience."

He's trying to sell the value of his report.

He wants to be a good expert.

Understandable, but it was testimony where the Defendant was denied an ability to use very -- to have the team -- the RSM team admitting a weakness in their analysis, and the weakness being that they had a more junior associate working on the case. That would have been powerful. And I think that the prejudice prong is easily satisfied by what the Defendant could have cross-examined versus the fact that he didn't have the ability to do that because this was not turned over.

Another analysis here is -- it's not just about impeachment. The Kyles v. Whitley case talks about that "the suppressed evidence could

HEARING 177

have discredited the caliber of the investigation." I know -- you may remember some of the questioning -- in the previous hearings, we talked about emails where they were looking for an IP address to establish venue, looking for restitution information, talking about whether, if they pursued a certain strategy, the Defendant would get the information in discovery.

They were asked to create documents for the Government -- "documents" meaning, like, an analysis or a spreadsheet, I think is what Commisso testified to.

So if defense counsel had had all this information, that would have clearly discredited the caliber of this investigation of -- they've already got a witness who's working both sides -- well, I don't want to say sides of the fence, but had worked for RSM, the alleged victim, and now is going to work for the Government. And that in his role for working with RSM, that that witness or team of witnesses were talking about how to help the Government. And this goes back to the summer of 2018.

HEARING 178

This information was exculpatory. And this is -- yeah, this is a better -- this is the emails about -- and this is November 7. So this is before Mr. Alrai is even indicted. And I think this is after one of the meetings with the U.S. Attorney's Office.

So there's much more to this email, but there's a back-and-forth about this meeting with the U.S. Attorney's Office. And part of that discussion is consideration of the net worth method. The reason that they suggest this is using this method would put out of play the opportunity to dispute market valuations and complex IT issues.

Well, guess what the Government did? And this is right from their reply motion to our motion to dismiss. They're saying that the non-disclosed evidence wasn't prejudicial because they still had the personal enrichment analysis, and it had nothing to do with the IT issues, and it was completely unrelated to the work RSM did for United Way UWMB.

Well, it's not completely unrelated, because while Naviloff is still -- and Fitzgerald -- are still working for United Way

HEARING 179

in November of 2018, they're trying to see how they can help the Government's case be -- defend against disputes as to market valuation. And that's what happened at trial from the previous emails.

Attorney Harrington is trying to attack
Naviloff of, like, "Hey, you're not an IT
expert. How can you come in here and say that
this software is the same as this software, or
this IT application is the same as this IT
application, or there were duplicate billings
or services not rendered? How can you
calculate the loss on something that you don't
have any underlying expertise?"

So what -- this is proof that RSM and
Naviloff -- and this could have been used
against them -- that they helped come up with
the Government's plan to not just rely on
market value and to look at personal
enrichment. So that, I think, is another
reason why this evidence would have been -- the
nondisclosure was prejudicial. I think that's
a better way I want to say that.

We've heard a lot about document scans, Your Honor. And I mentioned this during the

HEARING 180

cross-examination of Mr. Commisso. And as I said, we learned today -- and I just want to clarify what happened.

So you can see on this -- it's basically a screenshot where it says -- at the bottom, you can see -- the tabs aren't active because it's a screenshot, but it'll say user's identity, service account, security groups, group policies. So if this were the actual Excel document, I could scan through that. There would be 40 tabs. And this is at Uuu -- were the actual Excel document. So this is something that was turned over after trial.

We assumed that it came from
Attorney Commisso. Because based on what we had had or the information we had, he was -information was coming through him, document requests were sent to him based on the letters we talked about before. And so what happened is this network scan was produced after trial.
What was produced prior to trial was one of these tabs. So probably not an exact measurement, but about 140th of what we got after trial.

And so the question -- and I was asking

HEARING 181

Attorney Commisso about this, because he had testified, like, "As far as I know, nothing that came from United Way that was exculpatory wasn't turned over to the Defendant."

And I asked him about the network scan, and he's, like, "Well, I'm not really familiar with what's on there."

And so this is a quote from Meyer's testimony where -- I think this is the question: "When you got there," number five, "you were not able to find a password expiration policy?"

"Yeah, there wasn't an expiration policy and the complexity of the passwords were weak."

So from this network scan that we get posttrial, we find information about the passwords, and whether there's password --

So it says, "Password last set. Password expires." And that's under one of the tabs that was not turned over to us prior to trial.

Another example from the posttrial scanned -- another quote from Mr. Meyer, "Okay. And also when you got there," number five -- oh, actually, I did that one already. Oh. It's the same quote about the complexity of the

passwords.

So part of this scan under "password strength assessment" -- the red is added by us just to make it clear -- as part of the scan that was run, it says "strong security, strong security" -- I won't read it all the way down, but that would have been something that we could have impeached Meyer's statement about the passwords being weak. We could have impeached him with this network scan that was not turned over.

THE COURT: Is it not turned over? Is it reviewed by Meyer and/or Naviloff and not turned over? Or is it never reviewed? I can see an argument either way, but I'm trying to figure out which it is.

MS. BROWN: See, that's the thing, Your Honor. As I understood the Government's proffer and Commisso's testimony, that there was some exchange of -- so as I understood it, this 40-tab Excel network scan that was not produced until after trial was -- came directly from RSM. And I would invite the Government to correct me if I'm wrong, but that's how I understood their proffer earlier. And this

HEARING 183

came from RSM after your discovery order this summer, August-something. And this was produced.

I asked Attorney Commisso about it -- that I was assuming everything was getting funneled through him to do whatever data security investigation -- or data security analysis as to the privilege. As I understood his testimony, this didn't go through him. This came straight from RSM posttrial.

So that's -- if I, again, understood
Attorney Commisso's testimony, this must have
come directly from Mr. Meyer to Mr. Naviloff as
part of the RSM analysis.

THE COURT: So it was that stream unknown until today, in other words; right?

MS. BROWN: Exactly.

THE COURT: But it's your understanding that Naviloff saw this before trial, or didn't see it? Either way, you can criticize, but which is it?

MS. BROWN: Well, there's an email that we talked about earlier, and I can find that, where Meyer is sending -- it's either Meyer is sending it to Gilpin, or Gilpin's sending it to

HEARING 184

Meyer, but there's a back-and-forth on that email. And Commisso cc'd -- remember I asked Commisso about it?

Like, "Hey, this network scan was forwarded from between Gilpin and Meyer, and it says 'network scan' on there, and you're copied."

And he was like, "Well, I wasn't really paying attention to it. I was just copied on it. That was kind of between Gilpin and Meyer."

So there is evidence that they -- that

Meyer -- goes back to before. He had access to

it. He's forwarding it to RSM. So I think

that's enough to make a connection that this is

information he had that he thought was -
either Gilpin's asking him to consider or, the

way I understood the email is, he was asking

Gilpin to consider it. So if he's forwarding

it to Gilpin then --

THE COURT: Yeah, I get it. I get it. I understand. I'm asking -- maybe the prosecution knows.

Is this information that anybody at RSM actually reviewed?

In other words, would Attorney Brown or 1 2 Mr. Harrington's cross have been, "How can you 3 say it's weak passwords, having reviewed this?" Or is the cross, "You didn't even bother 4 to review this"? Which is it? Do we know if 5 Naviloff or someone on his staff actually saw 6 7 this, Mr. Hunter? 8 MR. HUNTER: (Inaudible). 9 THE COURT: Time out. Your audio is, 10 like, beyond bad. 11 MS. LE: I think he might be frozen, 12 Judge. 13 THE COURT: Yeah. He keeps freezing and 14 unfreezing. 15 MR. HUNTER: Is this better, Your Honor? 16 THE COURT: Yeah. 17 Much better. MS. LE: 18 You remember my question? THE COURT: 19 MR. HUNTER: Yes. Basically, did someone 20 from RSM see this document? The short answer 21 is yes, as I understand it. And then I can 22 explain my understanding of where this document 23 came from. 24 So, wait a minute. So RSM saw THE COURT: 25 this before trial; right?

MR. HUNTER: Yes.

THE COURT: But it wasn't produced pretrial?

MR. HUNTER: Correct. What happened, Your Honor, is the Government learned that there were two network scans, one done by John Meyer. And what we had understood before trial was RSM had a separate network scan that they had for their analysis.

We asked for both of those network scans before trial, and we thought that we had produced them. One is the 62-page PDF document, and the other is the one tab from this spreadsheet that Ms. Brown is referring to. And we asked for them from the respective parties and we thought that we had them.

THE COURT: I see.

MR. HUNTER: After trial -- well, through this litigation, we learned that there was this larger spreadsheet that had more tabs than just the one that we had. I requested it from RSM and produced it to defense counsel. And so that's the timeline of what happened here in regard to this network scan.

Just to be very frank and candid, if we

HEARING 187

had it before trial, we would have produced it. We wanted to produce the network scans that RSM had before trial.

THE COURT: All right. So you explained to me why you didn't have it, and I understand.

Do you concur with me? I view this as something that is colorably impeachment material -- to cross-examine Meyer and/or Naviloff.

Do you agree or disagree?

MR. HUNTER: Yes, Your Honor, I agree. I think there are reasons why that might weaken the impeachment. But, yes, if I were a defense attorney, I would want this to cross-examine both of those witness.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Go ahead, Ms. Brown.

MS. BROWN: And just to clarify that there's no doubt about this --

THE COURT: I'm not saying there's any doubt about this.

MS. BROWN: Well, I just want to clarify what this document is, Your Honor. On the left, we took a screenshot from an actual email from Ryan Gilpin.

HEARING 188

So Ryan Gilpin goes to the document on the right, takes this information, takes a screenshot, puts it in an email that he shares with the team, saying, "Hey, look at this." So there's no question that -- it's not even about had access to it.

It was, like, a "Hey, look at this. This is important" kind of email. So that there's just no question that RSM and Meyer had access to this. This is that same scan that was being shared.

So, finally, to the third part, which is the due process violation. I'm not going to spend a lot of time on that. We have outlined that fairly well in our motion.

THE COURT: I have to kind of apologize to you for this. Because it was -- failure to preserve evidence is obviously a very obvious due process violation. And for whatever reason -- and you briefed it, by the way -- for whatever reason, I was somehow stuck on, like, a civil discovery freeze situation, which is similar to this, because a request was made.

But, yeah, I guess what I was saying to you, though, last week was, "What's the legal

HEARING 189

basis for this?" And I was sort of getting all huffy about it. It's obviously got a legal basis. I'm not sure if you can make the case, but it's a clear body of law, and I get it.

MS. BROWN: But it actually is very similar to the idea of spoliation in civil cases, which is you -- you're the party bringing this case, and you were in a position unique to make sure something valuable didn't get destroyed.

So it's a simple argument, but, obviously, there's a constitutional due process dimension here. And that's what we're arguing. And that's why I asked some of the questions of Attorney Commisso. I mean, there's no question this investigation began in May. Now we're hearing it began before that.

But at least as to United Way, there's no question that computer data was key to this case -- that finding out what happened in this case was key. And the Government chose the path of letting Attorney Commisso, and then later RSM, decide what they get and what they don't get. As the Government, they could have asked for things to be preserved. They could

have asked for documents from their computers. And that's done all the time that -- think about child pornography cases, where they get subpoenas to go in and get things from a party.

So they didn't do that. They chose not to do that in this case. And that -- the case I was referring to is the Cooper case, that they can't just blindly allow a third party not to preserve evidence. And as I said, I think we've articulated that fairly well.

THE COURT: Wait a minute. We've gone 90 minutes, so I wanted to give the reporter a break.

MS. BROWN: Oh, sure.

THE COURT: But let me ask you one question before that.

Given the timing of how this all lined up -- your due process argument -- so what is the evidence that the Government either permitted or blindly allowed it? I'm not sure I've heard that.

MS. BROWN: Yeah. The FBI was involved in the case in the end of May.

Attorney Commisso said there was -- he didn't like the word "coordination." There was

HEARING 191

some communication between him, and the Government, and the FBI as to this June 12 -- I mean, June 12 is going to be the key date when this data would become important. So Mr. Alrai's not there anymore. And so they would want to, as close to that date as possible, figure out what's in the IT environment.

And so they -- Attorney Commisso talked about there being communications about the FBI knowing about that meeting, and even being outside to hand a subpoena to Mr. Commisso. The thing is, why would the FBI want to be there on the day that he's learning there's this investigation? Well, because he might go home and destroy something; right? They're being smart about this.

Like, if this guy just knows that he's been questioned about his role -- potential fraud or misconduct, as the FBI, they're like, "Okay. We want to make sure that he can't go mess with any evidence. We're going to give him a subpoena or a warrant right way, so that we can prevent that." And they didn't do that. They didn't trust Mr. Alrai, but they trusted

HEARING 192

United Way to preserve evidence that didn't get preserved.

So that's -- there's no email or document that said, "Boy, it would really be nice if you, like, didn't preserve this." Obviously, that's not what we're saying. We're saying it's neglect.

THE COURT: All right. Look, it's been a little over 90 minutes, so we'll take the afternoon break. I'm sure the United States will have a response to the argument you just made about preservation. And we will reconvene -- you can finish up your argument, Attorney Brown, at 3:10.

(Recess taken at 2:55 p.m., and the proceedings resumed at 3:11 p.m.)

THE COURT: Attorney Brown, you were on your due process spoliation argument.

MS. BROWN: Actually, I think I'm done with this slide.

The remaining, I think, four slides that I have, I've attempted to address some of the questions that the Court posed prior to the hearing. And they may have been answered, but I'll just go through them quickly.

HEARING 193

One is authority for the proposition that the Government must or should turn over itemized expert bills or expert's internal communications, documents, indicative of expert's deliberative process. And I talked about that a little bit earlier -- that if it's Brady, they've got to turn it over, regardless of whether it's work product. So we're not saying they have to turn it over in every case.

But there's also plenty of case law that talks about that these things are relevant. Your Honor has expressed this already about if -- in fact, almost same as what you said -- rejected documents could be more important to cross-examination than documents actually relied on. And there's support for that finding that the relevance of funds, documents considered and not used -- all of that is relevant. So that, I don't think, is a barrier to our Brady argument.

Another question the Court posed is the effect on the Defense of Attorney Commisso's involvement in the prosecution. We've argued that there's cases that say while ordinarily -- and we agree with this -- ordinarily, a

HEARING 194

third-party -- the Government's not responsible. I guess a better way to say it is, ordinarily, Brady does not apply to third parties, even if those third parties helped the prosecutor in the case. And the Government sets out all those cases. We agree with that.

But as the Blaszczak (phonetic) case and the other cases cited in our motion say, this is a case-by-case, factual analysis. I think it would be an understatement to say that this case is unique and unusual. Very rarely do you have a witness who's being paid by both the alleged victim and the Government in the same case. It's unusual in terms of the role that both the expert witness and the lawyer for the alleged victim played in discovery.

But it still comes down to Government conduct. And the Government conduct in this case is them turning over the reins to other parties, and not exercising their duty to review the evidence. And it's -- that email you brought up earlier --

When you combine it with Exhibit Ll, there's nothing there except the Government saying, "Hey, you guys work it out" -- two

HEARING 195

people who have an interest in the case. And the Government obviously has an interest in the case, but they also have an ethical obligation to do justice that Attorney Commisso didn't have in this case, and Mr. Naviloff certainly didn't have.

Commisso's role also is that he used the privilege as a sword and a shield. He said that he didn't withhold anything relevant to Naviloff's loss calculation, but we pointed out that there's hundreds of emails that he has marked as privileged involving Mr. Naviloff, and that he has redacted documents where there's obvious discussions of loss calculation involving Mr. Naviloff. So he has withheld documents.

Also, another analysis here is that there is evidence that Commisso and RSM were assisting the Government's investigation way before Mr. Alrai was even indicted. We've talked about the emails involving helping the Government establish venue, rebut expected arguments regarding market value, increasing loss amounts, finding assets for forfeiture and restitution, potentially shielding exculpatory

HEARING 196

evidence. And instead of exercising scrutiny towards Commisso's zealous efforts to obtain a conviction against Mr. Alrai, they either joined in his zealous efforts or took a hands-off attitude, I would add to that.

The role of IT expertise in development of Mr. Naviloff's expert opinion, and the evidence of who provided this -- I mean, it boils down to it -- and I know these questions are posed prior to the hearing, so you may have answer to all that. But it's certainly uncontested that Mr. Gilpin did most of the work. The Court has seen emails where he's doing findings and analysis. Those are the words of RSM -- not my words.

So this is certainly not just, like, "Hey, let's have a meeting on Tuesday" kind of emails. These are emails where there's analysis and findings shared, and analysis from another expert. And we talked about just a few minutes ago -- Gilpin was reviewing network scans and analyzing that, along with Meyer, to determine whether certain services were rendered in this case.

Diego Rosenfeld, the person Naviloff

HEARING 197

claimed -- so it's not just the billable hours from Rosenfeld. If you look at all these emails where they're discussing findings, he's not in most of them. There's a couple that he's in where he's cc'd, but most of them are from Mr. Gilpin, which would have provided great fodder for cross-examination and was prejudicial to the Defendant's case.

And the fourth question the Court had posed is the meaning of the reliance. I think I've probably addressed that. I just would note one other particular case, the McCambridge case, noting the failure to respond completely to a specific discovery request suggests to the Defendant that such evidence does not exist and can amount to a misleading representation. And, again, you don't have to find misconduct on the part of the Government for this.

And that was one of the -- in the Bundy case that we talked about, that was one of the issues that was discussed, is that there had been representations that -- to the Defendant that he had everything. Or he had tried to get specific things, and it had been represented to him that he had everything. And, so,

therefore, he may have abandoned lines of defense, lines of argument, or theories of the case. And that's our argument as well. So that is the end. I'm going to stop the share.

And I am done, Charli.

THE CLERK: Thank you very much.

THE COURT: Can you submit that slide

presentation, please?

MS. BROWN: Yes, I will do that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Somebody, I'm sure, is handling the argument for the prosecution, so please proceed.

MR. HUNTER: Yes, Your Honor. And I will try to be close to my computer, but please let me know, and if the court reporter could let me know, if you can't hear me.

THE COURT: Yep.

19

MR. HUNTER: So I'll just start -- defense counsel made several -- argued several times that she doesn't need to prove that the Government intentionally did anything. But just trying to remember, at its core, what is

CLOSING STATEMENT

21

22

23

24

25

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

HEARING 199

the Defendant's motion about? It is a motion to dismiss for prosecutorial misconduct.

And the first term has been very clear:

"The sanction for dismissing an indictment
after a Defendant's been convicted of an
offense is employed only in truly extreme cases
of egregious prosecutorial misconduct."

Similarly, the failure to preserve cases that the Defendant cites require showing Government bad faith. Egregious conduct is what we're talking about here. And the Defendant's failed to meet his burden that the Government's conduct here is so egregious, so truly extreme, as to require dismissal of the indictment. In essence, what the evidence here shows -- the Government took steps to try to identify and produce documents pursuant to Defense discovery requests.

Now, another argument that the Defendant made is that the Government essentially outsourced this or passed this off to RSM and United Way. But as was discussed in a lot of the pretrial litigation, the Government had to talk with RSM and United Way, because the Defendant was asking for documents that were

HEARING 200

not in the Government's possession or control under Rule 16, or as that's understood for Brady purposes. So the Government reached out to the parties that had the documents or might have the documents that the Defense was requesting.

And as the Court's noted, there was the added complexity, because the Government did retain RSM to perform its loss analysis, of making sure that when RSM was producing documents to the Government, that it was not producing something that United Way hadn't waived privilege on. For example, related to the data breach investigation.

And so the correspondence -- a lot of the correspondence that defense counsel cites, where the Government is forwarding discovery requests to defense counsel, are showing just that -- that the Defendant's asking for documents the Government doesn't have, and the Government is forwarding those requests to the parties that do.

One of the documents cited -- it's

Government Exhibit 21, but I think defense

counsel has it as a separate exhibit -- is an

HEARING 201

example of this, where Mr. Harrington had an October 11 letter requesting a number of things, including RSM's work papers. And Mr. Naviloff wrote a response responding to that about whether or not RSM had it, what they had, what they didn't have, what they produced, what they didn't produce. And the Government sent that response to defense counsel.

So, again, what the Defense is essentially trying to do is use the Government's and the victim's willingness to expedite things, to try to produce things without going through a formal Rule 17 process, against us. We reached out to the parties that had the documents, and then we produced them if we received them.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. HUNTER: And the question here is, is this -- so that goes to the prosecutorial misconduct argument -- is essentially, the Government didn't do anything to try to hide the ball here. We worked hard to try to find everything that Defendant was asking for, that -- everything that Mr. Naviloff considered and relied on. And we tried to find that and get it to the Defendant before trial.

HEARING 202

And so I think the Defendant fails to show egregious Government misconduct that warrants dismissal of the indictment. But the basis of the motion primarily is Brady. And so the question is, is any of this newly discovered evidence -- Brady based on newly discovered evidence?

So the question is, is any of this newly discovered evidence Brady? And for that, the Defendant needs to show that not only is it exculpatory because it's helpful for impeaching, but that it's material, in that there's a reasonable probability that the evidence would have changed the result. And I'm putting the First Circuit Joslin (phonetic) case, which we cite extensively in our briefing. And the Defendant needs to show that the Government suppressed it; that the Government had the material and didn't produce it. And the Defendant has to prove that he was prejudiced by not receiving this material.

So just beginning with the suppression point -- and, again, we've briefed it. But I think the case that the Defendant hasn't really contended with is the U.S. v. Joslin, which is

a First Circuit case coming out of this district that involved a cooperating corporation that was cooperating with the Government's investigation.

The AUSA made some form of public statement, according to the opinion, that the corporation was part of the Government's team. The First Circuit assumed for purposes of its analysis that the corporation wrote the Government's prosecution memo and did research to establish venue -- so far more than even was being alleged here with John Commisso.

And in that case, the First Circuit held that the knowledge of that cooperating corporation is not imputed to the Government for Brady purposes. Those documents that are in the possession of that cooperating corporation are not in the Government's possession and control for purposes of Brady.

And the Government cites a similar line of cases regarding experts. Where, again, it boils down to -- is the expert an arm of the prosecution? And defense counsel alluded to some of these cases. But, there again, it -- the question is, is the Government using the

HEARING 204

expert for their area of expertise to testify for their area of expertise? And here we asked Greg Naviloff to do these two accounting analyses. Or, is the Government using the expert, essentially, as an agent? Which, again, I briefed the issue. I won't repeat it. But only here -- the evidence is the Government used RSM as an accounting expert. That's what we put Greg Naviloff on the stand for. That's what we asked him to do. And that's what he testified to.

And, so, again, everything that RSM knows can't be imputed to the Government for Brady purposes either. So the Government cannot suppress what it doesn't have. And for that reason alone, the Defendant's argument fails as to there being a Brady violation.

Just a couple of points just to address what defense counsel brought up in her summation. She mentioned this new stream of Meyer -- documents from John Meyer. I just point the Government to ECF Number 50, page nine, footnote ten, which was a pleading the Government filed when we were talking about this exclusion of Greg Naviloff's testimony.

HEARING 205

And, basically, there -- what the footnote says is basically, as we were conferring with RSM about this motion, we learned that they had emails from John Meyer that bore on his analysis. So we asked them for them. And we determined some of them had already been produced, and we produced the ones we didn't have. So, again, the point here is, again, that the Government, when we learned or had reason to know if some form of document that was -- that Greg Naviloff might have viewed, or relied on, or considered, we sought it out and produced it.

So the next element of the Defendant's burden is showing that the newly discovered evidence is material. And here, the First Circuit -- there's a number of cases, again, cited in our brief -- that evidence is not material under a Brady if it's sort of cumulative and weak impeachment evidence on an issue tangential to the conviction.

So the question is -- okay. Some of these documents could have been used to impeach Greg Naviloff. And this network scan, which, again, I addressed in the proffer and can

HEARING 206

address further, could have been used to impeach. But is this the type of material impeachment evidence? And, again, sort of the standard for impeachment in the Brady context is there's a reasonable probability that the evidence would have changed the result.

So just regarding materiality, there are at least two reasons why this newly discovered evidence isn't material. And for the first reason, I really want to focus on the argument the Defendant put forth regarding materiality, which mostly came in through Jason Sgro and his testimony. And I think the basic takeaway from Jason Sgro's testimony is he disagrees with Greg Naviloff's invoice analysis, because the line items on the invoices, Mr. Sgro thinks, might contain additional work that Mr. Alrai and DigitalNet did that's not captured in the invoice.

And Mr. Sgro said "there's a lack of detail on these invoices. It would help to have more detail." And so that's why he wanted all of these emails from the IT help desk and Mr. Alrai's email. But what the Court hasn't seen, and what the Defendant hasn't presented,

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

HEARING 207

is any of this newly discovered evidence that undercuts Greg Naviloff's assumption, which is that he can compare those line items directly to the invoices from other vendors.

And Greg Naviloff explained what he did is -- these are opaque invoices. There's not a lot of detail. And so he goes to the contracts, where there's more detail, and tries to match up the language in the contracts to the language on the invoices, and compare that to other contracts. So -- but this lack of detail in DigitalNet invoices is not a new issue. It came out at trial.

And I direct the Court to Dom Pallaria's testimony. Dom Pallaria was in the accounting department. And he testified that through his years of having Alrai at United Way, he was always troubled by, and often complained about, the lack of detail in DigitalNet invoices. Because United Way couldn't tell what they were This idea that the invoices are paying for. somewhat opaque was part of the fraud, in other And Mr. Pallaria even confronted words. Mr. Alrai about this with a particularly egregious example -- about a \$200,000 invoice

with very little detail.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

And Mr. Alrai's response to
Mr. Pallaria -- and this is from Dom Pallaria's
trial testimony -- said, "Alrai said that
we" -- United Way -- "is saving a lot of money
by not requiring the vendor, DigitalNet, to
provide a lot of extra detail and extra work to
support their bill."

In other words, a key part of this fraud was ensuring that only Alrai had oversight into DigitalNet's bills, and only he could confirm that DigitalNet was providing what United Way was paying for. And this is why Greg Naviloff's second analysis is important -and Mr. Naviloff explained this at trial -- is that part of the reason for this second analysis was because there was a limitation to his contract and invoice-based analysis, because there could be other areas of value or expense to DigitalNet that aren't accounted for in those invoices. And so that's -- he explained the personal enrichment analysis tested the assumption that the other services and the invoices weren't performed at a loss or breakeven.

HEARING 209

And, again, I point the Court to
Jason Sgro's testimony during this hearing.
Where, again, he's saying there's some
additional engineering expense baked into these
line items on the invoices that Naviloff
analyzed. And that that additional cost would
be reflected in the salaries for engineers.

Well, that cost to DigitalNet would have come through in Greg Naviloff's personal enrichment analysis, where he looked at DigitalNet bank records, he looked at Alrai's personal bank records, and tried to find all the costs to DigitalNet to providing services to United Way. And at the end of the day, he didn't find additional salaries for engineers. He didn't find additional cost to United Way that might explain what else those line items in the invoices provide. He found that Imran Alrai pocketed at least \$3.7 million through the fraud.

And there's another reason why the separate analysis renders this evidence immaterial. Because taken most charitably, the Defendant's materiality argument, again, through Sgro, is that we can't rely on this

HEARING 210

invoice contract analysis because Ryan Gilpin didn't know enough about IT; therefore, you can't rely on any IT assumptions that underlay the comparison between the invoices and the contracts. And, so, therefore, you can't reasonably determine loss.

And Sgro admitted, "I'm not looking for perfection, but I'm looking for ways to reasonably determine loss." The way he would do it is by getting all of the emails from the help desk. And, again, the way Greg Naviloff did it was through this separate personal enrichment analysis. But the sentencing guidelines, and the application notice to Section 2(b)1.1, direct the Court what to do if it can't reasonably determine the loss due to fraud.

The guidelines direct "the Court shall use the Defendant's gain if loss can't reasonably be determined." So if, again, Jason Sgro and the Defendant are right that this evidence is so impeaching that the Court can't consider the line item analysis of the invoices, well, then the guidelines direct the Court to consider the Defendant's gain.

HEARING 211

THE COURT: The guidelines don't counsel me to do that during the guilt phase of the trial.

MR. HUNTER: That goes to -- again, I think it's black letter law that for wire fraud, the Government doesn't have to prove that the victim suffered any harm due to the fraud. And there's plenty of cases about that. We cite some in our brief. I can cite more.

THE COURT: I know, but a jury could also find harm to the victim as part of wire fraud. It doesn't mean the jury -- the trier of fact can't.

MR. HUNTER: Yes, Your Honor, but the point for materiality is, is it material to quilt or innocence?

THE COURT: I know. Look, I understand.

My question, though, is -- see, to me, loss calculation is very important. And it's inextricably connected to fraud because there's a causation element to fraud. I know it doesn't have to cause harm, but under a view of the evidence that it did cause harm -- and I think this case is a case that can be viewed that way. At least that's the way I viewed it

HEARING 212

when I sat there and listened to it; right? I saw defrauding conduct -- very specific defrauding conduct that harmed the victim, no question. Economically -- you hit him in the pocketbook.

And I don't know how one finds loss and quantifies loss without connecting it with defrauding conduct; okay? To me, that makes it material. I know it could be done without that connection, without that causation, but that isn't that case to this Court -- at least the way I viewed the evidences the first time I sat through it.

And, frankly, I think the way that

Mr. Naviloff did his business confirms that.

Because he didn't just do math. He relied on

IT expertise in areas involving things like

overbilling and duplicate billing. He actually

rolled up his sleeves and did the hard work and

connected to the harm. I'm not sure you can -
despite the fact that the law permits it,

Mr. Hunter, I'm not sure you can separate harm

to the victim from loss in a case like this,

despite the fact that the law permits it.

Do you follow what I'm asking you here?

MR. HUNTER: I think so, Your Honor. And I guess I'd say a couple of things.

I think with regard to the IT questions in Greg Naviloff's analysis, it's limited to these four areas: Was there high availability backup? Which, again, John Meyer testified to it and was cross-examined about.

And then the other question is, is this -- basically, is this a fair reading of the line item on the invoice?

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. HUNTER: And so my materiality point is everyone knew going into this that the invoices were unclear, that they didn't have a lot of detail. And that one of the difficulties is how do you line these things up? And, again, Mr. Naviloff's primary way of doing that was looking at the language in the contracts. And he did have folks at his firm who would help him with vocabulary, understanding what this thing in the contract means, and so on.

But the lack of detail in the contracts was in no quantity going into trial. And that's where I think this personal enrichment

HEARING 214

analysis goes to the materiality point the Court just raised. So I was raising it -- there are kind of two reasons. One was the loss is not required to prove fraud, which the Court is pushing back on.

But the first reason was the second loss analysis -- the personal enrichment analysis was a way to check the IT assumptions, that there's not something else in this line item that DigitalNet's doing that DigitalNet's paying for that's not accounted for. So, again, I go back to Jason Sgro's testimony.

He's saying, "Well, the reason why these line items are so high is because you need engineers to do this. There are going to be other employees doing things." And, again, the Court saw the trial testimony. We know who the engineers were at DigitalNet. It was Cal Lobby (phonetic). And there are no other salaries -- there's no other information in DigitalNet's financial records showing all this additional cost expense and value. So the second analysis basically allows -- Naviloff recognizing the limitations of this invoice analysis, because of the lack of clarity, to check if there's not

some unaccounted for bucket of value here.

And I guess the one other point I'll just raise regarding the Government's burden to prove loss is the Court also made a finding regarding United Way's intangible right to control its own assets. And I don't want to go down the whole rabbit hole of that, but we briefed it in our trial brief, and the Court has said it's done some additional research there.

And there, the Government alleged in the indictment that the fraud also defrauded United Way of their intangible right to control their own assets. And, again, the line of cases, I think, is fairly clear that what we're talking about is did the lie -- did the fraud that Imran perpetrated go to the core of the bargain? And here the Court presided over a ten-day bench trial, where it saw overwhelming evidence of Alrai's fraud and deceit, and the Court heard witness after witness -- the Defendant's old friends, employees for both victims, testified to this fraud.

The Defendant lying to United Way and Robert Allen Group about DigitalNet's

HEARING 216

qualifications, how long it's existed, how many employees it has, its clients. I mean, in fact, one of the documents, and I think one of the more incriminating documents, was a document where United Way is trying to do their due diligence on this contract and confirm that DigitalNet is qualified. They ask for a list of clients. And we have the Word document on Mr. Alrai's computer showing him editing and creating this document, and then sending it back to United Way to do their due diligence.

So the Defendant's fraud regarding what DigitalNet is, what experience it has, goes to the core of the bargain, and falls right directly within these line of cases saying that the property that United Way can be defrauded of is their intangible right to control their own assets. So that was, again, charged in the indictment.

And I was looking through the transcript. The Court made a finding that there are two harms to United Way. One was its -- the overbilling, et cetera. And one was this intangible right or its ability to control its own assets.

THE COURT: You're saying I made that finding on the record?

MR. HUNTER: In the same sentence where you reference the overbilling/duplicate billing, you also mentioned United Way's right and ability to control their own assets.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HUNTER: So, again, the evidence of the Defendant's fraud through all of these other witnesses, including his deceit, was extensive. A lot of the most damning evidence was found on the Defendant's home computer, which the Court, again, heard testimony about.

So then that comes down to prejudice. And so what prejudice has the Defendant shown here? And, again, in essence, the issue was, was the Defendant able to effectively cross-examine Greg Naviloff about the assumptions in the IT invoice and contract analysis?

And as the Court has observed during his hearing, asking defense counsel, "What else would you do if I reopened the trial and reheard evidence?" Defense counsel cross-examined Mr. Naviloff extensively with this new evidence.

HEARING 218

And so we're talking about cross-examining Greg Naviloff about these assumptions. That's what the Defendant could have done. The Defendant has not done that -- or could do that under Rule 33. But it's all not prejudicial for the same reason it's not material; and that is that even if these assumptions are impeached, first, the Government would submit they're not so impeached so as to completely undercut the validity of Mr. Naviloff's loss analysis. I think his analysis is still sound and still stands.

But, also, there's a second analysis that recognizes the limitations of the initial one and confirms it. So it's not prejudicial for those reasons, and because the Defendant has effectively had a second bite at the apple, so to speak. He's been able to cross-examine these witness. He's been able to cross-examine John Commisso.

And, again, the Defendant has not pointed to a single document that contradicts the assumption -- the IT assumptions that underlay Greg Naviloff's loss analysis. What it boiled down to, I think -- what I saw on the slides

HEARING 219

that defense counsel just presented -- was it was impeaching because they could cross-examine Greg Naviloff about the work that Ryan Gilpin did. But I haven't seen an argument that there's something materially wrong with those assumptions with the invoices. So for those reasons, the Government -- the Defendant failed to meet his burden under Brady.

And, again, I would just point the Court to Rule 33. At the end of the day, if there's anything more that defense counsel needs to do with this newly discovered evidence, the Court has the ability to reopen evidence, essentially. And in the context of Rule 33, that's after a judgment's been entered, which hasn't even happened here yet.

So the Court's the finder of fact.

Defendant counsel has all of these emails -
THE COURT: I was wondering about that. I read the rule myself.

Are you telling me I can't order this relief until I order a judgment first?

MR. HUNTER: I don't know the answer to that either. There's not a lot of cases on this. As a practice --

THE COURT: I doubt it. I doubt that I have to -- I did render guilty verdicts; right?

MR. HUNTER: Right. And as a matter of common sense and practicality, I agree.

What difference does it make, you know, other than add more paperwork for the clerk's office?

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HUNTER: So, again, the point here is the Defendant either already has or the Court could allow the Defendant to use this evidence to cross-examine whatever Government witnesses the Defendant wants to cross-examine. And so for that reason, there also cannot be prejudice sufficient to warrant a dismissal of the indictment.

THE COURT: I think I'm with you there -I really do. I understand the Defendant has
lodged some serious allegations here, and is
very adamant, but I just don't view dismissal
here as a remotely likely outcome in this case.
I don't view the prosecutor's conduct as
intentional or egregious in a way that would
necessitate or warrant dismissal.

Let me ask you a question then,

HEARING 221

Attorney Brown. Have you thought about -- if I decide to order this relief, right, would you want a jury trial? Or would you just want rehearing on certain evidence? What are you thinking?

MS. BROWN: We've actually discussed that. And, you know, not to get into a lot of detail, but I think that the Defendant would certainly have a right to reconsider waiving jury trial. And I think -- and I talked about that last week, and I can include that in the supplemental briefing. I found a brief from another attorney addressing this issue.

But that's one of the arguments that that other attorney made -- is that now that his client has more impeachment ammunition, maybe they don't -- the reasons a client might want to waive a jury trial. And then if they've got more ammunition in the case and maybe a different theory that goes after the Government's investigation, then maybe they may not want to waive.

So we may want a jury trial. That was my long answer, sorry, on that.

THE COURT: You're telling me that you

MS. BROWN: We want it on the table. And we will -- like I said, I didn't want to take all day in my closing arguments. I'll address that issue. I've got a couple of cases on it.

don't know yet, but you want it on the table?

And I'll put a paragraph or two in the supplemental pleading to the Court.

THE COURT: Yeah.

I'm not sure how much I -- last week when I was listening to your arguments, I thought I might need more briefing on the merits. I'm less sure about that now. I thought that I would -- if you wanted to do it, I would certainly accept it, but I'm not sure I'm going to order it anymore.

But I definitely am going to order -- ask you to brief for remedy.

MS. BROWN: Okay. Yeah, as long as I get -- because I didn't address that in my presentation. So if I can do that and submit the PowerPoint.

THE COURT: Mr. Hunter, I want to let you finish your argument, but I also don't want to cut you off.

MR. HUNTER: I think I'm just about done,

Your Honor.

Basically, the conclusion is the Defendant hasn't shown egregious prosecutorial misconduct, hasn't shown that the Government suppressed any evidence, and hasn't shown that the newly discovered evidence is material or has failed to show prejudice. So each of these is independently fatal to the motions.

THE COURT: Right.

No egregious conduct warranting dismissal. No suppression. No materiality. No prejudice. Right.

This is a question of fact: Who can speak to the retention -- the actual facts around the retention of Naviloff?

Is it you, Mr. Hunter? Or is there somebody else who made that happen?

MR. HUNTER: That would probably be Mr. Davis.

THE COURT: Do you remember, Mr. Davis, how it was that you decided to retain and then retained Mr. Naviloff -- how that came about?

MR. DAVIS: Judge, it always struck me that there were no conflicts -- at least relevant conflicts -- between United Way and

the Government's position on the question of calculating loss. And once I saw that United Way had retained Mr. Naviloff and the nature of the work he had done and was doing, and also his qualifications, it struck me at some point that it would be efficient to simply build on that work.

And so at some point, I began to go through the contract process. Of course, we have to go through a process -- we have a contracting officer.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DAVIS: We had to separately negotiate a raid, and so on. But I don't know if that gets to the Court's point, but it just -- I try to be efficient in spending the Government's money and in getting to what we need to get to. And I certainly think it was my idea, and not someone else's, to retain Naviloff as a Government expert.

THE COURT: I've been wondering about that with my law clerks throughout the litigation.

Because it seems like it makes sense. From an efficiency standpoint, it makes a lot of sense.

Looking back now, it probably feels like it

HEARING 225

made things complicated, but I can certainly see the impulse to do it at the time. So you've told me why, and it makes perfect sense to me.

Can you tell me how? In other words, I don't mean the contracting officer, but did you discuss it with representatives of the United Way, including, but not limited to, Mr. Commisso?

MR. DAVIS: So I'm sure I discussed it with Mr. Commisso, and I'm pretty sure I didn't discuss it with anyone else. That is, I regarded United Way as a represented victim, and I would not have called the CEO or did something separate. But I know that I talked with him about it. And, frankly, if he had objected, of course, we wouldn't have done that.

I think there wasn't an objection and, perhaps, he shared my general views. And the Court's comment about the complications that have ensued -- maybe I would have done it differently. I'm not going to deny that, Judge.

THE COURT: Oh. Okay. Thanks.

Mr. Hunter -- I'm going to pose the questions to Mr. Hunter, since he made the argument -- but, Mr. Hunter, any time you want to delegate one of your cocounsel to answer the question, feel free; okay?

MR. HUNTER: Okay.

THE COURT: What about the bill? What about the bill? Because, understand, from the Court's perspective, that's exculpatory. Just showing that -- and not necessarily in a way that goes to concealing, or inconsistency, or anything. But it's exculpatory in the sense that the expert isn't responsible for all the work. And that's just exculpatory in the normal courts.

What about your obligation to produce that? That one didn't get produced and it was in your possession -- unlike everything else that, I concur, it's not a suppression of evidence case at all.

But what about the bill? What about your obligation to produce that? I know the Rule 16 doesn't specify it, but it's very, very -- it's so customary that I was almost surprised it wasn't produced.

What do you say about that?

MR. HUNTER: So I'll say, at least -- I'll let Mr. Davis talk about the bill as it came in, just because I don't know about that.

But I will say this regarding the materiality exculpatory point: I would just direct the Court -- on paragraph ten of Mr. Naviloff's report, he discloses that he received assistance from professional staff at RSM working under his supervision, and it disclosed their billable rate.

So at least regarding the fact that people worked -- there were multiple people on the team, and how much RSM was getting paid -- when I was thinking of expert discovery, I was seeing that has been disclosed. I'll be honest -- I didn't think about the bill, personally.

THE COURT: Okay. That's a straight answer. So what were you just pointing me to?

MR. HUNTER: Greg Naviloff's expert report that was produced, obviously, pretrial. And paragraph ten talks a bit about that.

THE COURT: Could you read that to me? Please read slowly for the court reporter.

HEARING 228

MR. HUNTER: Will do, You Honor. And we filed this as an exhibit, docket No. 170-1.

On page seven of the PDF, paragraph ten of the report, he says, "I received assistance from professional staff at RSM working under my direct supervision. Throughout this report, I make reference to procedures performed.

There's procedures that in some instances may have been performed by staff under my supervision. RSM is being compensated at a blended rate of \$350 per hour and \$580 per hour for court testimony."

THE COURT: So at least -- at the very least, actually -- at least the fact of compensation and the rate of compensation were disclosed. Okay. That's not insignificant, actually. Because that's sort of basic cross; right? You go through that. I don't remember if Harrington did, but you go through that. All right. Well, that's something. Thank you.

But I remain, though -- even with that, I remain convinced that the varying amounts of time, both relative to Naviloff himself and to each other, have at least the potential for exculpatory use -- impeachment use. Given

HEARING 229

that -- I mean, you said you didn't think about it, so I guess it's -- there might not be much you can say about it.

But don't you recognize that that's impeachment material, and, therefore, exculpatory material that was in your possession?

MR. HUNTER: I mean, I guess so, broadly, yes. It's impeaching. And so the question is, is it materially impeaching? Does it go -- is there a reasonable probability that that would have changed the result of the trial is, I guess, the question?

THE COURT: In isolation, I guess not.

Fair. That's a straight answer. Okay. Let me see what else I want to -- I have a few questions for you -- that, again, you can either answer or bounce.

In your objection of the motion to dismiss, you make the point that Commisso and United Way had diverging interests from the Government. But Mr. Davis just made the point that they weren't in conflict. I think they were divergent, but not in conflict.

But the objection says, quote, "including

HEARING 230

privilege, protecting United Way's public image and donor relationships, and protecting United Way from tax, regulatory, and other fallout due to Alrai's actions," end quote. And those were examples of divergencies; right -- divergences, I quess, in the interest?

I guess I want to know your opinion -- and I want to say this with all due respect to Mr. Commisso for having handled it. Should there had been more distance between Mr. Commisso and this prosecution effort? Or are you comfortable with how this played out?

And if that's something you want to bounce, I don't mind, because I know you haven't probably seen a ton of this over the years. But this is -- it's not unusual, and I wouldn't call our case for the victim to have counsel. But this was a lot of involvement.

This is just my observation: This was a lot of involvement. And there clearly was economic motives here for the victim to increase the loss. That's just part of it. I mean, that stands to -- depending on how an insurance carrier views it, and maybe eventually at tribunal, that has impact on the

HEARING 231

amount of a recovery. And not in a criminal remedy -- in a different remedy. I view this as very close.

Do you have any thoughts about that?

MR. HUNTER: Yeah, I guess I'll say one
thing. And, again, I'll defer to John Davis
regarding comfort based on his probably having
much more experience on this than me.

Certainly, my thinking and approach at the time regarding Mr. Commisso's involvement was -- it partially flowed from the fact that we retained RSM, and RSM did work that -- like the data breach investigation that was still privileged. And, therefore, Mr. Commisso needed to remain involved to ensure that United Way's privilege was asserted.

And so I was not uncomfortable with it for that reason, but I'll defer to Mr. Davis.

THE COURT: Only if you have thoughts, Mr. Davis.

MR. DAVIS: I will just say, Judge, that part of my judgment in this case was informed by Mr. Commisso's obvious ability and his obvious strong moral compass and professionalism. And I'm not going to get into

HEARING 232

making tributes, but I would just say it was very, very reassuring in the difficult early days of this whole situation to find that the guy on the other end of the phone is this thorough and calm, levelheaded, and always, always truthful, as far as I could tell.

I never had a sense that the Government was getting played, that there was BS, that -any of that. And so I certainly agree that the Government relied to a great extent on
Mr. Commisso in this case. But I would just say part of that is never in the relationship -- and I would say that to this day -- did I see things that gave me pause about the accuracy, or about the credibility, or about the motives of what's going on at the other end.

And I would also say that -- is there bias? Is there a motive to maximize restitution? Of course. He's a victim. He's representing a victim. And I know it's a corporate victim and not a personal victim, but that's what we do as prosecutors, as the Court knows. We work with victims. And they have statutory rights. They have the right to

HEARING 233

confer. They have the right to respect of their dignity and privacy. They have a right to notifications of all kinds of things. They have the right to appear.

And there should be no surprise -- or at least there's no surprise on my part -- that Mr. Commisso, representing United Way, is seeking the best result for his client, which has been horribly violated here. And so the Court says it's unusual. I agree it's unusual. This is a greater extent of involvement with the Government than most cases.

But, again, as an officer of the court, I will just say nothing that Mr. Commisso ever did gave me pause about his credibility and his professionalism. And so when it came time to hiring an expert, I hired the same expert he did. And maybe that was a mistake, but it wasn't a bad faith mistake.

THE COURT: No.

MR. DAVIS: And I stand by the discovery we provided in this case, both before trial and after.

I guess the last thing I'll say is I wish
I had produced the bill. And I see the bill is

addressed to me. I'd assume I received it.

I've actually just looked in my inbox, and I
can't find where I got the email. But my guess
is, Your Honor -- I think the one bill is dated
October 19. I assume we would have gotten it
around early November. I am sure that I
forwarded it to contracting.

And I wish and I kind of assume I would have said, "We need to disclose that," and would have sent that to the paralegal, but I apparently didn't.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. DAVIS: And the only failure on that score by the prosecution team is mine. I would have been the only person, I think, to actually see the bill.

And I think that one bill before trial may have been the first bill -- I didn't think of it -- I certainly don't remember reading it. I probably wouldn't have even read it, other than to note the total. And I would certainly say that the significance that there were multiple parties working on the case under Naviloff would have entirely escaped me; that is, I would expect that RSM would have associates.

And RSM, of course, just in October had produced a huge report with a huge number of schedules. It was a big production job.

And so -- wouldn't have struck me as odd that Greg Naviloff, senior partner, is not the only person on this bill. I was in private practice. I assume --

THE COURT: Oh, yeah.

MR. DAVIS: And there are a whole lot of engagements that are like that. So I'm not going to beat myself up too much, because I don't think it would have struck me until now that we're in the questions about IT expertise, and who do you rely on, and was it Rosenfeld, and so on.

Anyway -- but the shortcoming there is I probably just sent that bill to contracting to pay, and completely missed its significance as something that should have been disclosed.

MS. BROWN: Your Honor, can I add something here?

THE COURT: Not yet. I promise I'll give you a chance, but I can't lose my train of thought. Let me just make a note, then you can say what you want to say, instead of losing my

train of thought that way.

MS. BROWN: Well, just briefly, I want to --

THE COURT: Hold on a second. Let me make a note. I want to not lose my train of thought. Sorry.

Go ahead, Attorney Brown.

MS. BROWN: I apologize for interrupting, but I didn't want you to consider what Attorney Davis just said.

He's not under oath. He's not a witness in this case. He just vouched for a witness. He went on about the moral compass of this witness. It's one thing to summarize or make a proffer to the Court about discovery and how he got it, but it's another thing for a non-witness lawyer in the case to vouch for the moral compass, and also to give factual testimony about the exhibits in this case and whether he remembers reading them or didn't read them. That -- we don't have a way to cross-examine on that.

And I'm not saying that, again, to say that he's lying about that. You said it yourself earlier, that we all have a way of

HEARING 237

remembering things in a way that supports our beliefs, and our biases, and our opinions.

I think there's actually a saying out there that "the faintest ink is better than the best memory." And that's because we all remember things in a way that support what we want to believe we did. I'm included. I'm not saying that he did that.

But I think that to have him vouch for the moral compass of the witness -- I think that's inappropriate. And I don't even know that the Court expected that answer -- for him to go on as long as that. But I would ask that, to the extent it's testimony, that it be stricken and not be part of the record or the Court consider it in making the fact findings in this case.

THE COURT: Sure. Okay. For what it's worth on both issues -- let me just take them one at a time.

Regarding vouching for Mr. Commisso -yeah, I don't know anything about
Mr. Commisso's moral compass. But I will say
that nothing I've heard in this proceeding
makes me question his ethics or his honesty.
And like I said, he conducted himself as I

HEARING 238

would expect counsel for a victim to do in terms of its propriety, in terms of its ethics, in terms of its lawfulness. Okay.

As to the exhibit, though, I mean, I did
-- I have been saying I didn't plan to put the
prosecutors under oath, and I was going to ask
them some questions. So I did plan to at least
rely on what Mr. Davis said about the bill.

And, so, I mean, if you want to cross-examine him about that, I'll put him under oath and have him repeat it. Because it matters to me. That matters. It's not -- you didn't call any of these people as witnesses, but there's more to the story here than Commisso's conduct.

When you're accusing prosecutors of intentionally suppressing evidence here -- which you've done, and as is your right to do -- it's not unusual to call the prosecutors as witnesses and ask them to account for it.

Now, I'm willing to accept their words about the facts the same way I'm willing to accept your words, but that doesn't mean you have to accept it, Ms. Brown.

So if you'd like me to do that, I will do

HEARING 239

that. But I did plan on relying on what Mr. Hunter said, and what Mr. Davis said about the bill. I'm talking about the bill -- not about their opinion about Mr. Commisso.

So if that's something you'd like to cross him on, or you want to test, I think we probably should go through the formality.

Because to me, it matters. And it matters only -- honestly, it only matters on the issue of intentional suppression and outrageous conduct. Based on what I've heard, I'm not prepared to go there, but you might not be willing to accept that. And I mean this -- I'm not trying to just talk you out of it. If you want to examine him on this, it's up to you.

MS. BROWN: Well, he was not noticed as a witness for this hearing, so I'm not prepared to. But more importantly, if he is going to be a witness and the Court's going to accept his representations, then I want to see the emails on this case.

That's the point I've made all along -they haven't produced any emails. If they were
instructing RSM to give all of their analysis,
or instructing them to give exculpatory Brady

HEARING 240

material, there's no evidence that they've done that. And if I were going to cross-examine him, which I'm not prepared to do because he's not noticed as a witness for this hearing -- if I were going to cross-examine him, I would want the Court to order production of any emails that he had regarding this -- regarding instructions to their expert and discussions with their expert.

Did they send an email saying, "Hey, we've represented in a hearing that we've given the Court everything you've reviewed and any analysis, any documents you've reviewed. Is that true?" Those are things I would cross-examine him on. And that's important.

So I don't think the Court can take out this part, of, "Oh, I don't even know that I paid attention to it" as not a big deal. I would cross-examine him about things that I don't have. Which -- and we haven't gone there yet, which is there are cases out there of getting emails from prosecutors, if there's an issue -- of whether those emails are relevant. And we haven't gone there, but if the prosecutor's going to testify and --

HEARING 241

THE COURT: Respectfully, it's your burden here.

I mean, you just said, "We haven't gone there yet." Okay. But one thing I don't want to do is decide this motion and then have you say you were somehow prejudiced, and your client's rights were violated, in the way I conducted this hearing. I mean, this has to end at some point.

MS. BROWN: Absolutely. If the Government had noticed Attorney Davis as a witness for this hearing, I would have asked for additional documents.

THE COURT: No, no, no. You should have noticed him for the hearing. It's your burden.

Don't you think that their conduct -you've alleged their conduct as misconduct.
You've alleged that they've intentionally
suppressed evidence. And it's fair enough, but
I don't think it's up to them to notice him.
They could, but I don't think it's sort of a
shortcoming on their part not having done it.

And I guess maybe I shouldn't have said
I'm willing to listen to them without swearing
them in. I try to treat officers of the court

HEARING 242

a little differently than I treat fact witnesses. Frankly, if anybody wanted Mr. Commisso to speak to me just as he had, I would have done it as long as everybody agreed. I really don't want to do yet a hearing about how we did this hearing, okay, after its all over.

I have a few more questions, but we might be having another day of hearing, because apparently, if I accept Mr. Davis' and Mr. Hunter's representations, that's going to be a problem. And that's fine. Let me see if I have more questions about the law I want to ask.

Well, I have to ask -- I don't know who I'm asking. This is just a legal question.

But, like, Mr. Hunter -- you said to the Court earlier that you had been instructing, I guess, Naviloff and Commisso that you wanted their analysis.

So I'm not sure who gets this question; okay. Because Mr. Davis just told me that he certainly was aware and would assume that Mr. Naviloff would be working with staff; right? He's working with staff that aren't

HEARING 243

accountants. He's working with staff that are IT professionals.

And you had a bill in your possession that showed their names, and how many of them there were, and even their relative amount of work.

I just can't imagine how one would not assume that their communications internally included analysis.

What did it include then? I assume when these gentlemen on the bill communicated -- we've seen a little bit of it -- with Mr. Naviloff, they explain themselves about the conclusions they reach and how they reach them.

How is that analysis not relied upon by Naviloff? Again, I've told you this so many times -- that's where I'm struggling with this. I'm not seeing intentional conduct to bury exculpatory evidence. I'm just seeing, perhaps, a failure to appreciate an obligation that goes beyond Rule 16 and beyond any order I issued.

It just goes to -- if you understood -- if you assume, whether you assumed that he'd be working with staff or you had a bill that showed you he'd be working with staff and named

them, I can't imagine how that doesn't trigger in your mind either an obligation to produce that stuff or at least examine it for exculpatory evidence that must be produced.

So what's the answer to that question,
Mr. Hunter? Because you've told me you talked
about analysis to them. That was you today.
Ms. Brown doesn't want me to rely on it? Well,
I'm relying on it; okay. Mr. Davis has
explained to me that he assumed it. He had a
bill.

How is that not analysis? How did you not -- if you don't think you had the obligation to produce it -- and maybe you thought that because Harrington wasn't demanding it with a line item. I get that much. But what about the obligation to at least examine it to see if there was something there that was exculpatory that should be produced? We can't just take expert witnesses as deciding what to produce for themselves.

What's the answer?

MR. HUNTER: And so, I'm sorry, Your Honor. You cut out a little bit.

But -- so I certainly -- I don't recall

the exact conversation with Greg Naviloff, but I know one of the things that Mr. Harrington requested was all the reports prepared by people at RSM, including employees working under Greg Naviloff. And that was sometime -- and, again, I don't have a precise recollection of that conversation.

THE COURT: Time out.

We've just established -- you just spent a long time establishing that your memory of what happened is not really fair material for this hearing. I'm not asking you about that.

I'm telling you what I'm assuming, since you've already told me that you were looking for analysis. And since I know now that you had this bill with all their names on it, and Mr. Davis, as the lead prosecutor, also would just assume, even had he not received a bill, that he was communicating with staff -- that staff was not accountants. It was people outside of Naviloff's expertise.

So if you don't -- I want to know, one, why you don't think you have the obligation to produce that analysis. And I view it as analysis. Or, B, why you didn't have the

HEARING 246

minimal obligation to review it for exculpatory evidence? Because the discussion regarding the low-level associates certainly would have been producible. And that was brought to light during trial when Naviloff downplayed it, because he did -- or at least a trier of fact could assume that he did.

So didn't you have an obligation to do that, as an attorney who has a constitutional obligation to produce exculpatory evidence?

MR. HUNTER: Judge, just so I understand the first question.

Are you asking -- do we have a constitutional obligation to collect RSM's internal emails to review them for exculpatory evidence?

THE COURT: Well, you can reject my definitions, but I'm saying, do you have an obligation to produce analysis since you told me you directed them to produce their analysis? And I think communications with underlings outside of one's area of expertise to form one's opinions are analysis.

And I think -- and so my question is, didn't you have an obligation to either produce

HEARING 247

that or at least examine it for exculpatory evidence?

MR. HUNTER: And I guess I would say if we knew that there was some bucket of exculpatory evidence or potentially exculpatory evidence.

But I haven't -- I think that there may well be an obligation to review that for Brady. But I think here, there's no evidence -- and I certainly don't have a memory of any conversation about -- well, I don't want to get into that -- but of some knowledge of undisclosed reports or analysis of RSM underlings.

And so is there an obligation for the Government to collect every bit of internal communication or work product of one of their experts? I haven't been able to find a case or any legal authority for the Government having such an obligation under the rules of evidence or Brady.

THE COURT: Well, there's a lot of -- this line of cases -- a criminal case, Bullcoming and the First Circuit case. Let me see.

The First Circuit case, Ramos-Gonzalez, 664-F-31 -- it's not a discovery case. It's

HEARING 248

not a Brady case. But it's a 6th Amendment confrontation case. And it at least suggests that underlings that the lead testifying expert relied on in forming his opinion -- that a defendant has a right to actually confront them and cross-examine them.

I know it doesn't translate perfectly to this, and it doesn't. But that's what I'm asking you. I mean, look, I know there's not a case that says you have to look at every internal document. I know. That's why I've repeated a hundred times in this hearing -- this wasn't a discovery rule or order violation.

But you've told me today that you were looking for analysis; okay -- analysis relied upon by the expert. And I'm asking you, right, given that Mr. Davis just told me -- well, I knew he already had the bill. You had the bill. It was in your possession. The team had the bill. And that the lead prosecutor assumed that he would communicate with his staff. And these were staff that were not accountants. They were IT experts.

So I'm asking you -- yeah. If you think

HEARING 249

the answer is no, you can tell me, or yes and why. But why was there no obligation to either produce it as analysis or review it for potential exculpatory evidence? When people communicate with each other, that's bread-and-butter evidence. There's statements of witnesses. That's what witnesses are cross-examined with. That's how this works. We all know how it works in court.

Wasn't there an obligation to either produce it or review it for exculpatory evidence?

MR. HUNTER: I don't think so, Your Honor, unless we had some reason to believe that that evidence existed. I think we had a duty to --we inquired to get evidence, especially in response to Defense's discovery request, but I don't think we had -- I don't think the Government had an affirmative obligation to look at all of the internal communications of RSM and review all of them. I think -- I just don't think we did.

THE COURT: Okay.

Let me ask you this, Ms. Brown. Rosenfeld billed one hour. But a review of the records

looks like he worked more than one hour on this.

Would you concede it looks more like he worked about five hours?

MS. BROWN: There were times -- he worked more than one hour. I would agree with that. And I think part of it might have been during the RSM kind of tenure of -- during RSM's tenure of working with United Way.

THE COURT: Looks like Exhibit 30 on your motion, Attorney Brown. It's 164-30: Another four hours. I'm not saying it's still not fodder for cross. It is fodder for cross, but it's not one hour. That's all I'm asking. All right.

So, Mr. Hunter, this kind of goes back to what we were just talking about. I view the Government as having backed away from one of its positions in the brief, but I don't want to put words in your mouth. So if you don't agree with this, I want you to tell me; okay?

In the objection -- your objection to the motion to dismiss, you said the itemized bills don't have impeachment value. Now, I think they do have impeachment value; okay? They

HEARING 251

list out the time billed by each member of the forensic team, right, and the technology specialist separately.

I think they're relevant to the Defense because they're an impeachment of Naviloff, both in general -- the amount of work Naviloff did, the amount of work others did -- and then especially with respect to the fact that Naviloff, at trial, kind of emphasized one who did very little and didn't mention the others. And there was material discussing the person who did the most as being very junior; right?

Do you agree with me that there's some impeachment value there?

MR. HUNTER: So, I think, so, Your Honor, which is what I said earlier in the hearing.

THE COURT: I thought you did. Okay.

MR. HUNTER: And I think -- to what I said -- and I think -- not to completely back away from the argument in the brief, but I think it goes to the materiality prong, given what was disclosed in the expert report, which was that he was consulting with other people at his firm, including other IT professionals at his firm, and the billable right.

But I agree, Your Honor, that it is impeachable.

THE COURT: Last question from me, then.
On the Rule 17 issue, right -- the "they
should have subpoenaed" issue -- which, by the
way, I think is a fair argument. There could
have been subpoenas issued in this case that
weren't -- to the victim. All right? I think
Mr. Commisso would have been in there objecting
and moving to quash, I understand, but I think
we would have figured something out.

But Attorney Brown is saying that they relied on these representations that it had been given, quote, "every document Mr. Naviloff considered when he developed his opinion," and that, quote, "there were no notes or memos memorializing RSM's interviews with United Way personnel."

I don't know if you wrote that in the pleading, but if you did, what was the basis for that assertion? Because it doesn't appear that would have been true. What was the basis for that assertion at the time? What were you relying on?

MR. HUNTER: So starting with the notes of

interviews -- we were relying on Mr. Naviloff and RSM. And I think a similar representation is in Exhibit 21, because I think
Mr. Harrington asked about it. And this is the email from Greg Naviloff to us responding to that. And, actually, that's true of both parts of the Court's question.

THE COURT: Okay. Every document and then every interview.

Now, you'd agree with me, though, that the Defense was entitled to rely on those assertions in determining whether it should issue subpoenas; right? Or no?

MR. HUNTER: I mean, I think so. And part of my -- and this, I think, goes to part of the pretrial litigation we had over the -- even the litigation database; right? There was always a set of documents that the Defense requested at one point that he didn't get.

And those are the documents -- and I think this is -- again, it goes to the materiality point. It's those documents that Mr. Sgro says would be most material; right -- all of these documents from -- the emails to the IT help desk, and so on.

THE COURT: Okay.

I know last week I said that I was going to ask for more legal briefing. I don't think I need to. I really do think you've briefed it. If you want it, I'm not going to deny it, but I'm not going to require it.

I'm going to look at -- Attorney Le gave me a lot of help today when she was referring me to the various documents and exhibits that kind of make up the timeline. I'm going to put them together, assess it. If I'm still confused, I'm going to ask you to jointly submit one as one filing, to the extent you can agree on one. But I'll issue an order if I'm going to have you do that. I'll just issue it and give you a deadline.

MS. LE: Judge, can I interject right there?

I think that that -- the last Excel spreadsheet with the 40 tabs that Ms. Brown has discussed -- we didn't know about that when we filed our initial response. So Mr. Hunter, in his surreply, makes a notation about that situation; but, otherwise, it should be listed out relatively well -- when our team received

1	things, and what the Bates numbers were, and
2	what those items are.
3	THE COURT: Surreply was probably
4	170-something?
5	MR. HUNTER: 176.
6	MS. BROWN: I have 174.
7	THE COURT: 174, Donna?
8	MS. BROWN: Yeah.
9	MS. LE: That would have been your
10	MS. BROWN: Is that ours?
11	MR. HUNTER: Yeah. 176 is
12	MS. BROWN: Thank you.
13	MR. HUNTER: and it's footnote six
14	where I basically mention that.
15	THE COURT: And that's that last
16	spreadsheet?
17	MR. HUNTER: Yes.
18	And one thing I will say for the record on
19	this. In our discovery correspondence with
20	Mr. Harrington, when this issue of network
21	scans came up, the Government believed it had
22	both network scans.
23	And when Tim is asking about it, we told
24	him, "Here's the Bates number for the two
25	network scans." So, again, the Government

agrees -- or concedes; however you want to put it -- that this document -- we asked for it. We should have gotten it. And it should have been produced.

THE COURT: Okay.

Attorney Brown, I'm going to put the ball in your court on one issue. Well, no, I'm not going to ask for more briefing, except on one issue, which is remedy. I'm going to give you one week, Attorney Brown.

Is that enough time?

MS. BROWN: Yeah. We've actually done some research on this already, and so we can address that.

THE COURT: Well, let me just put this down. Today's the 7th; okay? By the 14th, you can elect a remedy, if I grant the relief.

It's a tough one. Very tough question.

But if I grant the relief, what are you going to want to do? Anything you want to do, you should tell me the authority for it; okay? Because I know you've told me last time we met that you don't think that the Rule 33 remedy is constitutionally permissible. I get it, and I don't want to jerk you around, Attorney Brown.

HEARING 257

I think I'd need a federal court telling me that the rules of criminal procedure are unconstitutional on that issue for me to -- I'm not suggesting it's the only thing I'm thinking about. But, like, to be persuaded -- I think it's taking, like you suggested -- but I'll keep an open mind.

MS. BROWN: Well, I think the Government and I can both agree the law is very sparse on this issue.

THE COURT: So, now, I'll give you a chance to respond to that. The Government -you can respond to that. That's a Monday. So
I'll give you until Friday to respond to that
remedy. If you want longer, just make a filing
if you need more time. But I'll say, for the
Government, the 18th on remedy.

Look, I don't think I'm inclined to dismiss this case; okay. I just haven't heard about egregious conduct by the prosecutors in this case, remotely, that would justify it. This strikes me as people doing their jobs in good faith in an unusual situation, where not only was the victim's counsel heavily involved, but also a choice was made, for what appeared

HEARING 258

to be legitimate reasons, to retain a professional that had also been retained by the victim. And it led to some irregularities that I think might require some relief from the Court, okay, but not egregious conduct.

Now, when I said I was going to put the ball in your court, Ms. Brown -- I'm just going to disclose to you, okay, leaving aside what Mr. Davis said about his opinion about Mr. Commisso, which he's entitled to, and I don't have any reason to disbelieve it -- but I'm not focused on that at all.

But in terms of what Mr. Hunter and Mr. Davis told me about what they remember, I'm prepared to rely on it as officers of the court explaining it to me. I realize that memories can be tested, though. So if you want, I don't see any shortcoming with them not -- noticing them up as witness.

If you want to examine them, file a request; okay? But the ball's in your court.

MS. LE: Your Honor, obviously, if that were to happen, there's going to be some complications where management will have to be involved; and, potentially, AUSAs would be

HEARING 259

recused from this matter moving forward once they've testified as a witness. So that is something we'll have to bring to the attention of management, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You do that. That said, I recognize what you're saying, and I'm not saying I'm granting it. I'm saying I want to know if there's going to be a request for it; okay? Like I said, I don't want to leave that unaddressed so it becomes an issue about the way this hearing was conducted. I don't want that loose end untied -- that's my point. Okay.

I am prepared to take the representations of all the attorneys in this case -- counsel of record -- including Ms. Brown, including you -- I'm prepared to rely on that. I don't need people to be under oath; okay? I also don't think, though, for what it's worth, it's particularly unusual in a case involving an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct that a prosecutor has to go under oath. It's unfortunate, but it's not remotely unprecedented. But if Ms. Brown wants that, she'll tell me.

And your deadline to do that is the same deadline as your remedy file; okay, Ms. Brown?

MS. BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Good.

MS. BROWN: Can I just ask one quick question, Your Honor?

You said before that you're not going to require the parties to file supplemental pleadings. And there are a couple of issues that, how do I say -- that came to light during the hearing that I hadn't really dealt with in the pleadings, because -- especially as to the scans and things like that, we really didn't learn until this hearing how it came about and who had what.

I may want to file a brief pleading to address that. I promise I won't do anything repetitive, or issues we've already addressed here.

But if I can do that, would it be the same deadline?

THE COURT: Yeah, same deadline. And it's like I said before -- I'm not requiring any, but if anybody wanted to do it, I'm not going to stop you. And when I get it, I'll give the

HEARING 261

prosecution a chance to respond, if they want it.

MS. LE: Since we're all here, can I make a suggestion about scheduling moving forward? Depending -- based on what the Judge has just indicated, there's unlikely to be a wholesale dismissal. So it might be a situation where the Court -- if you are prepared to schedule a forfeiture hearing or one of the other hearings, or address any of the other pending motions, since we're all here and have our calendars, we can do that now.

THE COURT: No. I appreciate the offer, but, no. I want to get this resolved. Because it's not that I don't want to get in mind the calendar, but if we're just going to move them again, all it means is work for Charli. And I'm just not going to create that for no reason. I mean, I don't know how you do a forfeiture of sentencing without resolving this. It's part and parcel. It's all together.

The other motions -- like I know there's a couple of different motions to compel and for contempt out there. They're just not front and

center for the Court in terms of -- they're just not front and center for the Court in terms of getting this issue resolved.

There is one issue -- there's a motion. I know one of my law clerks would fill me in if I asked them, but there is a motion to compel involving subpoenas out there.

What is that about?

MS. BROWN: There's two motions -- a motion for a Rule 17 subpoena. And the Government's objected, and Attorney Commisso has filed an objection.

And there's a motion to compel which I think might also be similar to a motion to reconsider one of the earlier discovery requests that was denied, basically saying, based on evidence that we've received in the last three, four months, we're making a request to compel certain documents. So there's two discovery-related requests out there.

THE COURT: But those are for sentencing and forfeiture; right? Not for this.

MS. BROWN: That's correct.

THE COURT: And not for the 33 of the 29.

It's for sentencing and forfeiture; right?

That is correct. 1 MS. BROWN: 2 THE COURT: Okay. 3 Ms. Le, it's not that I don't appreciate 4 the suggestion to get stuff on the calendar. 5 But I just don't want to put it on and take it off again, as I've done way too many times in 6 this case. 7 8 Anything else for the Court? All right 9 then. We are adjourned. I'll await your 10 filing on or before the 14th, Ms. Brown. 11 (The hearing was adjourned at 4:42 p.m.) 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

2	I, Molly K. Belshaw, a Licensed Shorthand
	Reporter for the State of New Hampshire, and
3	Registered Professional Reporter, do hereby certify
	that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcript
1	of my stenographic notes of the proceeding taken at
	the place and on the date hereinbefore set forth to

CERTIFICATE

the best of my skill and ability under the conditions present at the time. Read and sign was

6 not requested.

I further certify that I am neither attorney or counsel for, nor related to or employed by any of the parties to the action in which this proceeding was taken, and further, that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed in this case, nor am I financially interested in this action.

The foregoing certification of this transcript does not apply to any reproduction of the same by any means unless under the direct control and/or direction of the certifying reporter.

MOLLY RESOLUTION OF NEW HAMPING

Molly K. Belshaw RPR, LCR No. 00162